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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

LEADER PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL CRISIS:
THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP

by

CHANCHAL BHATTACHARYA ©

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN
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MASTER OF ARTS

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R. R. Gadacz

(Supervisor)

Baha Abu Laban

Date 1 September 1989

This thesis is dedicated to the two individuals who created for me,

through their own enormous personal sacrifices,

all the opportunities I now possess,

my parents,

Dr. Nirmal Chandra Bhattacharya

and Mrs. Ila Bhattacharya.

ABSTRACT

This thesis explains why charismatic leadership occurs in terms of leader personality, follower personality, and conditions of social crisis. Applying psychoanalytic and social learning theories, it identifies the psychological factors differentiating leader and follower personalities. It examines how different leader personality types arise as a consequence of childhood and adolescent experiences resulting in broad consistent motivational patterns predisposing them to recurrent and possibly psychopathological forms of political behavior. The psychodynamic basis for charismatic leader-follower bonds are explored using object relations theory. Social change theories are integrated with Weber's theory of charisma to account for the role of leaders during social crises. Case studies of Adolf Hitler and V. I. Lenin are presented to illustrate the dynamic relationship between leaders and crises.

Authors whose works are central to this thesis include James David Barber, David Rothberg, David C. McClelland, Harold D. Lasswell, Volkan Vamik, Martin E. P. Seligman, Theda Skocpol, Chalmers Johnson, Charles Tilly, Ted Robert Gurr, Arthur Schweitzer, and Max Weber.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about leadership. It sets out to explain why certain leaders, but not others, seem able to dramatically transform or reorganize broad aspects of social and political life in societies experiencing severe crisis. This thesis explains how the personality of a leader can make such a significant difference in the outcome of these broad social or political events.

Of course, this question has been at the centre of a continuing dispute for at least a century and a half. On one side, the social determinists argue that individuals have little or no impact upon the course of events. They see events as the products of broad social forces which impose a predeterminate pattern upon the choices available to individuals, be they princes or peasants. In effect, none possess "real" options. The alternative view, that "great men" make history, has found a considerable number of journalistic supporters, most notably Thomas Carlyle,[1] but few academic ones. Part of the reason for this scholarly one-sidedness has been the impact of positivism upon philosophy and the social sciences over the past century. Though positivism does not require human behavior to be predetermined, theories constructed within its framework can and often are interpreted this way. The behavioral approach has strongly supported such arguments. But as William James and Sidney Hook[2] have shown, this determinism ultimately rests upon a metaphysical presumption that begins by seeing the world as strictly deterministic. But it is this that is in doubt. The influence individuals have upon events is an empirical question that can only be settled by actually examining the historical situation.

The kind of situation this thesis is interested in is that of societal crisis. On the whole, the literature supports the view that under routine conditions personality plays a much less significant role than other factors such as roles, situational constraints and the like. But a crisis is a situation where these constraints are so problematic that continued adherence has become dysfunctional. This necessitates change, sometimes of a radical or revolutionary nature. Such outcomes are neither a consequence of purely voluntaristic free will nor of strictly deterministic social forces.

What human beings want as individuals and as social collectivities plays some role in determining what happens even when events do not transpire as desired. Crises are conditions under which these aspirations possess tremendous influence simply because of the palpable breakdown of the *status quo ante*.

In order to be expressed, these wants and desires must be formulated and articulated by individuals and groups of individuals, the latter often occuring as movements. All movements, including those which claim to be strictly egalitarian and consensual, have leaders. Sometimes a leader achieves such preponderant influence that he or she plays a decisive role in guiding or directing the behavior of the other members participating in the movement. The leader's persuasive influence may be so critical that the movement forms around her or him. Alternatively, these wants and desires may be formed and articulated by the existing authoritative, elite controlled institutional structures. Often by election or intrigue, one of these institutional leaders sometimes achieves such a concentration of influence within the decision-making structures that he or she plays a central role in guiding the use of institutional power and resources. Though power and influence will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, here it suffices to note that *influence and power* constitute the elemental "stuff" of leadership. In order to be leaders, individuals must possess *some appreciable amount of persuasive influence and usually seek at least some capacity for coercive powers*.

The question "why would someone seek influence and power?" is almost synonymous with "why would someone seek to be a leader?" Either question places theories about personality and psychological motivations at the centre of the explanatory stage. Another way of stating the above questions is to ask: "What factors generate personality-types which exhibit sustained motivation to acquire and use social power and influence?" At least a partial or provisional answer to this question is necessary in order to address the one about the relationship between leader personality type and response to crises. In turn, this suggests another: are there specific personality types whose responses to crises facilitate the formation of leader-follower relations which are the kind typically associated with charismatic leadership? This thesis explores these questions and explains why certain specific types *of leader* personalities facilitate the formation of charismatic appeal to followers. It offers an explanation for charismatic leadership as a partial function of leader personality and the crisis situation.

The thesis consists of seven chapters not including the Introduction and the Conclusion. The rest of this Introduction clarifies some key terms, provides an overview of the chapters and summarizes the main argument of the thesis. Chapter One reviews the literature pertaining to the study of leadership, concentrating on the dominant themes and perspectives in the field. Chapter Two discusses the psychological theories which can be used to explain leader and follower behavior. Chapter Three explores motivational patterns underlying leader behavior, while Chapter Four relates the resulting types to specific leaders, showing the relationship between psychodynamic structures and personality types. Chapter Five investigates the psychological bases of charismatic appeal, while Chapter Six reviews the main explanations for the origins and nature of social crises. Chapter Seven presents two case studies showing the interrelationship between leaders and crises. Finally, the conclusion explains why charismatic leadership, though unequivocally necessary in crises, is still at best a mixed blessing.

As Barbara Kellerman notes, there are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are studies.[3] She defines leadership as "...the process by which one individual consistently exerts more impact than others on the nature and direction of group activity."[4] Political leadership is this activity within the processes of government. According to James MacGregor Burns, "Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers."[5] James Downton Jr. states:

> ...leadership can be broadly defined as the coordinating structure of social systems. Through goal-setting and attainment, leadership coordinates the activities of other structures in order to increase the capabilities of the system. By increasing capabilities, leadership contributes in a positive way to the service capacity of the system, which enhances its ability to persist.[6]

Downton's idea of leadership is synonomous with that of a political system.

Each of these definitions captures something of the meaning of leadership. Kellerman focuses upon the role of individuals in influencing group actions. She looks at leadership as leader behavior in its most essential form. Burns' definition derives from the same presumption but expands and specifies the nature as well as object of such influence. Downton concentrates upon the roles such leader behavior fulfill and situates them within the context of group-oriented leadership functions. He connects individual behavior within the context of a group to the operational needs and aspirations of the group. Downton's functional definition of leadership gives an understanding of the "why" of leadership from the perspective of the group while Burns approaches the same question from the level of intra-group inter-personal relations. Both viewpoints are essential to comprehending leadership as a social phenomenon. For the purposes of this thesis, leadership is defined as the acquisition and retention of authority, based on follower acceptance, by groups and individuals through the use of persuasive influence and coercive authority to establish, alter or fulfill shared group norms and goals. This definition focuses on the means and ends of leadership as a process based on the use of power to achieve particular ends.

In everyday English, power is often objectified as a thing.[7] This view of power as a commodity is widespread and pervades both ordinary and political language. This has two consequences. First, it obscures the fact that power is a relationship. Second, it leads to the confusion of power with power resources. Consequently, what is fundamentally a psychological relationship between individuals or groups is simultaneously reified and confused with the factors of exchange or capabilities upon which the relationship is based. What is lost is the sense that power, broadly speaking is the ability of one to alter the likelihood of another behaving in a particular fashion by changing either (1)the material conditions of the latter's life experience, or (2) how he or she perceives and interprets the nature of and relationship between various life conditions and her or his relative preferences among them. The former defines the narrow meaning of power as constraint and facilitation while the latter defines influence as deriving from persuasive communication.

Unlike ordinary usage, virtually all scholars agree that power is best understood as a relationship, though they differ on a number of points.[8] Some see power as a social force where one actor causes another to behave in a particular fashion.[9] This narrow form of power is compulsive. Power-wielding of this sort is threatening, coercive, and above all constraining. A further developed conception sees power as asymmetric social exchange. This perspective has captured the attention of a significant number of researchers because it simultaneously highlights the relational nature of power through the idea of recurring exchanges and the role of power resources.[10] It also emphasizes the view of power as constraint. But the same conception of power as asymmetric interdependency can also see the relationship as facilitative. Providing certain kinds of resrouces can reduce the long-term asymmetry of social exchange. Such investments result in empowering and facilitative power relationships. Two factors distinguish constraining exchange relationships from facilitative ones. First and foremost is the nature of the resources and long-term consequences of their exchange. There is a fundamental difference between selling crack cocaine for cash and exchanging productive assets for promissory notes. The second factor is the intentions of the dominant party in the relationship. The basic motivations of a long-term investor and a drug dealer are fundamentally different even though both are driven by acquisitiveness. What distinguishes the two is the degree to which their interests and those of their clients are integrated, complementary, non-substitutable and interdependent over the long-term. This is the rational, self-interested basis for facilitative power relationships. The view of power as deriving from asymmetric social exchange relationships comprehends both constraint and facilitation.

Nonetheless, this perspective has certain significant problems. The exchange theory of power fails to account for obedience to authority from belief and habit. It also fails to explain why certain individuals voluntarily accede to the personal authority or preferences of another when the "exchange" consists of being the object of the other's psychodynamic projections. These weaknesses are neither fatal nor irremediable. The problem of habit can be resolved by altering the basis for exchange to one of expectations about rather than actual outcomes from transactions.

This allows the exchange theory of power to be grounded in social learning theory and cognitive psychology.[11] The problem of assimilating psychodynamic connection is somewhat harder because nothing is actually exchanged. Rather, one serves as the object upon which the other projects certain qualities, images, and feelings. The object then comes to "possess" these projections, which provides her or him with control over the other. Perhaps the best ordinary example of this process is the experience of falling in love, where one, in effect, falls in love with an idealized image of the love-object that has been projected onto the person with whom one has or desires a relationship.[12] On a less intense level, individuals associated with valued ideals and institutions come to be perceived as emblematic of the ideal. By coming to embody and "possess" the desirable image, the object gains control over the other as a result of being valued. This asymmetric psychological dependency creates a classical power relationship. The power dimension of such experiences is manifestly obvious to any who have had to endure unrequited love.

Perhaps the most important distinction in this literature is between power and influence. While many authors agree that the terms are not synonymous, they disagree on the meanings they associate with each.[13] They also differ on how they relate to each other. Some construct a strict analytical demarcation where power rests upon the willingness and capacity to employ coercion while influence derives from persuasion. Here, power is directive, compulsory, and punitive while influence is indicative, contingent, and appealing. From this perspective, a power relationship is a condition of asymmetric interdependence between two or more actors where the one who is less dependent is more powerful and the more dependent one is less powerful.[14] This understanding of power is analytically distinguishable from influence based on persuasive communication. Its advantage derives from its analytical simplicity. A pervasive tendency on the part of scholars is to define influence in terms of power, typically with influence being a weaker or more general kind of relational property than power. This does not result in an analytically precise meaning. The problem derives from the generality associated with the word in ordinary usage. Influence is often regarded as an intangible or indirect means of bringing about a particular end. This provides no firm basis for distinguishing it from the often vague or all-encompassing meanings attributed to power. The closest one can come to a specific meaning for influence derives from the general association of influence with communications and persuasion. Here, influence is understood to be communication by one that successfully persuades another to alter how he or she perceives and interprets the nature of and the relationships between various life conditions and events, and her or his relative ordering and strength of preferences among them. Obviously, influence refers to considerably more in ordinary language than persuasion, but none of these is easily, if at all, distinguishable from power. On the other hand, even though influence and persuasion are often treated as synonyms, persuasion and power are not. Thus, one can base an understanding of influence upon persuasion. This view is adopted here.

The meaning of authority is also problematic.[15] As Max Weber saw it, authority derives from some type or types of quality such as tradition, rationality, or charisma. Even though this approach can generate some excellent typologies describing the relationships between different types of legitimacy, sources of authority, relations between rulers and ruled, and the objects of obedience, it uniformly fails to account for obedience to authority as a psychological process occurring in the minds of followers. From this perspective, a follower's perception of a command being legitimate is itself what induces obedience. The follower does not judge or think about the command itself. Rather, he or she judges whether the command is legitimate. If it is within the terms of authority accorded to the commander, then it is acceded to without the need for persuasion. This is the most important specific consequence of possessing authority: one does not need to win the agreement of each follower for each command. Instead, one has won their prior agreement to obey commands falling within the boundaries of certain decision-making ranges. This agreement need never have been formally, or even knowingly, entered into: it may simply have evolved into being as a consequence of habitual customs and practices. What is crucial is that followers have come to regard acceding to certain kinds of decisions as appropriate behavior under specific circumstances.

Legitimacy derives from the belief shared by both the commander and subordinate that the former has the right to claim obedience from the latter with respect to the execution of certain kinds of actions. A command is understood to be legitimate if it falls within these established decision ranges. Determining the boundaries of these decisions is synonymous with establishing the boundary of legitimate commands. Such determinations are based upon what has already been accepted in the past as being or not being legitimate and the interpretation of current decisions in light of these past practices and conduct. Persuasion becomes the fundamental factor in establishing judgments on uncertain cases. A particular command is regarded as legitimate if it is perceived and interpreted as being substantively congruent with pre-existing customs and practices which are already perceived as being legitimate. In this context, authority is the right to make decisions which others are obliged to obey so long as their substance and the manner in which they have been arrived at and applied are perceived to be legitimate. Legitimacy pertains to the command whereas authority refers to the commander. They are not so much properties as habituated perceptions.

Nowhere is the importance of authority greater than when the decision in question involves the use of power in its most starkly coercive form. Even when they are observed more by their breach, all societies have norms separating the legitimate from the criminal use of threats and violence. But the relationship between coercive power and authority is more complex than simply determining when coercion may be legitimately employed. Authority involves the right of one to command and the duty of another to obey. In its narrow sense, power is the capacity to compel another to comply. Both produce the same or similar results though by different means. The central difference between the two is that in the case of authority, the compulsion to obey comes from within the subject of authority whereas the subject of constraint is either directly or indirectly forced to accede. Authority is incalculably more economical than the constant recourse to coercive power. Power and authority need not coincide in that constraints and coercion may operate in either an illegitimate manner or under conditions where there are no clear norms, such as during civil or religious wars. Authority can also exist without narrow power as Stalin failed to recognize when he demanded to know how many battalions the Pope commanded. Though the Pope did indeed command no battalions, his pronouncements do command the obedience of hundreds of millions and the serious attention of millions more. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has no armies. It can and has broken a President. Taken together, constraint and authority are symbiotes, the former ensuring obedience to authority while the latter legitimates its exercise. An historically effective way of creating authority is through ideology and charismatic leadership. The two are intertwined. Some of the most charismatic leaders in history have promulgated and propagated popular ideologies and religions.

The nature of charismatic leadership as an actual phenomenon remains one of the deep puzzles in modern social science. This is not the result of any absence of interest. Charisma and charismatic leadership have been popular topics of discussion in both the popular media as well as in scholarly journals. Despite this continuing fascination, there has been a notable paucity of explanations which integrate the different facets of the phenomenon into a coherent understanding. In addition to the sheer complexity of the phenomenon, attempts to understand it have also been stymied by over-specialized research agendas. Disciplinary boundaries have also acted as barriers to the transmission of useful insights. These particular problems have combined with a more general crisis in the overall study of leadership as a process to seriously hamper efforts to understand leadership generally and charismatic leadership in particular. These difficulties have been amply documented elsewhere and need not bear repetition here. What is important is that the absence of an overall provisional framework has severely constrained efforts to explain the phenomenon as a whole.

What makes leadership charismatic? Obviously, as Max Weber pointed out, the perceptions and responses of followers to a particular leader's appeal.[16] This emphasizes two important dimensions: the social psychological and the psychodynamic. The first deals with the interpersonal and small group dynamics between leader and followers, and among the followers themselves.

There is an immense volume of empirical research, much of which is contradictory, inconclusive, trivial or obvious. Nonetheless, the sheer bulk of material assures the presence of some useful information though the tremendous amount of chaff makes sorting it a daunting task. The psychodynamic level offers a different problem. While there is a considerable body of useful work on the psychodynamic characteristics of historic political leaders, there are very few empirical accounts of the behavior of followers. This imbalance complicates efforts to arrive at an accurate understanding of the psychological factors underlying leader-follower relations.

The sociological approaches to leadership often stress its functional importance at the level of groups or organizations, while ignoring or taking it for granted at the level of societal responses to crises. Fortunately, there is enough overlap between theories of group leadership, social movements, conflict between social collectivities, and macrosocietal dynamics to show the relationship between leadership and crises. Theories of group action can also be rooted in psychosocial processes, thereby showing how broad social conditions induce certain significant psychological responses which serve as the basis for leader appeals, organizational mobilization of previously uninvolved supporters and social action. This exceptionally complex system of interrelated social and psychological processes underlies leader appeal to followers under crisis conditions. This thesis brings together theories covering all of these elements in order to give an integrated account of charismatic leadership, its psychological structure, and socio-political causes.

Charisma, or charismatic attractiveness, is the manifestation of a particular kind of leader-follower relationship.[17] This relationship is psychodynamic and exists, foremost, in the mind of the followers. However, the leader's personality and capabilities can significantly affect the likelihood of followers forming such attachments. The number of susceptible followers is also increased by socially induced psychological stress. This stress is often experienced as a consequence of such social disturbances as sudden economic dislocations, wars, or anything else that dramatically alters the immediate living conditions of large numbers of people. The existence of psychologically susceptible followers in significant numbers is the most important precondition for charismatic attraction. While this attraction does sometimes come to be focused upon unlikely figures, most objects of charismatic attraction tend to be leaders with very compelling personalities and messages. The ability of a leader to hold the support of followers is related to their perceptions of her or his capacity to successfully resolve the crisis which induced the psychological stress.

This phenomenon can be studied from two different directions. A follower-focused approach would emphasis the psychological conditions which are necessary for or concomitant with this type of attraction. It would explore the psychosocial factors generating these conditions. The impact of leader personality and message would appear as a catalytic variable transforming a latent condition into an actual charismatic relationship. The alternate approach seeks to explain why some but evidently not all leaders possess this catalytic ability. A leader-focused explanation addresses how differences in personality affect the kinds of appeals these leaders can successfully make. Although both focuses must cover the same set of variables and relationships, they do so with very different emphases and explanatory agendas. The follower-focused approach seeks to explain how social conditions result in particular psychological conditions, occurring on a mass scale, which render large numbers of people susceptible to charismatic appeal. This approach addresses the preconditions rather than the actual occurrence, strictly speaking, of charismatic ties, whereas the leader-focused approach looks at how specific characteristics of certain kinds of leaders result in the formation of these ties.

Perhaps the most important explanatory difference between the two is one of emphasis in timing. Both deal with the human response to social crisis. The follower-focused approach looks at the "downside" where social pressures adversely effect groups and individuals, forcing them to change, often in maladaptive ways, in response. Though one may convincingly argue that the occurrence of crisis reflects the failure of the society's political system to respond effectively to its causes, this explanation does not require the political system to hold centre stage; it is part of the back-drop. Politics and the political system are far more immediately relevant to the leader-focused approach. The leader-follower relationship typically occurs within the context of socio-political groups which facilitate the organization of mass followings into political movements or parties agitating for reform or revolution. Although leaders sometimes win power through their control over revolutionary parties or movements, they may also achieve substantive power first through the normal pathways of institutional leadership and then combine the resources of the institutions they govern with their capacity to appeal in order to facilitate reform or revolution from above. Regardless of whether the leaders achieve power through social movements or organizations outside the normal governing framework, or through promotion from within the governing elites, they must be able to evoke sufficient mass support in order to successfully implement desired changes. This reflects the "upside" of the dynamic. This thesis is principally concerned with understanding the political implications of this process and therefore chooses to look at it from the leader-focused perspective.

Leadership in general has been studied from a number of different though poorly integrated perspectives. This thesis views leadership as both a type of power relationship and as a process. The task of providing an analytically precise definition has proved difficult for virtually everyone. Though this discussion has been going on now among behavioral social scientists for over sixty years, most agree that it is a form of interpersonal influence rooted in persuasive capacity and the ability to give direction to others. This is the social psychological view of leadership. A second view is of leadership as a set or system of socio-political functions carried out by individuals, elites and institutions operating within and responding to a greater social context. This derives from structural functionalism and the systems approach. Both views are employed in this thesis. On the interpersonal level, leadership is a form of influence deriving from the putative leader's capacity to persuade others to adopt a particular viewpoint or course of action. From the perspective of social groups and societies as systems, leadership is also a set of highly interdependent functions whose responsibility is to assure the effective adaptation of the social group or society to changes in its environment, and to regulate or resolve internally generated conflicts. But these adaptive functions do not always perform adequately and the social system may fall apart.

Living organisms, the very model for homeostatic systems, do after all die from internal cancers and diseases as well as external traumas. But unlike living organisms, human societies can also be reconstructed or significantly reformed precisely because they are not themselves living creatures. In this sense, they are more like mechanisms with the socio-political leadership functions fulfilling the same roles for social groups and societies as cybernetic controls do for complex electromechanical systems. But again, this analogy is not precise and ought not to be extended too far. Leadership is best understood on its own terms. Leadership can also be understood as a form of instruction. Like the truly great teachers, great leaders guide and educate those who accept their discipline and authority. And sometimes the most important lessons great leaders have to teach can only be grasped with the passage of sufficient time and careful consideration of their possible meanings. This thesis offers no deep secrets. It does attempt to provide a basic understanding of leadership in terms of it as a process of influence and power, and as a system of role-functions fulfilled within the context of a greater social system.

Although nobody is ever born a leader or follower, different socialization experiences effect individual personality development, by either facilitating or retarding the acquisition of useful leadership skills and the motivation to seek power. The two most prominent paradigms used to explain these differences are the needs-social learning, and the psychodynamic approaches.[18] The needs-social learning approach is dominated by Abraham Maslow's theory of hierarchy of needs, research developing from Henry Murray's theory of learned needs, and social learning theories arising from cognitive psychology. Research supports the view that effectiveness as a leader correlates strongly with the level of need satisfaction the person has attained. In effect, Maslow's needs hierarchy helps partially to explain why some aim to seek leadership positions and are able to meet the attendant challenges successfully while others are not. Murray's theory of learned needs serves as the foundation for the highly productive research strategies pursued by David C. McClelland and his students. Their work is vital to understanding why power-seeking personalities develop as a consequence of socialization. Social learning theorists like Julian Rotter, Martin E. P. Seligman, and Albert Bandura have been instrumental in identifying and explaining from a cognitive-behavioral perspective a number of psychological phenomena which seem to underlie a range of significant behavior, such as a leader's orientation towards ambiguous circumstances and the response of followers to conditions of threat and uncertainty.[19] These different theories combine to argue that potential for leadership is a function of largely positive developmental experiences. On the surface, this seems to contradict the implications of various psychodynamic explanations of leader and follower behavior. Psychodynamic theories derived from the work of Sigmund Freud and first applied to the study of political behavior by Harold D. Lasswell typically look for the locus of leader behavior in neurotic or other essentially psychopathological ego functions. They focus upon anomalous behavior often rooted in early childhood or adolescent traumas which have had a profound developmental impact. Though these experiences are not characteristic of most leaders, they are relevant to the ones studied in this thesis.

A number of important leader traits or attributes have their origin in neurotic or narcissistic adaptations to developmental crises.[20] These adaptations, when reinforced by considerable talent and ability, become the bases for highly motivated and appealing personality types. These psychopathological types bear close, if superficial resemblance to a number of healthy ones. Although some neurotic and many healthy personality types do make very effective leaders in many situations, they never seem to evoke as intense feelings of charismatic attachment as do narcissists. Narcissists and exceptionally self-confident, self-certain personalities evoke charismatic attachment in followers who suffer from various degrees of personality fragmentation caused by severe anxiety and have an often extreme need for reassurance and stability. The image of extreme self-confidence projected by narcissists and their healthy counterparts provides the reassurance, while their worldview or ideology, so central to all charismatic appeals, provides their followers with a coherent and intelligible conception of experienced reality. Unlike the needs-social learning approach, the psychodynamic theories can explain these kinds of psychological phenomena and resulting leader-follower relationships. They account for the variations in motivation and behavior of individuals whose overall capabilities are best explained in the context of needs-social learning theories. This thesis examines both approaches to explain the basis of leader motivation.

Stable societies governed by regimes generally perceived as legitimate select office-holders for their compatibility with the regime's governing norms and organizational needs. Political systems which do not experience high levels of externally imposed stress tend to behave like extremely complex bureaucratic organizations. It is the infrequent occasions of generalized social crisis that forms the context within which critical leadership manifests itself. Charismatic leadership is not so much a response of the political system as it is a consequence of possibilities created by its breakdown. Unlike politics in ordinary times, which reflects the normal functioning of the system as a whole, charismatic leadership requires a state of crisis and the presence of an individual possessing exceptional qualities. Since charismatic leadership is a consequence of crisis, this necessitates a basic understanding of crises.

Despite the variations in emphasis and explanations, most theories agree on the presence of a number of basic steps.[21] First, disturbances caused by factors outside of the society or internal contradictions produce social strains leading to feelings of injustice. These feelings form the basis for collective action by individuals organized along the lines of shared interests, values and social ties. These groups often coalesce around highly articulate individuals professing an explanation and solution for the perceived crisis, and around existing organizations with already established governing elites if they contain such persons. If the ruling institutions succeed in resolving the crisis through internal reforms or some other form of pressure release such as conquest or technological development, then the entire system returns to something akin to homeostatic equilibrium. If such solutions are not found, then the system remains in a condition favourable to change. If the crisis progressively worsens, then the support for change will increase as will support for radical solutions. This constitutes a latent revolutionary condition. Depending upon the evolution of the crisis, revolutionary groups may succeed in consolidating sufficient power to compete effectively with the incumbent elite. Should the regular military forces suffer defeat or go over to the insurgent groups, then the revolution will most probable succeed. The last step, consolidation, involves the revolutionary cadres forming the basis for the new ruling elite and reorganizing old institutions or creating new ones.

Most accounts of social change ignore or down-play the role and importance of both leaders and leadership. Weber rightly points to three types of charismatic leadership which can be pivotal in creating the conditions for successful reform or revolution. These types of charismatic leaders offer their followers ecstatic rapture, new moral frameworks, or effective operational guidance and direction. Each of these forms of charismatic leadership evokes different though nonetheless powerful feelings of follower attachment. These attachments are rooted in psychodynamic relationships formed in the minds of followers with the image and message of their adopted leaders. This often intense bonding and sense of devotion plays a crucial role in mobilizing and sustaining vital mass support for leaders seeking to resolve crises through either reform or revolution. Most though not all theories of social change and crisis have ignored this dimension.

Charismatic leadership is a consequence of the conjoint occurrence of a period of significant social crisis and an individual possessing a sufficiently effective combination of cognitive structures, personality traits, power resources, and simple luck to successfully strengthen the old or establish a new order. Individual leadership can take on this enormous significance during crises, which it rarely does during normal times, for a number of reasons. The advent of crisis is usually the consequence of some destabilizing force which has a delayed but progressively debilitating impact upon the legitimacy of the affected regime. This decline in popular support is one of a number of necessary conditions for potentially radical political change of either a reformatory or revolutionary nature. Personal crisis also intrudes into the lives of significant numbers of ordinary people as a consequence of the more general troubles besetting the society as a whole. This results in potential followers susceptible to charismatic appeal. Some are individuals operating within conventional organizations seeking political change or relief from the oppressive circumstances. These are individuals who have been mobilised by organizations to participate in their own self-defense. Other potential followers are those who, as a consequence of the stresses imposed, become psychologically susceptible to certain types of psycho-emotive appeals. If the former type are mobilised as groups by organizations, the latter are mobilised by inspirational ideologies or charismatic leaders. Many sociopolitical movements, including charismatic ones, include both kinds of followers even though, obviously, they are motivated by different considerations. The occurrence of charismatic leadership is itself one of the key catalytic events necessary for radical reform or revolution. Social stability if attained through changes facilitated by charismatic leadership, allows the resumption of normal politics which, paradoxically, precludes the rise of charismatic leaders in non-critical times.

In order to exemplify this process, this thesis examines the two greatest domestic upheavals brought about by the First World War: the Bolshevik Revolution and the rise of the Nazis to power. In both cases, a single individual played a decisive role in producing the final outcome. Without V. I. Lenin or Adolf Hitler, neither event could have occurred in a form that would be historically recognizable as being the same. Of course, history would have continued to unfold in their absence but along a radically different course with very different consequences for their societies and the people living in them. Lenin and Hitler exemplify the point that while leaders do not necessarily make history to their own choosing, the truly great ones can, at pivotal points in the general flow of events, exert significant influence. Both men were able to play their historic roles in large part because of their personalities. Hitler was the very archetype of the destructive narcissistic leader. His charismatic appeal resulted from the attractiveness of his idealized self-image to large groups of Germans seeking reassurance and guidance in the midst of the crises which plagued Weimar Germany. Hitler's impact was fundamentally a function of the size of the overall pool of potential supporters. While every society contains individuals who respond favourably to personalities and messages like the ones Hitler projected, few societies provide as fertile a milieu as Germany did during the inter-war period. Lenin is virtually the opposite of Hitler in terms of immediate personal magnetism. Lenin's charismatic appeal derived from his daunting intellectual dominance and sheer will power. His grasp of the strategic and tactical elements within the revolutionary situation guaranteed obedience and loyalty from the rest of the senior Bolshevik cadre. Lenin combined rare genius with a dominating will. Both men exemplify the pivotal role which can be played by exceptional leaders under propitious circumstances.

This thesis does not argue that "great men" decide history. It does argue that under certain relatively rare circumstances individuals of exceptional gifts who also possess particular personality characteristics *may* be able to influence the course of events. It does not argue that charismatic leadership or charismatic leaders ought to be regarded as "good things." They are at their very best necessary evils. Charismatic leaders often provide "solutions" to crises which are substantially worse for many than the problems which led to their initial rise to power. Not all charismatic leaders produce unpleasant outcomes. But unhappy results are an inherent possibility for any society whose ordinary political processes have failed to deal effectively with the crisis inducing conditions. Max Weber stressed the importance of crisis to charisma because he understood that only crisis situations simultaneously induce the widespread psychological susceptibility that generates intense follower devotion while also providing the opportunities to demonstrate the exceptional talents which validate the "gift of grace." The paucity of charismatic leaders during normal times reflects, in part, an absence for their need and the presence of effective competition from more conventional politicians. All charismatic leaders, even the seemingly moderate reformist ones, are deeply unsettling in their demands and actions. They are gambles for any society. The revolutionary charismatic leaders are not even voluntarily accepted gambles. They storm or force their way into power and then set about to reorder their societies without tremendous concern for popular mandates. They are empowered by history and their own successes. By faith in their own designs and the ability to realize them, they command their followers to obey. This is why charisma is more often the bane than the savior of constitutional regimes, especially those whose basis has not yet been sanctified by long-standing traditions. Crisis demonstrates the incapacity of the existing system to function properly and invalidates pragmatic reasons for continued support, the absence of which will diminish the ability of the regime to deal effectively with the causes and consequences of the crisis. Only deeply felt love for enduring traditions and customs can sustain support for the ruling institutions in the face of evident failure. This devotion to the symbols and beliefs of the traditional order substantially pre-empts, precludes, and crosscuts the formation of charismatic attachments. These traditions must also be destroyed or weakened by the conditions of crisis before charismatic appeal can gain full potency. It is in the absence of rational and traditional reasons for continued support for the existing regime that charisma reaches its fullest potential appeal. Under these crisis conditions, charismatic leaders may seem truly heaven-sent.

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15. Lukes, p. 639-44.

16. Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, 3 vols., 4th ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, ed. (New York: Irvington, 1968), p. 1116-7.

17. This will be discussed in Chapter V.

18. Carol Barner-Barry and Robert Rosenwein, *Psychological Perspectives on Politics*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985), p. 113-39.

19. Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, *Introduction to Theories of Personality*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1985), p. 309-38, 533-57.

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21. Chapter VI of this thesis.

CHAPTER ONE

THE FIELD OF LEADERSHIP: AN OVERVIEW AND CRITIQUE

Though the arts of winning power and of rulership have been a topical subject for over two thousand years they are not quite synonymous with leadership. Works like The Book of Lord Shang[1] and Kautilya's Anthrasastra[2] provide detailed instruction on the proper administration and government of absolutist empires, including descriptions of appropriate forms of torture for various crimes and advice on how to set up effective secret police and spy networks. Xenophon's The Education of Cyrus[3] details the proper education of Persian princes and Athenian aristocrats, while Cicero's more advisory writings may still be read for profit and self-advancement.[4] These works, all of which predate the birth of Christ, offer insights into the process of winning and holding power sufficient to merit the careful attention of any intent on such an end. But though they deal with necessary component skills, they do not address the basic substance of leadership.

This is because leadership, as a process founded upon the relationship between leader and followers, could only come to claim significant attention in an age whose politics has been dominated by the ascendant masses. This is not to say that there were no leaders before the religious conflicts of the Reformation disrupted traditional beliefs and fealties. It simply recognizes that it is easier to win personal followers when they have not all been monopolized by hierarchies of religious and traditional authorities. Instead, it took the triumph of popular democracy in the United States and of popular nationalism in France to fix attention on mass leadership. The intellectual debate of this period from the end of the Napoleonic Era to the end of the First World War was dominated by the debate between the "Great-Person-in-History" thesis, first put forward by Thomas Carlyle, and an array of social-determinist positions ranging from Hegal through the social Darwinists to the orthodox Marxists.[5] Though this epistemological battle still rages in some quarters, it was largely superseded by the rise of the behavioral approach to American social science research, particularly in experimental psychology and in sociology.[6] By the early 1920's, the empirical social scientific approach supplanted the preceding speculative approach which had been rooted in the philosophy of history. The modern study of leadership has as its intellectual origin this turning point in the field.

The phenomenon of leadership has been fruitfully explored at four different levels of analysis. Leader studies focus upon two broad sets of topics: (1) characteristic leader traits and attributes, and (2) psychodynamic and personality factors and how they account for leader motivations. The social psychological and group psychology level discusses the types and bases for leader-follower interactions in terms of inter-personal dynamics. The third level is that of the group or institution at which leadership as a role system of organizational processes occurs. The fourth is that of societal change and the political system. At this level, leadership is explicitly a function of political institutions and movements whose leaders' behavior may, during periods of general crisis, have a historically pivotal impact. This review will proceed with an examination of each level starting with the first.

As already stated, there are two broad sets of questions the literature has sought to answer with respect to leaders. The first deals with their traits and behaviors. The bulk of the research in this area has been into attributes of inter-personal dominance and small group effectiveness. A second, and for this thesis much more important, area of research has been into the psychodynamic and personality factors resulting in motivation to lead. The literature offers two superficially opposing schools of answers. The psychoanalytic approach derives from the works of Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, and more recent scholars like Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg. The impact of the psychoanalytic approach has been felt in two waves. The first has its origins in the seminal work of Harold D. Lasswell and introduced the classical tradition into political psychology. This tradition in psychoanalysis is referred to as ego psychology.[7] The second wave is called object relations theory and derives from Melanie Klein's work. Application of this approach to the study of leaders only began in the mid-1970's and has so far generated a small but extremely promising selection of works in political psychology and psychobiography. Despite its promise, there is very little of the second wave to review. The second major approach is actually a composite of the different schools.[8] The first and best known is that of Maslowian needs hierarchy and self-actualization. The second is learned needs, pioneered by Henry Murray and developed by motivation psychologists such as David C. McClelland. The third, social learning theory, is best understood as an aspect of cognitive psychology, and its current leading figures are Albert Bandura and Martin E. P. Seligman. Each of these approaches will be examined as to what it offers for the understanding of leader motivations as well as the psychology of their potential followers. But before beginning this review of psychological approaches, this section will look at some of the characteristies generally identified with leaders.

The history of research into leader characteristics can be summed up in three words: traits, behaviors, and competencies.[9] This field of research, since its inception in the early 1920's, has concentrated on identifying characteristics which seem either to correlate strongly with or aid in the attainment of leadership positions. The trait approach focused upon the personal attributes such as physical, social, task-related, intellectual, and personality factors of individual leaders. The behavior approach began in the late 1940's as a consequence of researchers' dissatisfaction with their inability to account for the elevation of leaders strictly on the basis of traits. The focus on behavior led to close scrutiny of leader styles of interaction with followers in small group settings. Although this approach remained leader centred, it recognized the importance of followers. Outgrowths of the behavior approach, which will be discussed in the subsection on organizational leadership, are the contingency and situational-personal perspectives. Research into the acquisition and effective use of situationally valuable cognitive and practical skills, called competencies, is a recent activity which, while highly promising, is still at the stage of generating findings for specific role-occupations. Perhaps the most important point to be made about these three approaches is that they reflect a progression in research focus away from viewing leadership qualities as fixed and static possessions of the individual and toward perceiving them as learned skills of varying degrees of situational value and fixity within the personality of the leader. The latest version, the personal competency approach, may prove useful in eventually identifying actual skills used by leaders and explaining how they were acquired.

The conventional view of the traits approach is that it cannot fully account for leader selection and is therefore not a productive strategy for the study of leadership. This criticism is valid but minimizes the importance of traits which do seem to correlate strongly with attainment of positional or achieved leadership. Though these traits are not universally valuable, they provide advantages in a wide, though (depending on the trait) variable range of situations.[10] Variations in the strength of these traits help to indicate potential for leadership in different situations. Bass also found that leaders differ consistently in terms of how they use their interpersonal, administrative, technical, and intellectual skills in that some focused upon task-oriented goal attainment while others stressed group cohesion and effectiveness through nurturant and expressive behavior. The former style of leadership has been variously labelled autocratic, directive, task-oriented and instrumental while the names associated with the latter type are democratic, participative, relations-oriented, and expressive. Studies into these two styles of behavior dominated research in both organizational behavior as well as small groups for all of the 1950's and much of the 1960's.

Research into competencies constitutes a partial return to the traits approach in that the emphasis is again upon studying qualities possessed by the individual. But unlike the traits studies of the prewar and wartime era, competency studies begin with specific settings and attempt to learn what mix of skills yields the highest likelihood of success according to some predetermined norm. While this research is extraordinarily suggestive of the kinds of skills which may prove crucial to political success, none of these studies has focused on politicians or behavior in political settings. Though traits and competencies are important to the study of leadership, they do not explain the motivations and personality characteristics of followers and the leaders themselves.

Unlike most other authors, Carol Barner-Barry and Robert Rosenwein's excellent discussion of leadership from a psychological perspective lays as much stress upon understanding the behavior and motivations of followers as it does on leaders.[11] By itself, this elevates their discussion well above the norm for the literature. Though they review the broad range of theories from the nature of power to group dynamics and social exchange theory, of relevance here are their resumes of the psychoanalytic and needs-social learning perspectives. They provide what is possibly the best overview currently available.

Barner-Barry and Rosenwein describe four major schools of explanation within the psychoanalytic approach which they label the conflict perspective: psychopathology, authoritarian personality, narcissism, and fantasy projection.[12] What unifies these different viewpoints is that they share the perception that tension and conflict "...exists between what the individual would like to do and what she knows the world demands of her."[13] This perception is based upon a number of common assumptions. First, individuals seek to gratify impulses but avoid the pains of anxiety and guilt. Second, the physical and social environments impose constraints which frustrate the fulfillment of human desires. Even though humans learn to accept their circumstances, they do so with a sense of ambivalence given that all their sources of potential gratification are also possible sources of frustration or pain. As a consequence of this, all thoughts and behavior derive from a combination of conscious-rational and subconscious-irrational psychological forces. What this perspective stresses is the importance of the dynamic structure of both leaders' and followers' personalities as a significant source of motivation for certain types of political behavior. Despite these underlying similarities, these views focus their attention upon different aspects of the same overall phenomenon.

As Barner-Barry and Rosenwein note, the psychopathology approach is most closely associated with the work of Harold Lasswell, generally regarded as the founder of American political psychology.[14] Lasswell applied psychoanalytical techniques pioneered by Sigmund Freud and other early practitioners to the study of political personality types. Essentially, Lasswell argued that certain types of political activists are motivated by a variety of different neurotic mechanisms which employ the person's activism as a means of externalizing her or his internal psychical conflict. Even though this view has come under sharp criticism, it remains significant enough to warrant more comment when leader motivation is discussed later in this thesis.

The Authoritarian Personality is a seminal work that applied psychoanalytical techniques to understanding the psychological characteristics of individuals predisposed to supporting authoritarian ideologies.[15] The methodologies and underlying assumptions of the researchers have had a profound impact on the subsequent study of political followers generally. The study's core assumption is that certain attitudes reflect possession by the individual of a particular kind of personality that in turn, is highly susceptible to political appeals based upon stereotypically right-wing or conservative values. Barner-Barry and Rosenwein note there is evidence suggesting that both the attitudes and personality characteristics may be significantly influenced by circumstantial factors such as culture, social milieu and economic conditions. This suggests that susceptibility to authoritarian appeal may increase due to certain environmental factors with a subsequent impact upon political behavior by various mass and elite groupings.

A relatively new and interesting approach seeks to explain the leader-follower relationship in terms of narcissism.[16] Here, the leader is motivated by a desire for self-gratifying adulation by the masses while the follower adopts the leader's pronouncements and persona as substitutes for either a malfunctioning or maladaptive superego and ego-ideal. This enables her or him to repress or suppress painful psychological states such as prolonged anxiety, depression, or psychical conflict. Narcissism acts as a conceptual framework within which one may explain the operation of reciprocal ego-support and gratification by leaders and some of their more emotionally attached and committed followers. As will be discussed later, this framework is particularly relevant to explaining the formation of charismatic attachments by some of the psychologically susceptible potential followers of certain kinds of leaders.

The final view, fantasy relationship, is closely related to the preceding, especially in its explanation of follower motivation.[17] Barner-Barry and Rosenwein point to four common fantasies which people may experience under conditions of stress, helplessness, internal conflict, or anxiety.

The first is "dependency" fantasy in which individuals who perceive themselves as weak, dependent, and shameful seek reassurance, security and empowerment. The second, "fight-flight" fantasy, consists of the followers feeling threatened by some external force which they must either combat or escape. "Pairing fantasy" rests upon followers seeking nurture and encouragement to grow or strive after some collective or individually realizable goal. Finally, "utopian fantasy" springs from the desire to experience conflict-free, secure, and loving communal relationships. In each case, the leader is selected by followers on the basis of how well he or she satisfies their fantasy needs.

According to Barner-Barry and Rosenwein, the conflict perspective offers four types of insights into the leader-follower relationships.[18] First, the various views relate political behavior to inner conflicts and tendencies. Second, they seek to show the relationship between the dynamic personalities of leaders and followers. Third, they show how the behavior of leaders and followers provide reciprocal ego-support. Finally, they offer insight into why followers change leader attachments, either deepening or weakening them, on the basis of changing psychical needs. The conflict approach provides an indispensable set of explanations for why followers attach themselves fervently to leaders under conditions of socio-political crisis.

The needs-social learning approaches derive from work by Abraham Maslow and Henry Murray who originated the concepts of the hierarchy of needs, and learned needs, respectively.[19] Maslow's work, which will be examined in greater detail later, provides a framework for understanding the relationship between the fulfillment of basic needs and certain propensities in motivation which are politically significant. Murray's discussion posits five key assumptions.[20] First, humans learn from experience to seek those activities which are pleasurable and rewarding while avoiding those bringing pain or loss. Second, many of these learning experiences occur in early childhood, setting in place long-term dispositions so that significant forms of motivation become internalized into the person's formative character or personality structure. Third, these learned dispositions are felt by the individual as needs which become potentialities for action. Fourth, through prior experience, the person has learned to associate certain situations with opportunities to fulfill these felt needs and consequently, exhibits a greater likelihood to initiate action geared towards that end. Fifth, the individual actively seeks out these opportunities for need fulfillment and avoids those which limit her or his capacity to do so. Sixth, these needs are socialized into the person, and may be inherently insatiable.

Barner-Barry and Rosenwein discuss need for achievement, power, and affiliation as common socialized needs and Machiavellianism as a form of behavior which generates success in political settings. The needs-social learning approach offers insight into the origins of sustained human motivation and constitutes the basis for many of the theories of socialization and personality development. Both the psychoanalytic and needs-social learning approaches will be revisited in greater depth in the next three chapters.

The group dynamics and organizational studies of leadership account for the overwhelming bulk of both empirical research as well as conceptual innovation. These types of studies deal with essentially the same set of concerns and variables. The principal difference between them is that leader studies at the level of group dynamics focus on understanding the relationship between the leader and her or his followers as intra-group interpersonal dynamics. This emphasizes the social psychologic dimensions of the situation. Organizational leadership studies concentrate on understanding the structural and functional implications of these interactions within their greater environmental context. An apt though simplistic way of identifying the difference is that while the former deals with leader-follower interactions, the latter tries to explain leadership as the interaction between organizational roles.

In The Scientific Study of Leadership, Glenn D. Paige provides a model of leader behavior as a system of multivariate multidimensional linkages.[21] He begins by analytically positing three basic patterns of leadership: (1) conservative leaders who want to preserve the existing order; (2) reformist leaders who pursue moderate but not fundamental change; and (3) revolutionary leaders who seek a fundamental transformation of existing institutions. Both conservative and reformist leadership seek to preserve the basic structure of the existing socio-political system. They are competing tendencies within the status quo but are united against the aspirants of revolutionary change. He sets out six variables which he uses as sources of explanation for leader behavior:

1) the personality of the leader,
2) the various roles being fulfilled within the leadership structure,
3) the interpersonal as well as societal organization of social relations,
4) the tasks which the leader must fulfill,
5) the leader's value-structure, and
6) the leader's environmental setting or situation.[22]

Paige claims that these variables allow for the construction of leader typologies, the explanation of variable systemic outcomes, and the operation of the various kinds of political systems themselves. Margaret G. Hermann, amplifying on a similar schema, points out that any understanding of leader behavior rests upon understanding five variables:

> ...we need to know something about (1) the leader's personality and background, as well as the recruitment process by which he became a leader; (2) the characteristics of the groups and individuals whom the leader is leading; (3) the nature of the relationship between the leader and those he leads; (4) the context or setting in which the leadership is taking place; and (5) the outcome of interactions between the leader and those led in specific situations.[23]

In apparent order of operational precedence, she labels these variables context factors, leader characteristics, leaders' constituencies, relations between leaders and constituents, and leader behavior. Context factors are the demands and constraints which impose limits upon leader choices and behavior. They include constitutions and laws, accountability to others, presence and nature of opposition, political beliefs and culture, resources, organizational and social milieu, and essentially the entire socio-political environment. She identifies seven important leader characteristics: (1) basic beliefs, (2) her or his motivations for seeking leadership, (3) political style, (4) reactions to stresses and pressures, (5) how he or she was first recruited into active politics and particularly into positions of leadership, (6) previous political and related experiences, and (7) the formative political climate at the start of the leader's career.[24] She notes that all leaders have multiple, often cross-cutting constituencies of supporters who require different handling. She also observes that an important leader quality is the ability to deal with nonfollowers in a fashion that enables the group to effectively interact with its environment in pursuit of its goals.

Leader-constituent relations rest upon a process of coalignment where the leader seeks to match her or his own goals and interests to those of her or his followers' expectations within the framework of their political unit.[25] The main tools available to political leaders are persuasion and bargaining, which may include "Patronage, tradeoffs, negative sanctions, appeals to reference-group loyalties and friendship, cooptation, and compromise..." She defines leader behavior as "... the action that results when a leader and those he is leading interact in a specific situation." Unfortunately, she does not provide any further explication. Instead, she cites the lack of conclusive findings establishing the bases of effective leader behavior as the reason for the brevity of her discussion. The evidence exists but has not yet been fully integrated into the field's general literature.

The basic model Paige and Hermann propose falls within what are called personal-situational theories. These view leadership as the conjunction of leader, group, their task and environment. This is a fusion of the "Great Person" and "environmental forces" perspectives.[26] It has generated considerable interest because it seems so adept at reconciling what often have been presented as conflicting views. Kellerman provides a succinct description of how this relationship works:

> ...the likelihood of personal impact 1) increases to the degree that the environment admits of restructuring; 2) varies with the actor's location in the environment; and 3) varies with the personal strengths and weaknesses of the actor. In other works, individual actors are likely to make a political difference only when the environment is hospitable (that is, malleable), when they are located at or near the top of the heap, and/or when their particular skills meet the requisites of the particular situation. In this view, a leader will emerge as the result of a good fit between the personality of the individual actor and the characteristics of the setting. Erik Erikson wrote that true leaders (as opposed to heads) *can* only grow out of that special fit. He argued that the answer to "Who leads?" depends on the answers to "What is the setting?" and "Who are the followers?"[27]

From this perspective, the "Great Person" versus "social or environmental forces" controversy becomes, as Bernard Bass has called it, a pseudo-problem.[28]

As pointed out earlier, the critical difference between studies of leadership at the level of interpersonal dynamics and of the organization is the importance of context in evaluating the nature of the relationship. Above all, organizational leadership is understood in terms of role fulfillment and managerial competence. The importance of organizational leadership studies is enormous in one direction but trivial in another. To the extent the political system exhibits the characteristics of a highly complex network of formal organizations, organizational leadership models and findings can be used to describe and predict political actor behavior. The political system can be understood as an exceptionally complex type of organization characterized by very high levels of uncertainty in certain aspects but indistinguishable from stable bureaucracies in others. This type of leadership is important because it is the kind which emerges in all societies governed by stable regimes, including ones as apparently dissimilar as the Soviet Union and the United States. Organizational leadership studies are geared towards understanding how well particular personality types fit certain roles and how these roles facilitate the fulfillment of important or desirable functions within the context of a generally functional environmentally adapted institution. Even though individuals who possess the capacity to deal effectively with major societal crises may occasionally rise to the high positions within their political systems, these qualities need not have been the basis for their selection. Instead, they may have been selected for other reasons and only coincidentally happened to possess the abilities necessary to reform a society turmoil.

Going beyond leader behavior to leadership functions in society, James V. Downton Jr. begins his book Rebel Leadership, by noting that "A leadership structure is an aggregate of roles played by those who successfully initiate action affecting the coordination of group behavior."[29] He argues that such roles fall into two broad categories which, borrowing from Talcott Parsons and Robert Bales, he labels instrumental and expressive. Defining his terms, Downton states:

> Instrumental refers to the task-oriented roles of leadership that contribute to organizational effectiveness, such as setting goals, allocating labor, enforcing sanctions, and the like. On the other hand, the "expressive" mode of leadership refers to roles that establish social and emotional ties between leaders and followers, for example, friend, orator, counsellor.[30]

Downton describes five functions of leadership, the first three of which are instrumental and the remaining two expressive.[31]

First, the goal-setting function is a manifestation of systemic need for adjustments in response to environmental or internal changes. Downton distinguishes between general or distant goals which reflect the system's long-term orientation, and short-term or particular goal hierarchies. He argues that general goal hierarchies are the main target of revolutionaries. Second, the communication function fulfills the two-fold task of informing and motivating. Third, in describing the mobilization function, Downton uses a formulation of power which rests upon one affecting the behavior of another through persuasion (information-sharing), positive inducements, and coercion.

The fourth leadership function and the first expressive one is ego support. Downton argues that expressive leaders provide support to followers suffering from one or more of the three forms of ego weaknesses. The first type of weakness is a consequence of discrepancies between a follower's attainments and hopes. The second basis for ego discontent is related to the first in that the follower's social status does not correspond to what he or she thinks it should be. On a social level, this results in "status protests" by groups which perceive their traditional rights and perogatives being threatened. The third type of weakness reflects conflict between one's desires and one's conscience. Downton states:

> ...the expressive leader can reduce the resulting ego discontent in three basic ways: (1) he can re-establish the supremacy of the conscience by reaffirming a follower's commitment to the existing moral code. (2) he can attempt to strengthen the follower's ego so it can more successfully mediate conflict among the other agencies, or, (3) he can change the moral structure of the follower's conscience in a way that allows for the freer reign of the id.[32]

Downton's final leader function is inspirational. Some leaders can give meaning to their followers' lives and provide a sense of purpose to action and the endurance of suffering. Downton posits an important distinction between inspirational and charismatic leadership. The former derives from a crisis of meaning while the latter is a consequence of the disintegration of the follower's ego structure.[33] Downton states that all charismatic leaders inspire though not all inspirational leaders have charismatic followings.[34] Though he argues that charismatic leadership ought to be regarded as distinct from inspirational leadership, his actual discussion suggests that charisma is simply a type of inspirational leadership. Further, his discussion does not seem to reflect a proper comprehension of the different types of charisma Weber identified and which include Downton's concept of inspirational leadership.

In Leadership, James MacGregor Burns also attempts to provide the field with a comprehensive discussion about the forms and nature of leadership. Though the work deserves the prominent recognition it has been accorded, it suffers from a crucial conceptual flaw which largely invalidates the work's theoretical value. Nonetheless, the sheer breadth of coverage makes it an interesting introduction to the field.

Like this work, Burns begins his with a discussion of the nature of power. He notes that in order for it to be an analytically useful concept, it makes sense to distinguish between power-motives and power-resources, where the former refers to intentions while the latter pertains to means. He agrees with the now conventional wisdom that power is relational and not merely a "thing."[35] Power exists only within the context of two or more persons. As already stated, leadership is a particular form of power which "...is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers."[36] Burns stresses that leaders do this in order to satisfy their own goals and objectives. He also emphasizes the point that leaders, unlike naked power-wielders, do not obliterate their followers' desires and expectations. Leaders seek a matching of means and ends with their followers even though their motives may diverge.

Perhaps the strongest part of Burns' work deals with the psychological origins of leader personality. Burns synthesizes findings from the psychobiographical literature with Abraham Maslow's theory of human motivations into a satisfying account of the sources and nature of the different kinds of leader drives.[37] He shows the utility of applying Maslow's hierarchy of needs to the study of leader motivations and provides solid evidence for discounting the psychopathology approach to understanding the underpinnings of political behavior advanced most prominently by Harold Lasswell. In addition, he also provides an interesting survey of various forms of leadership covering the span from revolutionaries to intellectuals. These discussions serve to flesh out is Burns' most important contention: the distinction between what he terms transactional and transformative leadership.

Burns distinguishes between two types of leadership. Transactional leadership "...occurs when one person takes the initiative in making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things."[38] The valued things may be tangibles like wealth or services, or they may be intangibles like acclaim or respect. The relationship is organized around and by the nature and frequency of exchanges. Transactional leadership consists of brokering between individuals acting either for themselves or as agents where the quality of leadership reflects the ability to successfully initiate transactions. In this sense, leadership is a form of entrepreneurship. There is nothing overly problematic or unusual about this formulation in that it simply restates the conventional brokerage view of politics and political interaction.

Burns also provides one of the clearest descriptions of what constitutes leadership behavior, beginning with what distinguishes leaders from followers:

> The leader takes the initiative in making the leader-led connection; it is the leader who creates the links that allow communication and exchange to take place. An office seeker does this in accosting a voter on the street, but if the voter espies and accosts the politician, the voter is assuming a leadership function, at least for that brief moment. The leader is more skillful in evaluating followers' motives, anticipating their responses to an initiative, and estimating their power bases, than the reverse. Leaders continue to take the major part in maintaining and effectuating the relationship with followers and will have the major role in ultimately carrying out the combined purpose of leaders and followers. Finally, and most important by far, leaders address themselves to followers' wants, needs, and other motivations, as well as to their own, and thus they serve as an *independent force in changing the make-up of the followers' motive base through gratifying their motives.*

Burns has rightly identified the capacity to take initiative effectively as the central quality defining leader behavior. This particular question will be pursued in greater detail in the section on leader psychology.

The second form of leadership Burns identifies is what he calls "transforming leadership" which "...occurs when one or more persons *engage* with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality."[illegible] It is obvious from Burns' discussion and his choice of examples that he is referring to a kind of morally commendable and effective leadership based on ideas: the politically successful implementation of praiseworthy reform or revolutionary ideologies. Even though central to Burns' idea of transforming leadership, he never provides a clear sense as to what constitutes the "good" in political life. He also does not provide an analytically sound basis for distinguishing between those leaders he regards as being leaders in his sense like Gandhi and Woodrow Wilson, flawed leaders like Lenin, and nonleaders like Hitler. Burns conflates leadership with morality by viewing leadership as moral agency. But Burns has done more. At the heart of his work is an almost childishly obvious analytical error.

Despite his claim, transactional and transformative leadership are not mutually exclusive types. More descriptive of the actual orientations are the labels "accommodating" and "altering" because this is the actual distinction central to Burns' discussion. At root, the division between transactional and transformative does not work because the former refers to means and the latter to ends. It is obvious that all the political leaders Burns perceives as transformative also used transactional means by which to achieve their ends. Given Burns' own definition, it is impossible to conceive of a form of leadership which is not transactional. Rather, Burns' simple dichotomy makes more sense if it is perceived as two overlapping continua where the first stands for status quo accommodating versus altering intentions or ideology, and the second concerns level of transactional skill displayed while employing different kinds of power resources. Though the first dimension has received extensive coverage within the literature, discussions of political skillfulness generally consist of either anecdotal comments or references to traits. For all these criticisms, Burns' work remains one of the few efforts to provide a comprehensive explanation of leadership as a whole.

Despite the enormous effort of researchers working at all the levels, the field is itself in a state of conceptual crisis. The very richness of the field creates problems for students of leadership. The myriad approaches and the absence of an organizing paradigm that extends beyond any one level of analysis constitutes one major source of the incoherence which currently characterizes the field. In addition, the behavioral approach has itself become perceived as problematic, thereby adding concerns about the acceptability of certain types of claims to the roster of difficulties. Still, there is a large store of interesting and informative studies awaiting a paradigmatic explanatory framework.

This chapter has provided an overview of the dominant themes, findings, and problems within the literature on leadership. It has stressed the importance of looking at leadership in terms of its four levels of analysis. It has serves as an introduction to the theories and arguments which will be elaborated upon in the next three chapters of this thesis. The chapter immediately following this one deals with leader characteristics and motivations. It directly builds upon many of the points raised in the preceding discussion, especially the portion on the psychodynamic bases of human behavior.

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CHAPTER TWO

PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LEADER AND FOLLOWER BEHAVIOR

The psychological capabilities which *enable* most leaders to acquire and use power effectively result from their having experienced during childhood and adolescence the satisfaction of their basic Maslowian needs. Socialization substantially accounts for their *desire* to acquire power and use. One aspect of socialization empowers potential leaders with the capacity to lead whereas another motivates them to seek out and actualize such opportunities. Simply stated, certain basic developmental needs must be sufficiently satisfied in order for a person to be primarily concerned with fulfilling desires for high social and self-esteem, or self-actualization through the exercise of leadership.

This chapter reviews the literature on personality development and socialization in order to explain why some individuals, but not others, possess capabilities conducive towards acquiring and retaining leadership positions. Second, this chapter also explores the related but separate questions of why some people, but not others, are motivated to seek power. Nothing requires that these two groups overlap perfectly with each other. This chapter addresses these questions by reviewing the two principal approaches to explaining personality development: needs-social learning and psychoanalytic. Despite their differences, these two approaches are complementary. They point towards the existence of a continuum of psychological capabilities which determine leadership ability. They also stress the importance of childhood experiences as the principal influence upon the person's psychological development. Though they originate in different theoretical perspectives, these two approaches provide the basis for a comprehensive synthesis explaining both the capacity for and drive to acquire leadership.

Although no single factor decisively determines whether a person will be selected by a group as its leader, the empirical evidence shows consistently strong correlations between achieved leadership status and a range of positive social and psychological traits such as intelligence moderately above the group's average, and high self-esteem. Despite the central place low self-esteem has in at least one prominent explanation of leadership motivations, and though case studies reveal evidence of neurotic defenses and narcissism in a number of historical leaders, and while some ascribed leaders have acknowledged feelings of low self-esteem or self-worth, the overwhelming bulk of empirical evidence decisively supports the contention that occupants of leadership positions possess higher than average self-esteem.[1] Further, low self-esteem is unequivocally a liability, though not one which will absolutely prevent someone from achieving positions of considerable leadership. It is also noteworthy that all the American presidents who have been identified as suffering from some form of psychological disability deriving from low self-esteem had ego defense mechanisms which, under certain stressful circumstances, became dysfunctional.[2] This again emphasizes the positive benefits of high self-esteem for those seeking or occupying stressful leadership positions. The evidence strongly suggests that individuals most likely to become leaders do not suffer from any gross psychopathologies or shortcomings.

The basic characteristics of leaders as a group make them paragons of attractiveness. They are favourably endowed in most desirable physical, psychological, and social attributes. This is significant as a generalization despite the fact that numerous leaders may seem deficient in one or more positive qualities. The evidence also suggests that leaders as a group possess a number of traits traditionally associated with having good character. According to Bernard Bass:

> The leader is characterized by a strong drive for responsibility and task completion, vigor and persistence in pursuit of goals, venturesomeness and originality in problem solving, drive to exercise initiative in social situations, self-confidence and a sense of personal identity, willingness to accept consequences of decision and action, readiness to absorb interpersonal stress, willingness to tolerate frustration and delay, ability to influence other persons' behavior, and capacity to structure social interaction systems to the purpose at hand. It can be concluded that the clusters of characteristics listed above differentiate leaders from followers, effective form ineffective leaders, and higher-echelon from lower echelon leaders. In other words, different strata of leaders and followers can be described in terms of the extent to which they exhibit some of the characteristics.[3]

Both the empirical evidence as well as a broad reading of the biographical literature strongly suggest that possession of the above traits is virtually axiomatic to being considered a leader.

In addition to the above traits, leaders also have above-average performance capabilities in a number of key skills.[4] The single most consistently prominent skill required by a leader is the ability to communicate effectively in both interpersonal settings as well as to crowds. (It is noteworthy that television seems to emphasize interpersonal communicative skills rather than the more "distant" rhetorical abilities required for effective speech-making in front of crowds or assemblies.) A second set of skills pertains to the technical problem-solving requirements of the leader's setting and group. Obviously, the leader of an armed revolutionary force requires a different set of skills than a parliamentary house leader, or a chief executive officer for a major transnational corporation. The specific environment within which a leader has been trained profoundly affects her or his repertoire of skills and abilities. In turn, her or his proficiency at them is the basis for claiming roles demanding instrumental leadership abilities. A third set of skills not typically discussed in the literature on leadership pertains to stress and anxiety management techniques, and ego defense and coping mechanisms. It is apparent from the general literature that traits typically associated with leaders as a group can only occur as a consequence of successful prior adaptation to anxiety-inducing or ego-threatening situations. Despite the tremendous amount of work invested in identifying leader skills for diagnostic and training purposes - and some studies have reported considerable success - the literature as a whole is characterized by mixed findings and results.

This suggests that though possession of certain skills may be helpful, success as a leader is contingent upon many factors external to the leader. Thus her or his abilities may not be decisive in all situations. Nonetheless, these skills seem to be prerequisites. Their presence does not assure success but their absence virtually seems to guarantee failure. Their greatest importance is as a means of distinguishing leaders from followers through behavioral manifestations. These differences are rooted in socialization and childhood experiences which had a profound impact upon personality development. This chapter now turns to a discussion of the two main explanations for how personalities are formed.

As mentioned in the last chapter, though there are a host of different explanations for how the human personality develops, the two favoured by political psychologists are the needs-social learning, and the psychoanalytical approaches. These two broad streams provide the theoretical paradigms within which psychological phenomena are explained. Both offer explanations for why some become leaders while others do not. The various needs and social learning theories successfully address the nature of socialization and the impact of environmental forces upon the developing personality. The psychoanalytical approaches account for certain types of important psychological mechanisms manifested most visibly when they are psychopathological. Unfortunately, psychoanalytic theories seem to treat virtually every deviation from the socially accepted norm as psychopathological and this badly colours all such explanations of extraordinary behavior. This pervasive tendency to regard everything unconventional as symptomatic of mental impairment undermines its explanatory value. For these reasons, needs and social learning theories tend to account best for broad patterns of similarities in personalities while psychoanalysis accounts for behavioral differences.

The broad implications of the needs and social learning theories are that leadership behavior is a function of two conditions. First, the potential leader is typically someone who has experienced the prior fulfillment of most developmental needs. Second, leader behavior is acquired through particular patterns of socialization. Both conditions are broad generalizations. Individuals suffering from severe needs deficiencies do rise to leadership positions if they possess qualities or capabilities which compensate for their weaknesses. Surprisingly, in light of how it has been understood and presented in the political psychology literature, the psychoanalytic approach does not contradict this position. Freud's basic contention was that psychopathological behavior occurs because psychic energy is being consumed to sustain ego defenses. The behavior itself is symptomatic of anxieties derived from repression of unpleasant experiences and thoughts. When these thoughts are unrepressed through therapy, the individual feels relief and regains the use of the psychic energy which had been deployed to uphold the previously existing defenses. The critical point is this: those whose psychic energies are being used to deal effectively with the world at large rather than their own state of mind are far better able to exert themselves effectively in the pursuit of such goals as they set for themselves. Within both theories, the sources of functional disability are the psychological consequences of past unpleasant experiences.

Where these two approaches differ is in their theoretical presuppositions, methodologies, and general explanatory thrust. Given these differences, this chapter will now turn to a discussion of Maslow's hierarchy of needs in order to establish the factors which distinguish leaders from followers. This will be followed by reviews of work by David C. McClelland and Martin E. P. Seligman, both of whom explore the psychological consequences of two radically different patterns of socialization and their effect upon personality development. This will be followed by a discussion of psychoanalytic theories.

Abraham Maslow provides the most coherent scheme for understanding basic human needs and the motivation to fulfill them. In Motivation and Personality Maslow enumerates his now famous five basic needs.[5] The first is the physiological need to maintain bodily homeostasis. The second basic need is for safety and security. Maslow argues that neuroses caused by what Karen Horney has called "basic anxiety"[6] and what Seligman labels "learned helplessness"[7] are the product of unresolved childhood attitudes of fearfulness. These two phrases, basic anxiety and learned helplessness, refer to conditions resulting from prolonged safety need deficiencies. Maslow's third set is for belongingness and love, also referred to as affiliative needs. Studies with other social primates as well as clinical observations of humans strongly support the view that love and affection are vitally important to healthy psychological development, and a sustained childhood deficiency can result in a continuing need into adulthood. The fourth set of needs relates to self and others' esteem. He argues that there are two subclasses of esteem needs. The first relates to perceptions of self-efficacy and competence, while the second deals with the desire for those attributes such as wealth, possessions, power, dominance, prestige and celebrity, all of which dominate social esteem. Maslow's final need is for self-actualization, a generalized desire for competence, effectance, and accomplishment. In effect, Maslow's self-actualizing person is one who has largely satisfied all her or his basic needs. Jeanne N. Knutson notes that "...individuals who achieve leadership roles tend to have self-actualizing personalities."[8] The satisfaction of basic needs makes possible self-actualization, which in turn facilitates the acquisition and use of power and positions of leadership.

What the preceding discussion has focused upon is the motivation to be competent. In explaining how these needs act as motives, Maslow introduced the distinction between deficiency and growth motivations.[9] Deficiency motivation occurs whenever a basic need is unsatisfied and satiation is a necessary condition for good physical or psychological health. Growth motivation is the basis for self-actualization, and it represents the "need" to realize and actualize one's own potential. Unfortunately, while it is relatively easy to substantiate deficiency motivations it is much harder to identify and explain its positive counterpart. Maslow was careful to point out that it is not necessary for a lower order need to be fully satisfied before a higher order need emerges.[10] People who are driven by deficiency needs are not necessarily precluded from developing substantial competencies. These needs can result in a very high and sustained drive geared toward success-reward generating activities. Such a person will develop extremely powerful self-reinforcing habits of effectuality resulting in perceptions of high self-efficacy and self-esteem. These self-reinforcing and persistent habits of effectuality can motivate success-generating behavior, even when the person is also being driven by one or more deficiency needs. The person is not successful because he or she is driven by deficiency needs. Rather, if the individual is successful, he or she has become habituated to success-rewarding actions and attitudes. Success does not balance or compensate for the deficiency. Instead, it *contradicts* the deficiency, creating a dynamic tension within the person's mind which, in turn, must be managed through the suppression or displacement of the unsatisfied deficiency need. This dynamic lies at the core of what Alfred Adler termed the striving for superiority.[11] It also constitutes the driving tension within the personalities of leaders James David Barber terms Active-Negatives.

Regardless of whether the person is driven by growth or deficiency motivation, both manifest themselves as a desire for power. In Power: The Inner Experience, David C. McClelland offers an account of the developmental origin and different manifestations of what he terms "the need for power." McClelland explores how four important socialized needs affect the expression of power striving.[12] These four factors are the needs for achievement, power, affiliation, and activity inhibition. He has succeeded in constructing a rich explanatory framework with them. Although the focus of this section is upon the need for power, his strategy helps to explain a much wider range of motivations.

The literature on the originative basis for the Need for Power, or to use McClelland's symbol, N Power, is very sketchy and impressionistic. David G. Winter reports:

> Alfred Adler maintained that power strivings must be an over-compensation for a childhood sense of inferiority or powerlessness. But our results suggest that adults, and young people past adolescence, who have a high need for power, felt a sense of power, rather than inferiority, at an early age. They were often eldest or only sons from the upper middle classes. They describe their early family life as more unified, their parents as more concerned about their performance, and themselves as more eager to satisfy their parents' wishes, than do people lower in need for power.[13]

Although Winter was not explicitly testing for this, there is a strong implication that the strength of N Power correlates positively with the fulfillment of basic needs deficiencies, and capacity for self-actualization. In explaining the basis of the Need to Achieve, or N Ach, McClelland and others have pointed to broad socialization patterns. Specifically, McClelland has traced the differential tendencies for N Ach to child-rearing practices, parental encouragement of self-reliant behavior, and attention to performance.[14] Again, there is a strong positive correlation between the strength of this need and the level of basic needs fulfillment. The Need for Affiliation, or N Aff, is itself quite complex but in this context refers to the tendency to place a high value upon the maintenance of strong positive relationships with friends and kin which provide feelings of safety, security, love, social esteem, and reinforce self-esteem. An obvious and not coincidental by-product is that such a motivation renders the person extremely vulnerable to peer and social pressure which can act to limit power or achievement oriented behavior. McClelland's final significant factor is what he refers to as Activity Inhibition, which represents internalized norms regulating propensities for immediate gratification of egoistic desires. This is roughly equivalent to Freud's Superego and reflects the person's capacity for self-discipline and willpower.

Two patterns of power motivation are particularly relevant. The first is characterized by high N Power along with low N Aff and Activity Inhibition. He refers to this as the "Conquistador Motive Pattern," emphasizing personal and egoistic domination of others.[15] Describing this form of behavior, he states:

> As he grows older, simple methods of controlling the environment by physical assertion or aggression gradually give way to more subtle techniques, and he learns to persuade, bargain, and maneuver to control the behavior of others....Men who fixate on this modality are known as competitors....when men with high n Power play a prisoner's dilemma game, they typically try to exploit their *partner*...because by deception one makes the most money.[16]

Patronage is a more socially acceptable variant of this kind of behavior even though the recipient is placed in a dependent position and eventually forced acknowledge inferiority in a persistently asymmetric relationship.[17] Such patronage can become an extremely powerful method of social control given how it combines ostensibly "good" deeds with the power inherent in the asymmetric dependency relationships implied by all non-reciprocal gift-giving. This kind of conquistador subjugates others by rendering them dependent and thereby controllable.

The second pattern McClelland describes is the "Imperial Motive Combination." These are people with high N Power and Activity Inhibition with low N Aff. He argues that this kind of behavior is most strongly promoted by patriarchal value systems:

> There are four key psychological themes in classical patriarchal ideology. First, the individual gets power by *submission* to higher authority....By becoming an official representative of that power, he too as an individual has power. Second, the individual must show *self-control*; he must curb his selfish impulses....Third, he must be willing to *sacrifice his interests* for others that the whole system may prevail....Fourth, the theme of *justice* is prominent. If a person gives up his assertiveness and submits to the Father's will, he will get his just regards. God, the Father, operates a divine "payback" system which rewards those who do his will and punishes those who disobey Him.[18]

McClelland's work documents the relationship between certain kinds of belief systems and power-seeking or achievement-oriented behavior. His research shows a strong link between patriarchal cultures and their eventual rise to regional or global domination. On the individual level, it verifies the influence of maternal child-rearing practices and attitudes upon their children's eventual levels of personal achievement and power attainment. But just as early socialization can help propel a child forward, it can also disable her or his capacity to ever seek or perform effectively in leadership positions.

Martin E.P. Seligman's theory of learned helplessness relates how certain types of socialization can result in the formation of cognitive-affective processes which significantly limit motivations in a wide array of organisms, including humans. His theory rests upon two propositions.[19] First, initiatives are motivated by expectations of particular outcomes. Any organism, including a human, will learn helplessness if it expects outcomes within its environment to be independent of its initiatives. The outcomes themselves need not be unpleasant in order for helplessness to be learned. Second, the organism learns helplessness when the events are unpredictable. The occurrence of what Seligman refers to as "safety signals" provides predictors for key events and this provides organisms with a measure of control over how they respond, typically resulting in much lower levels of anxiety.[20] Learned helplessness and high levels of anxiety induce congitive-affective as well as physiological dysfunctions limiting the organism's capacity to cope effectively with and respond to the stress- creating events.

Seligman points out that a variety of social conditions can induce learned helplessness in humans. He identifies grinding poverty, the climate-dependent character of subsistence agriculture, and prolonged periods of dependency upon the potentially capricious largesse of others, including the state, as conditions capable of inducing learned helplessness within humans.[21] These conditions render individuals more susceptible to transient as well as prolonged periods of depression, which further impairs self-motivation. Perceptions of events as either uncontrollable or unpredictable can be enculturated through ideo-religious value systems. For example, many traditional religions attribute the occurrence of a wide variety of events to the "will of God" when they can be either controlled, like the effects of flooding, or predicted, like weather patterns, by humans willing to make the effort. Seligman notes the political implications of his theory:

> When the lower strata of society are ground underfoot, revolution tends not to occur; when people begin to expect, however, that their own actions might succeed, the time is ripe for it. A belief in uncontrollability should, of course, make the initiation of revolutionary acts impossible. When oppressed and impoverished people see all around them the possibility of power and affluence, their belief in uncontrollability shatters and revolution becomes a possibility.[22]

Many political regimes have employed religions or ideologies to explain that particular unpleasant outcomes are a consequence of forces either outside human control or ought not to be tampered with. Thus, unemployment caused by market recessions is justified as a necessary component to capitalism, private deprivation is validated as a necessary aspect of building socialism in one country, and murder of innocents as the will of God. All these rationalizations act to inculcate learned helplessness.

Learned helplessness theory offers a compelling account for why some individuals lack initiative. As Burns noted, it is the capacity to take initiative that makes a person as a leader, regardless of whether he or she actually occupies formal authority positions.[23] Those in whom helplessness has been inculcated as a consequence of experience and socialization have been psychologically debilitated to such an extent that they are incapable of such initiative. They are reflexively apathetic. But they can be mobilized. As Seligman points out, their apathy is a consequence of how they have come to interpret their world.

But if this interpretation changes through the adoption of an adaptive and energizing ideology or religion, then their helplessness will be replaced by action guided by their newly formed expectations. If these expectations are confirmed by subsequent experiences, then both the new ideology and activism will be further reinforced until it becomes a self-rewarding positive cycle of environmentally adaptive behavior. Events like depression, economic expansion, civil war, and social disturbance disrupt normal expectations and force the reconsideration of conventional beliefs.

As will be discussed later, these conditions induce some to revolt as a consequence of relative deprivation while enervating others through heightened feelings of anxiety into a condition of depressive withdrawal. These conditions are ideal for the rise of mass social and religious movements propagating new ideologies or religions because they provide potential relief from the anxieties induced by disrupted social expectations.

The advantage of Seligman's theory is that in addition to explaining why depressive withdrawal occurs in the face of crises, it also accounts for the reactivation of people as a consequence of their reinterpretaion of the causal relationships governing their circumstances. Seligman's theory helps provide a psychological foundation to sociological theories such as Ted Gurr's study of relative deprivation and points to possible explanations for the significance of religious and ideological beliefs to social change.[24]

The great strength of the needs and social learning theories is that they offer explanations for why individuals are capable or incapable of pursuing leadership positions. They also point to the importance of socialization as a significant factor in instilling motivation to achieve or seek power. What they do not explain effectively are how particular events influence the development of long-standing psychological motivations and traits which propel specific individuals in their personal pursuit of power and achievement. Although McClelland's work provides an excellent framework for identifying broadly similar patterns of socialization, it does not provide the kind of specific explanations necessary to account for the behavior and personalities of historically significant political leaders. Thus, while needs and social learning theories identify general factors which mark groups of people in terms of the capacity for leadership, they do not provide an adequate account of unusually strong motivation or apparently psychopathological behavior.The great strength of the psychoanalytical approach is that it does provide cogent explanations of variable plausibility for behavior which is largely inexplicable within any other framework. Although all the psychoanalytical schools have their roots in the work of Sigmund Freud, a tremendous amount of splitting has occurred over the past seventy years. This discussion will concentrate upon the work of Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, and the object relations theorists. The first two are discussed because of their substantial impact upon political psychology and their direct concern for power-seeking behavior. Horney especially provides an excellent account for how psychologically insecure persons come to acquire leadership skills. Object relation theory explains the psychological bases for leader-follower attachments. Together, these schools provide a basic insight into leader motivations and patterns of affective attachments between them and their followers.

Alfred Adler argues that in early childhood all human beings experience feelings of inferiority, and to overcome it, children strive for recognition and superiority over their environment as psychic compensation.[25] He also claims that the compensatory striving is proportionate to the strength of the sense of inferiority up to the point at which the child no longer feels capable of overcoming the sense of internal torture. Adler argues that since no child (or for that matter, few adults) possess the self-awareness from which to derive accurate self-estimations, how they are treated by adults is profoundly influential in establishing the extent of their desire for power. This striving for superiority becomes the basis for the adult's motivation to seek and win political or any other form of power. The Adlerian approach finds a resounding echo in the work of the early Lasswell, whose own idea of the "compensation principle" is clearly derivative from Adler's notion of superiority striving.[26] Adler's own work is vulnerable to the kind of criticism directed at Lasswell, as will be shown in the next chapter.

Karen Horney offers an explanation for the origin and structure of what she refers to as "basic anxiety," the psychological factor underlying low self-esteem and the compensatory drive. According to Horney, the basic anxiety derives from the absence of genuine love and affection from parents during childhood. This basic anxiety is the "..insidiously increasing, all-pervading feeling of being lonely and helpless in a hostile world."[27] It manifests itself in a number of ways. Of relevance here is that it induces striving for prestige and power.[28] The striving for power provides protection against feelings of helplessness or weakness. Secondly, it also reassures the person that he or she is not insignificant and therefore worthless. Finally, it also provides the person with the means and opportunity through which to express hostility towards others. The desire for prestige also satisfies the need to be reassured of one's own significance by impressing others with one's exemplary attributes, thereby winning their desperately needed applause. As expressions of hostility, Horney identifies the desire to dominate with the power drive and the desire to humiliate with the need for prestige. Horney's discussion is framed around the analysis of neurotic as opposed to "normal" behavior. But one of the central features of Horney's discussion is her observation that people possessed by such neuroses are not only unaware of them and the underlying anxieties, but also often actively believe themselves to be in fact the opposite of what they fear.[29] This means that individuals who are powerfully motivated to engage in certain forms of behavior as a consequence of repressed anxieties deriving from subconsciously felt low self-esteem may consciously think and apparently behave as if they possesed high self-esteem.

From Freud on, psychoanalysts have known that ego defenses fulfill psychologically adaptive roles by protecting the mind against anxiety induced by potentially damaging thoughts, memories, or ideas.[30] These defenses become maladaptive when the levels of stress imposed upon the individual reach the point where he or she begins to decompensate. This occurs when the defenses prove inadequate to the task of protecting the individual from felt anxiety. Decompensation manifests itself through obsessive-compulsive behavior, various forms of neuroses, rigidification of thinking, panic, or personality disintegration. Decompensation results from the functional collapse of the ego's defense mechanisms against anxiety. Defense mechanisms which become dysfunctional under the stress account for the types of neuroses Horney had discussed. As Freud notes, the maintenance of ego defenses consumes psychic energy proportionate to the degree of repression. Often, this leaves the person unable to cope effectively with additional stress. It is important to remember that not only do most people cope adequately with the stresses they face under normal circumstances, but that some cope in a highly adaptive manner. As already noted in the discussion of Horney's work, adaptations which prove self-reinforcing will become habituated long after the initial anxiety-producing state has passed, leaving as its residue an extremely valuable trait or personality characteristic. To a very considerable extent, leader-style is simply the amalgam of an individual's characteristic pattern of handling stress within familiar situations. How a leader decompensates reflects her or his history of handling situations bearing some resemblance, however remote, to the crisis at hand.

In the last twenty-five years, a new approach to psychoanalysis, object relations theory, has gained popularity as way of explaining why and how individuals suffering from breakdowns in mental processes form psychopathological attachments with objects and other people. Object relations theory has prompted studies of follower behavior marked by strong emotional bonding to a particular leader or set of highly symbolic objects.[31] Object relations theory is concerned with the processes through which an individual develops and sustains a healthy sense of self. The self is an aspect of the ego. The ego has two primary forms. It is simultaneously the organizer and structural organization of the personality. The latter is labelled the self. This structure evolves into being through the differentiation of itself from objects external to it (ie., other people as well as things) and the formation of relations with these objects via the process of integration. Both of these operations, differentiation and integration, occur during childhood development stages but sometimes malfunction among adults, resulting in a number of important psychological disorders,

The most important of these disorders are narcissism and the borderline personality disorder.[32] Object relations theory explains why some followers form strong psychological attachments with leaders, particularly narcissistic ones, who project strong and clearly defined personas. An individual suffering from the narcissistic personality disorder perceives her or his own self as wholly good, omnipotent, and omniscient, and some reviled object as wholly evil but powerful force to be opposed and destroyed. This practically defines Adolf Hitler's attitude towards the Jews. Such an individual can have enormous influence upon personalities suffering from borderline disorder, who typically swing sharply between self-glorification and self-abasement, and personality fragmentation caused by nervous anxiety or stress generally. Object relations theory gives a persuasive account for the psychological bases for the charismatic relationship, particularly between narcissistic leaders and fanatical followers suffering from borderline personality disorders.

The strength of the psychoanalytical approach is that it explains particular, significant types of psychological relationships which cannot be adequately accounted for within the needs and social learning approach. Even though Adler's and Horney's work is usually more properly applied to explaining difficulties faced by neurotic individuals who have difficulty functioning in their everyday lives, it also accounts for the formation and development of valuable traits which can propel gifted but psychologically tormented persons into positions of power and leadership. Similarly, object relations theory accounts for the psychological dynamics underlying the often intense commitments expressed by fanatical followers for narcissistic leaders who employ projective appeals to venerate themselves, their followers or emblems of their movement while vilifying their adversaries. For all the criticisms leveled against the psychoanalytic schools on theoretical and methodological grounds, including their excessive reliance upon clinical case studies which overemphasize psychopathological aspects and an occasional tendency towards gross overgeneralizations when applying their theories to social phenomena, this approach successfully addresses questions which others do not even raise. Psychoanalytical explanations are indispensable to accounts of individual motivations and psychopathological behavior. Used and applied properly, they are an invaluable source of insight and understanding.

One of the difficulties with the field of political psychology is its often tenuous connection with both new and often long established theories in psychology. In addition, because political psychologists are better versed in their own sub-discipline's literature than in the much broader ones of personality theory, social development and social psychology, there has been a significant shortfall in intellectual cross-fertilization. Thus, one finds the occasional opportunistic importation of a psychological theory into political psychology to address a particular kind or set of questions divorced from the greater intellectual context within which it had arisen. Once imported, the theory becomes the subject of specialized application without careful reference to further developments. The classic example of this is Freudian psychoanalysis. Harold D. Lasswell introduced it into political science, thereby creating the sub-discipline of political psychology in 1930. Unfortunately, few if any of the works subsequent to his discuss further developments in psychodynamic theory and relate innovations and their implications to the field's understanding of political motivations. Instead, works continued to be published in the 1970's testing "hypotheses" deriving from Lasswell's work which had been based upon theoretical work done in the 1920's. Very little of ego psychology, the theoretical successor to Freudian psychoanalysis, has found its way into political psychology. Object relations theory has fared somewhat better because of its utility in explaining certain features of leader behavior for psychobiographers.

The various needs approaches have been underutilized in political psychology and to explain the behavior of organizational leaders. Although a number of authors have applied Maslow's hierarchy of needs to the study of political behavior, it has not received the kind of empirical research attention necessary to establish its utility as an explanatory framework when applied to different levels of political participation, although circumstantial evidence continues to suggest its value. Likewise, McClelland's research agenda, pursued by himself and his students, has profound implications for establishing the impact of certain patterns of child-rearing and socialization upon subsequent adult behavior. It has been used to evaluate power and achievement needs of presidents. Little work has been done directly applying his strategy to the study of actual activists belonging to political parties or interest groups. In terms of its implications for how the field understands the motivational foundations of mass politics and mobilization, the most interesting work currently being done is the investigation into learned helplessness, though no studies have related it as a phenomenon to broad social forces or conditions. Despite the continuing research into political socialization, the field of political psychology is marked by a lack of innovation and responsiveness to innovations generated within the main body of psychology. In turn, this has created a gap between useful explanatory models and studies applying them to specific empirical problems. This disinterest limits the verifiability of these models despite their apparent utility. Though this is not the place to pursue this problem, it has to be acknowledged as a significant weakness in the field's literature.

But despite these difficulties, both the psychoanalytic and needs-social learning approaches remain valuable frameworks for explaining political motivations and behavior. It was noted at the outset of this discussion that the psychoanalytical and needs-social learning approaches are not necessarily incompatible in terms of their predictions about behavior. Under conditions of stress, Freudian theory predicts regression to a prior stage of behavior, typically one characterized by dependency, a desire for merger with the maternal source of security combined with identification with the authoritarian father-figure. In very different language and for different reasons, cognitive psychology predicts a depressive withdrawal, and a strong desire for comfort and security. Despite their incommensurable theoretical premises and many differences, both offer interesting parallels. Psychoanalytic theory is the more useful of the two in explaining the particularities of individual behavior and responses to certain kinds of circumstances. At the same time, the needs and social learning theories give better accounts of general behavior and tendencies. Combined, they give a stereoscopic view of the psychological foundations to both leader and follower behavior.

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CHAPTER THREE

MOTIVATIONAL BASES FOR LEADER BEHAVIOR

The significant works in political psychology have typically sought to establish relationships between certain internal psychological dispositions or motivational patterns and corresponding external behavioral habits or tendencies. The core objective of all political psychologists has been to show consistent similarities between internal dispositions and external external behavior. Beyond this, the principal scholars in the field have varied markedly in their research strategies and objectives. Nonetheless, they have all sought to present their findings in the form of typologies. This chapter examines these typologies with two objectives. The first is to present and review the main explanations of leader behavior within the field. The second and more important objective is to highlight important underlying parallels and similarities. To this end, the chapter closes with a synthesis of the principal explanatory typologies in the literature.

Political psychologists have emphasized four different ways of constructing explanations for political behavior. Case studies or psychobiographies, explain a single individual's pattern of behavior. Comparative case studies establish similarities and differences between specified actors in order to verify hypothesized propositions or as exploratory efforts seeking out observable patterns. Survey research begins with clear and explicit assumptions about the importance of various factors whose actual significance and interrelationships are then empirically tested. Typologies serve as a useful heuristic to summarize and present the significant relationships found through either the comparative case studies or survey research methods. Beyond their convenience, typologies also allow for the construction of theoretical "ideal-types" against which actual cases can be measured and gauged. In these cases, the most important feature of the typologies is their theoretical basis, since the cases themselves serve primarily to illustrate and confirm. The types themselves are important because they depict the correlations between significant attributes. There is a tendency when examining typologies to assume that the types are themselves "real" and not merely illustrative of theoretical constructions. This is dangerous. However well grounded in theoretical argumentation and empirical findings, the types and typologies remain imaginative constructs. The usefulness of typologies has been repeatedly demonstrated through their creative employment by such important political psychologists as Harold D. Lasswell, James David Barber, and others.

Harold Dwight Lasswell founded political psychology as a sub-discipline with the publication of Psychopathology and Politics in 1930.[1] This work inaugurated the systematic and theoretically grounded study of political personalities. Lasswell made three centrally related contributions to the field. First, he introduced psychoanalysis as the basis for theoretically grounding psychological explanations for political behavior. In turn, this allowed him and others to relate significant developmental events and tendencies within the life-history of an actor to her or his political conduct. This led Lasswell to identify a particular kind of motivation, which he labeled the compensation principle, with the power-seeking behavior of the *homo politicus*, the "political personality."[2] This argument constitutes his central contribution to the field and the contention which has generated the greatest interest among other social scientists. His final contribution derives from the preceding. Lasswell argued that the political personality manifests itself in three types: the agitator, the administrator, and the theorist. Although this last typology was significant in the early stages of the field, its value has declined sharply over time and therefore shall not be discussed here. Instead, the following discussion will concentrate upon Lasswell's argument about the compensation principle, power-seeking behavior, and the political personality.

But before this argument can be pursued, a crucial preparatory point Lasswell makes must be grasped. In a very curious discussion, Lasswell distinguished between the institutional and functional meanings of politics.[3] By institutional politics, Lasswell refers to the wide range of governmental or related processes which are conventionally associated with politics. These include political parties, public bureaucracies, legislatures, and judiciary, and the whole spectrum of overtly political concerns such as civil wars, revolutions, and international conflict. In more modern terms, Lasswell's institutional politics is the politics of the State. Lasswell's description of functional politics rests upon two definitions. He argues that a politician, in the best sense of the word, can be distinguished from a business man in that the former seeks integration of interests while the latter strives for special advantage or compromise (the two not being mutually exclusive). Lasswell states:

> An integration of interests is the solution of a conflict in such a way that neither "party recognizes that so much has been won and so much has been lost in the outcome. It represents a reinterpretation of the situation in a sense which renders the old line of battle, the older definition of interest, irrelevant....The essence of the contrast between integration and compromise is that of a synthesis and a trade. The politician is a discoverer of inclusive advantages, and the business man is a haggler for special advantages.[4]

The politician as synthesizer of inclusive interests is the first key definition. This defines function. Lasswell also says that "...the political man is the one whose principal value is the pursuit of power. The essence of power is understood to be the capacity, and usually the will, to impose one's own values as permanent or transitory motives upon others."[5] This defines behavior. Although these two definitions can overlap, they are not strictly co-relational. As Lasswell points out, political man can also be a business man. In his subsequent discussion, Lasswell stresses his definition of political man, leaving the other as a more normative contention. But together, the two establish the function and motivation of political man.

Lasswell describes the power-seeking personality as one that accentuates power over other values, relative to other persons. This power-seeking behavior defines *homo politicus*, or political man. He presents the motivational relationship for this kind of behavior:

> The political type is characterized by an intense and ungratified craving for deference. These cravings, both accentuated and unsatisfied in the primary circle, are displaced upon public objects (persons and practices connected with the power process). The displacement is rationalized in terms of public interest.[6]

Lasswell sums this process up as the displacement of private motives upon public objects rationalized as public interest. Even though the individual pursues power in order to obtain deference, he or she rationalizes this behavior as efforts to accomplish some celebratory public objective. This leads to the second component of Lasswell's formulation. He states:

> Our key hypothesis about the power seeker is that he pursues power as a means of compensation against deprivation. *Power is expected to overcome low estimates of the self*, by changing either the traits of the self or the environment in which it functions.

This is called the compensation principle and refers to the felt need for power as a compensation for low self-esteem.

Lasswell is careful to note that compensation is not an automatic result of deprivation since passive withdrawal is also a probable outcome. Lasswell identifies a number of factors which he regards as leading to compensatory behavior rather than withdrawal. First, compensation is more probable when the deprivation is not crippling. Second, the effect of deprivation is not overwhelming if the person still experiences some measure of benefit. Third, the deprivation is not overwhelming if it is not wholly attributed to the self. In addition, power will be favoured as a means of generating compensation if it is expected to yield more benefits than any other alternative. Finally, Lasswell argues that childhood conditions characterized by high levels of both indulgences and deprivations, so long as the two are related to acquiring skills and performances, can act as powerful inducements to learn a high level of personal motivation. Though Lasswell's compensation principle has been often interpreted as describing a psychopathological motivation, it makes more sense to regard it as deficiency motivation manifesting itself as a form of learned behavior resulting in a high need for power, as conceptualized by McClelland.

The central problem is how to interpret the compensation principle. The conventional version sees low self-esteem as a continuing character trait resulting in a constant need for ego enhancement. This results in an insatiable psychological need for power as a palliative. But a second interpretation may emphasize the contingent nature of low self-esteem. This interpretation recognizes that each person possesses self-expectations which, when unconfirmed, generate feelings of low self-esteem. The person has a choice. Either he or she lowers her or his expectations or redoubles efforts. The latter choice reflects a continuing perception of self-worth justifying the additional effort. Someone suffering from low self-esteem is more likely to withdraw than persist. If the persistence generates eventual success, the person has learned to regard feelings of low self-esteem as a signal or warning to increase effort in order to obtain desired outcome. Here, low self-esteem is conditional and transitory. It occurs in the context of a personality which may be characterized by high overall self-esteem. What distinguishes the two is the nature of the low self-esteem. In the conventional interpretation, the low self-esteem is a deeply rooted character trait, whereas in the revised version presented here, it is produced by the disparity between expectations and outcomes, resulting in either lower expectations or greater effort sustained by high overall self-esteem. These are not mutually exclusive or conflicting interpretations. Rather, they relate to differences in how the compensation principle works within the basic character structure of the person as well as the source and nature of felt low self-esteem.

An additional problem arises from how self-esteem is to be understood and measured. From Horney's work, anxiety induced by low self-esteem is effectively displaced, denied, or avoided. Under these circumstances it is not experienced or interpreted as low self-esteem. Thus, a person driven to compensate for feelings of personal inadequacy will do so by exhibiting behavior and expressing attitudes opposite to what might be expected. Horney's work suggests interpretive caution in the face of possible paradoxical expressions of low self-esteem. Surprisingly, Lasswell never seems to give full credit to Alfred Adler for the compensation principle. Adler's discussion of inferiority complexes and striving for superiority is virtually identical in meaning to Lasswell's own discussion. This omission is even more striking given Lasswell's evident familiarity with less central aspects of Adler's work.

Virtually all the criticisms of Lasswell's work seem to derive from misunderstandings or misreadings. A common line of criticism attacks his supposed contention that political man seeks power in order to compensate for low self-esteem. Investigators then proceed to show that political activists exhibit higher than average self-esteem. What is lost is the critical distinction between institutional and functional politics. Lasswell was not talking about people engaged in politics as it is conventionally understood. Rather, he had labeled power-aggrandizing behavior as being political regardless of whether it is manifested in legislative assemblies, corporate boardrooms or within the confines of the person's home. In this sense, Lasswell's political man bears a very strong resemblance to McClelland's Conquistador. But such personalities are not likely to be found in modern political parties or legislatures, both of which heavily emphasize cooperation and bargaining. Unfortunately, much of the evidence presented showing activists as having relatively high self-esteem relies upon survey self-reports which are susceptible to the kind of paradoxical expression that Horney had identified as a consequence of denial. Much of the criticism leveled at Lasswell simply does not connect because it reflects misreading of his work rather than direct refutation of key points. What may be the genuine weaknesses in his presentation have been left untouched as a result of the distractions created by ambiguities in his discussion.

The first serious criticism Lasswell should be asked to address is one of significance. Nowhere does he establish that "political man" is likely to be found engaging in institutional politics. If they restrict themselves to the professions, bureaucracies, and the like, then their actual impact on government may not be necessarily important. Despite his quite misleading use of case studies about men engaged in institutional politics, his basic argument suggests that it and functional politics may not have a particularly strong connection to each other. Lasswell has to show, as he has not, that political man engages in politics and in numbers or with influence sufficient to warrant the kind of intensive study this particular type has been accorded. As he himself has noted, the available research suggests that politics, at least in the polyarchies, is an inhospitable milieu for Lasswell's political man.

Second, as pointed out above, the compensation principle can be interpreted in a number of different ways. It is not apparent that Lasswell's understanding of his own idea is necessarily the most accurate description of the extremely complex psychological processes involved. This is not to say that he is wrong. It simply notes that his formulation may be such a gross and misleading oversimplification that it may mislead.

A final criticism of Lasswell is that he introduces psychopathology into the study of political personalities without establishing its interpretive boundaries. The use of psychiatric or psychoanalytic terminology unavoidably colours differences as deviance. The investigative focus is on identifying traumas which are then interpreted as the originative basis for some enduring behavior. This approach rests upon a pre-existing theoretical framework that both points out and then explains certain kinds of phenomena, without addressing the central puzzle about leaders: why are not others motivated by similar experiences. Even a selective reading of biographies, and some thought about ordinary humans, highlights the fact that it is not the occurrence of trauma but rather the person's response to them that separates those who become leaders from those who do not. Further, there are exceptional leaders who seem to have been largely unaffected by hardships of any kind while growing up. This may explain why there are no psychobiographies of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. While necessary as a valuable mode of explanation, the psychoanalytical approach accentuates aspects of political character which may have everything to do with ultimate failure, but nothing at all to say about why these same "failures" had careers leading up to the very summit of political power.

The principal value of Lasswell's theory is that it explains the motivations of the ideologically committed activist and politician. Regardless of whether private motives are displaced on to public objects because of a need for deference or as a consequence of some psychological trauma at a critical point in the individual's development, this powerful affective identification with some political enterprise or end constitutes the basis for intense political commitment to causes, parties, and movements. When combined with power-seeking behavior, this commitment becomes both the catalyst and engine driving political change when the greater socio-political conditions allow and favour such efforts. Although better accounts can be given of this displacement process using object relations theory, Lasswell deserves credit for being the first to identify the psychological basis of ideological commitment.

The Machaivellian personality identified by Richard Christie and Florence Geis bears a striking resemblance to McClelland's Conquistador and resembles Lasswell's political man in that they are both power-seekers.[10] But where "political man" seeks power to assuage esteem needs through rationalized power seeking, the Machiavellian has been socialized to seek exploitive advantage over others through an emotionally detached rational calculation. Unlike Lasswell's political man they do not form emotionally strong attachments to people, objects, or ideas. They do not displace private affects at all.

Christie and Geis identify four definitive characteristics of the Machaivellian personality. First, such a person remains emotionally detached within interpersonal relationships. He or she does not feel empathetic connection that may interfere in her or his capacity to manipulate the other person. Second, Machiavellians tend to lack concern for conventional morality. They exhibit no cognitive dissonance as a consequence of breaking conventional expectations. Third, they have low levels of ideological commitment. They are the quintessential pragmatists. They never become so preoccupied with their putative values that they allow them to interfere with the pursuit of success. Finally, they do not show any gross psychopathology. Machiavellians do not suffer from cognitive distortions induced by neuroses or psychotics. While the Machiavellian type may not be a morally appealing kind of personality, it constitutes a psychologically healthy adaptation to a social environment that emphasizes the pursuit of success and the attainment of personal ends through manipulation.

Machiavellians enjoy manipulating others and actively seek out settings or contexts which allow them to gain advantage over others. The central characteristic of Machiavellians is an emotionally detached cognitive style that emphasizes goal attainment. Concomitant to this is a tendency to objectify others and regard them in terms of their instrumental value. Their amorality also seems to reflect a generalized sense of hostility and anomie. Machiavellians possess an unflattering view of other humans. Christie and Geis find that Machiavellianism correlates strongly with urbanization, level of industrialization, and parental permissiveness. It does not correlate with ideology, intelligence, education, and a wide range of other traits or characteristics. Those scoring high on the Christie-Geis scale for Machiavellianism consistently outperformed those scoring moderately or low in every situation replicating circumstances commonly occurring in politics. In fact, those directly modeling political contexts such as legislatures, political issue bargaining, and others were the circumstances were High Machiavellians prevailed by the greatest margins and with the most frequency. The striking similarities between the Christie-Geis Machiavellian and the McClelland Conquistador suggests that the two may be the same. The Machiavellians personality type is significant because of its striking success in gaining power. Unlike Lasswell's political man, the Machiavellian's sole concern is power unfettered by attempts at rationalization.

As mentioned earlier, it is unknown how common any of these characteristics actually are among practicing politicians and political activists in the industrialized polyarchies. A different approach to identifying political types begins by examining prominent politicians themselves and seeking to find consistent patterns of behavior and motivation. This relies upon the comparative case studies method to identify consistent patterns of similarities and differences. These kinds of works demand formidable powers of scholarship and insight. Consequently, they are exceedingly rare. For these reasons, James David Barber's The Lawmakers[11] and Presidential Character[12] constitute significant works. In The Lawmakers, Barber explores the characteristics of Connecticut state assembly people to uncover factors influencing their legislative effectiveness. In Presidential Character, he examines the life histories of the twentieth century presidents to seek out personality traits or patterns predictive of subsequent performance in the White House. The latter work constitutes a major achievement in terms of scope and implications.

Barber constructs fourfold typologies in both works based upon a pair of attributes. The Lawmakers typology is organized around the legislator's activity level and willingness to return. By cross-cutting these two, Barber comes up with his spectators, Advertisers, Reluctants, and Lawmakers. For the Presidential Character Barber retains activity level but substitutes general orientation towards life-work (positive or negative) for willingness to return. Thus, he derives his now famous four-fold classification of presidents: active-positives, passive-positives, passive-negatives, and active-negatives. Although The Lawmakers is an interesting work in its own right, Presidential Character represents Barber's mature thinking on the relationship between the person and political performance.

Barber identifies five concepts critical to explaining this relationship: character, world view, style, power situation, and climate of expectations.[13] The two latter ones relate to the leader's context and are not as relevant as the three concerning the personality. Barber argues that a president's personality is patterned by these three factors into a dynamic package exhibiting enduring and predictable characteristics. A president's character originates out of childhood experiences and reflects the person's enduring orientation towards life experiences. Barber highlights two central features. Self-esteem is the leader's principal resource, its protection and enhancement the politician's most essential activity. Related and of equal importance are the person's criteria of self-evaluation. This is the pattern of self-expectations which govern the person's preferences and intentions. The president's world view evolves into being during adolescence and reflects her or his conceptions about causality, human nature, and morality. Style congeals into being during early adulthood and consists of the politician's habitual pattern of performing three political functions: rhetoric, personal relations, and homework. Rhetoric refers to how the person speaks and generally handles her or himself in public. Personal relations refers to interpersonal dealings, while homework deals with work habits and patterns of thought. The balance of these three elements defines a leader's style just as character, world view, and style, reflect the influence of the individual's personality upon her or his political behavior.

As mentioned earlier, at the core of Barber's work lies his fourfold typology of character.[14] The first baseline, activity-passivity, reflects the amount of energy a leader invests into her or his political tasks. Barber cites as representative of the two extremes Lyndon Baines Johnson and Calvin Coolidge, the former as legendary for his awesome drive as the latter for his constant resting. The second baseline, positive-negative, pertains to how the leader feels about her or his political life. Barber argues that these two factors constitute central features to every human personality and together provide a simple classificatory system. Active-Positives are characterized by relatively high self-esteem and success in dealing with their environments. They exhibit a high degree of fit and congruence with their political circumstances and appear to actively enjoy their roles and efforts. Active-Negatives perceive life as a hard struggle within which winning and holding power are essential necessities for dealing with their political conditions. At the same time, they are hag-ridden by a perfectionist or highly moralistic conscience. They deploy often intense effort marked by a compulsive quality from which they derive very little emotional satisfaction. They seem to be seeking escape from anxieties through their work. Passive-Positives manifest an optimistic cheerfulness which belies their low self-esteem and need for constant compensatory affection. They are compliant, other-directed, agreeable and cooperative. Passive-Negatives in politics are a paradox since they do little and like their roles even less. They engage in politics out of a deeply felt sense of duty and obligations which counteract and compensate for low self-esteem. As a consequence of their sense of duty and obligation, they tend to be the defenders of what is "right, good, and true." Although Barber characterizes them in unflattering terms, he does include George Washington among their midst. That these are not on balance trivial individuals suggests that the occupants of this category should not to be summarily dismissed without inspection of their actual record of accomplishments. Barber summarizes by stating that the Active-Positives are after achievements, the Active-Negatives seek power, the Passive-Positives want love or affection, and the Passive-Negatives try to do what they see as their duty.

Presidential Character can be faulted on a number of levels. The least important but most annoying feature of Barber's impressive scholarship is his minimal use of references. Also, Barber does not identify the psychological theories he draws from. In his extended and thorough review of the book, Alexander L. George concludes that:

> ...the dimensions of active-passive and positive-negative affect, as presently defined and operationalized, unsuitable for the kind of rich developmental and psychodynamic character typology Barber has attempted to formulate; they can be

> retained only if they are altered to take note of *qualitative* differences in activity and affect displayed at the phenomenological level of behavior.[15]

George also recommends a less ambitious undertaking than Barber's attempt to link phenomenological, psychodynamic, and psychogenetic factors to specific character types. George's balanced and carefully considered critique of Barber's work has to be taken in context. Though George identifies critical failings in Barber's analytical methodology as well in his psychological assumptions and theory, he acknowledges Barber's considerable achievement in developing a substantive explanation relating personality to performance. What makes Barber's work hard to judge fairly is that despite its considerable flaws, it is the finest systematic analysis of its kind. In scope and depth, it dwarfs all other similar works. Thus, while George's many criticisms accurately state its weaknesses, it remains a pathbreaking effort to systematically understand the relationship between character and performance.

One of George's central criticisms of Barber's work is that it does not offer an explanation of character that connects with existing psychological theories.[16] In this context, David L. Rothberg makes a significant if apparently unintended contribution to providing a firmer grounding for Barber's typology. In Insecurity and Success in Organizational Life, Rothberg lays out his own fourfold typology using as his pair of variables, high-low self-esteem and internal-external locus of control.[17] As in similar studies, self-esteem is taken to be self-perceptions of worth and efficacy while internal-external locus of control refers to the extent to which the person perceives that he or she has control over her or his own circumstances. Those who perceive themselves as possessing substantive control are "internals", whereas those who attribute predominant influence to factors outside their power are "externals." Rothberg uses these two variables to construct four types: Rational Man (high/internal), Existential Man (high/external), Administrative Man (low/internal), and Entrepreneurial Man (low/external). Rothberg then applies his typology to two groups of elite military and business manager-leaders. Despite the significant differences in methodology and treatment of psychological theories, Rothberg's findings show striking similarities to Barber's assessments. This suggests that Rothberg's quantitative and more precise work confirms Barber's more qualitative interpretations. By providing theoretical contact as well as additional evidence in a different form, Rothberg helps address one of George's more significant attacks on Barber's typology.

Perhaps the most impressive feature of comparison between the two typologies is the way that four pairs of types emerge. Barber's active-passive variable seems to manifest the behavioral consequences of high or low self-esteem while positive-negative affect reflects whether the locus of fate control is perceived as internal or external by the actor. Thus, one finds the following pairs: Active-Positive Rational Man, Active-Negative Existential Man, Passive-Positive Administrative Man, and Passive-Negative Entrepreneurial Man. Strong similarities within each pairing suggest that the two typologies are substantively the same.

Rothberg's Rational Man possesses a high sense of self-esteem and a strong belief in her or his capacity to effectively control her or his environment. He or she is characteristically trusting and trustworthy in addition to being both extroverted and free of anxieties. The Rational Man manifests moderate need for power and for affiliation but is overwhelmingly motivated to seek out and solve problems. In this sense, the Rational Man is propelled by self-actualizing growth motivation. The acquisition of power is perceived as coincidentally necessary to solving problems but is not in itself central. Self-actualization is manifested through the desire to accept and meet challenges. Rational Man's critical characteristic is that he or she is unburdened by long-standing psychological difficulties. The principal similarities between Rational Man and Barber's Active-Positive are that they do not suffer from unresolved traumas. They are both highly rational and solution seeking as opposed to being driven to accumulate ever more power. They approach their tasks with positive emotional feelings. High self-esteem combined with a perception of the world as both rational and controllable underlie the character type Barber labels Active-Positive.

Like Barber's Active-Negative, Rothberg's Existential Man is simultaneously the most complex, intriguing and problematic type of leader. They are also the romantic, tragic heroes of their respective typologies. Unlike Barber's description, Rothberg's stresses the more positive features which help explain their paradoxical successfulness. The central contradiction in Existential Man is the presence of very high self-esteem along with a belief in the essential uncontrollability and unpredictability of one's life circumstances. Both these qualities also occur in Barber's Active-Negative politicians. Rothberg rightly points to Machiavelli's reference to the Prince's conflict-ridden relationship with *Fortuna*. Both the Prince and Existential Man seek to gain power over fickle *Fortuna* through action. Like the Prince, Existential Man is marked by an extremely high need for power, very low activity inhibitions and low need for affiliation and for achievement. Existential Man seeks power in order to establish well ordered environments susceptible to ready control. Underlying Existential Man's need for power is a deeply rooted sense of anxiety. In this, Existential Man shares an important resemblance with Lasswell's political man except that the former is driven by basic anxiety rather than low self-esteem. It is legitimate to ask whether the extremely high self-esteem expressed by Existential Man is simply a reaction-formation which arose to help repress deeper feelings of *low* self-esteem. Unfortunately, it is difficult to tell whether Rothberg's instruments could have penetrated sufficiently far into the individuals' subconscious minds. This speculation is important because if this is the case, then Existential Man is Lasswell's political man as well as Barber's Active-Negative. All three learned activism as their most effective response to threats against their well-being and this has produced a perception of the world as threatening but which, given sufficient power, can be successfully confronted, subdued and made safe.

Like the Passive-Positive, Administrative Man is preoccupied by concerns about how others perceive her or him. He or she strives to fulfill group norms and becomes disturbed in the face of unstable or crosscutting expectations. Through diligent effort the Administrative Man is typically very successful within stable organizational roles and contexts. Administrative Man's central driving motivation is her or his need for affiliation and for approval from others. The similarities between Barber's Passive-Positive and Rothberg's Administrative Man suggest that they represent the same type of personality.

The Passive-Negative Entrepreneurial Man contradicts virtually every normal expectation of what a leader-manager is supposed to be like. Like Existential Man, Entrepreneurial Man perceives fate as extremely controlled. But unlike the former, the latter does not approach it with an aggressive mastery-seeking stance. Entrepreneurial Man experiences a sense of despair in the face of perceived uncertainties over her or his capacity to effectively cope with an uncontrollable environment and other powerful people. Life is experienced as a trial. The Entrepreneurial Man has an extremely low need to achieve but very high need for power concomitant with extremely strong activity inhibitions. This combination of very high power need and activity inhibitions renders her or him simultaneously crosscut and cross-pressured. Such a person may subliminate the need for power under a drive to do one's duty, thereby making it compatible with the activity inhibitions. This conflict lies at the heart of her or his intense unhappiness. He or she is almost a classic example of someone powerfully driven to realize a passionate desire while detesting herself or himself for possessing the feeling. Rothberg neither suggests nor explores the clearly sexual, and Freudian, implications of this kind of conflict. The similarities between Entrepreneurial Man and Barber's Passive-Negative derive from their similar tendencies towards passivity combined with their general sense of unhappiness. It is impossible to tell of whether the Passive-Negative shares Entrepreneurial Man's intense but constricted need for power.

Interestingly, Rothberg equates Entrepreneurial Man to McClelland's Imperial Personality since both exhibit very high power needs combined with high activity inhibitions and low affiliation needs. However, nothing in McClelland's account of The Imperial Personality type suggests low self-esteem or external locus of control. Further, the Imperial Personality's inhibitions seem directed more towards moderating consumptive impulses than constraining manifestations of power need. The inhibitions seem to sublimate personal power needs so that they are transformed into what McClelland refers to as "empire building", the creation of powerful organizations capable of fulfilling ideological or religious goals. What lies at the heart of the apparent disagreement is their understanding of activity inhibitions. Rothberg associates inhibitions with an incapacity to act upon power impulses whereas McClelland interprets them as sublimation. In McClelland's formulation, inhibitions redirect power needs from the kind of personal conquests he associates with the Conquistador to the rational conquest or creation of organizational power he identifies as characteristic of the Empire-Builder. From McClelland's description, the Imperial Personality can be utterly ruthless in exercising power so long as he or she is doing so on behalf of a self-perceived legitimate cause. Again, this is suggestive of Lasswell's political man except that the displacement of power needs onto public objects is a consequence of socialization and its actualization the result of person's very high, not low, self-esteem. Underlying the Imperial Personality is a belief in an ordered and intelligible world susceptible to human control. It is also worth repeating that the perceived locus of fate control maybe either external or internal.

This means that either Rational or Existential Man may possess an Imperial Personality depending upon whether their power needs have been socialized into empire-building as opposed to the pursuit of personal conquests. However, it is much more likely that Rational Man will be an Empire-Builder than a Conquistador because her or his belief in a rationally ordered intelligible universe provides the conceptual foundation necessary for an Imperial Personality. However, Existential Man may also have a worldview that is personally directive but that also conceives of the world as unstable and uncertain. This creates an enormous tension within Existential Man. On one hand, he or she is driven to fulfill a particular set of ideological or religious goals in the face of a potentially hostile and threatening environment. But in the face of this uncertainty he or she nonetheless possesses a huge counter-balancing wellspring of self-confidence and self-esteem with which to face down the constant feelings of anxiety and threat of failure.

Like the Rational Imperial Personality, the Existential Empire-Builder's belief system directs her or him to displace personal power needs onto public objects and thereby provides a focus for her or his drive but without the comfort of knowing that success will naturally follow from the effort. The Existential Imperial Personality builds in the face of hostility and conflict. For this reason, one may find that this personality type predominates among Active-Negative politicians, revolutionaries, and leaders who rise to power in the face of extreme social instability and national danger. Conversely, one expects to find Rational Empire-Builders arising out of expansionary, self-confident elite social classes. Such leaders manifest their essentially rational and optimistic worldview even in the midst of profound social crises. Their objective is to reconstruct, reform or enhance what they perceive as a basically intelligible and benevolent social reality. Both the Rational and Existential Empire-Builders are agents of order even though the former seem more inclined to support the *status quo* while the latter are more likely to pursue change. Both are fundamentally motivated by a desire to create and sustain an enduring and stable social order.

In contrast to the Imperial Personality's enduring desire to establish order, the Conquistador seeks power for its own sake. Existential Man and the Conquistador have a natural affinity. Existential Man's sense of uncertainty and intense need for power corresponds easily with the Conquistador's nihilism and power drive. The Conquistador is intrinsically Machiavellian and Existential Man can easily assimilate this kind of behavior. Although the idea of a Rational Conquistador is in principle possible, the underlying value orientations of Rational Man conflict strongly with the Conquistador's primal nihilism. Though this contradiction makes the likelihood of a Rational Conquistador improbable, it does not make it impossible because it is entirely possible for a person to be highly rational in the pursuit of power for its own sake. The Rational Conquistador is a Machiavellian who also possesses high self-esteem and an internal locus of control while lacking a sense of positive value or meaning in life beyond acquisitiveness. Machiavellianism and acquisitiveness are already inherent within the Conquistador, so locus of control becomes the key factor in determining whether this sub-type also fits into Rothberg's Rational Man category. Nothing in Rothberg's description of Rational Man precludes the Conquistador-type from overlapping with it. The Rational Conquistador shares the Machiavellian's central characteristics of affect detachment and "cool" cognitive style. Like the Machiavellian, Rational Man also emphasizes dispassionate problem-solving with minimum inhibitions on power-oriented actions. Like Rational Man, the Machiavellian pursues power because its possession and exercise is both enjoyable and the necessary basis for desirable solutions to situational problems. The Rational Conquistador is simply a Machiavellian Rational Man.

The preceding discussion of Lasswell, Barber, Rothberg and McClelland shows the explanatory importance of general psychological theories to understanding what are still the major attempts by political psychologists to provide a general explanation of political types and their characteristic behavior. Rothberg's work in particular is important in that it highlights a number of key attributes of leaders, as opposed to managers, which have not been previously identified. Specifically, he stresses the importance of leaders being uninhibited in their willingness to act upon their power motives. Here he seems to differ significantly from McClelland although Rothberg is not specific enough to properly identify the root of disagreement. He also points to the importance of moderate levels of narcissism as a necessary prerequisite for effectiveness as a leader. In addition to being largely uninhibited, a leader must also possess sufficient self-love and self-confidence to be internally motivated. This finding is strongly suggested by psychodynamic theories. The underlying similarities of these works suggest that present lines of research may shortly generate a general theory of leadership motivation encompassing research as different as that of McClelland and Barber.

This chapter reviewed the significant attempts by political psychologists to offer general explanations for leader behavior and motivations. In so doing, it also showed the importance of the general theories of motivation to the more applied efforts. The next chapter will build upon the preceding discussion in an attempt to identify more precisely the qualities which seem to distinguish potentially charismatic leaders from the more ordinary variety who typically rise to power during stable political times.

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1. Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

2. Ibid., p. 74-7.

3. Ibid., p. 46-51.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

6. Lasswell, *Power and Personality*, p. 38.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 40-1.

9. Sniderman, p. 257-62.
Stanley Allen Renshon, *Psychological Needs and Political Behavior: A Theory of Personality and Political Efficacy* (New York: The Free Press, 1974), p. 233-9.
Fred I. Greenstein, *Personalities and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 3-23.

10. Florence Geis, "Machiavellianism" in *Dimensions of Personality*, ed. Harvey London and John E. Exner, Jr. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), p. 351-5.

11. James David Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

12. James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, sec. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977).

13. *Ibid.*, p. 7-9.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 11-4.

15. Alexander L. George, "Assessing Presidential Character," *World Politics* 24, 2: 278 (1974).

16. *Ibid.*, p. p. 246-9.

17. David L. Rothberg, *Insecurity and Success in Organizational Life: Sources of Personal Motivation Among Leaders and Managers*, p. 13-20, 149-75.

CHAPTER FOUR

LEADER TYPES AND THEIR UNDERLYING PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSONALITY STRUCTURES

So far, this thesis has concentrated upon reviewing the various theories and typologies developed to explain and categorize leaders and leadership behaviour. This chapter seeks to relate these ideas to actual individuals, showing how their psychodynamic motivations result in particular kinds of leader behaviour. A number of points need to be made at the outset. First, this is not about passive or inactive leaders. Only Active-Positive or Active-Negative leaders, using Barber's terminology, are examined. Second, a basic principle followed throughout is that the most significant difference between the various kinds of Conquistador and Imperial personalities is the absence of a self-transcending belief system in the former and its presence in the latter. Nihilism is taken to reflect the absence of a sense of personal meaning integrated into a greater scheme of things. This sense of meaning can derive from an elaborate ideology or deep religious faith, or an implicit worldview. Third, this chapter emphasizes the similarities between leaders rather than their differences. This is intended to highlight the star qualities which make them leaders and leaders of differing types. Finally, this chapter highlights psychological characteristics which lead to effective leadership. The first section looks at narcissistic leaders and the various kinds of personality types which appear as a consequence of this particular disorder. It concludes with a discussion of how leaders with healthy egos develop traits which offer them abilities similar to those exhibited by narcissists. The second section looks at neurotic leaders possessing remarkable talents who were both driven as well as eventually destroyed by their unresolved intrapsychic conflicts. They are compared to a pair of Imperial personalities who exemplify the very best that can be achieved in terms of healthy personality development in the absence of profound crises at some formative stage in life. The primary object of this chapter is to "flesh out" the theoretical discussions of the previous chapters and relate personality types to specific patterns of developmental experiences.

Individuals suffering from the narcissistic personality disorder manifest a grandiose self-image and often paranoiac worldview. In clinical cases, this disorder so completely incapacitates the person's ability to interact with others and the environment generally that he is incapable of achieving any workable relationships at all. In some cases however, the person retains a high order of effectiveness because the impairment focuses upon a particular set of object relations while leaving the others alone. Vamik labels this "destructive narcissism" and it is contextually adaptive under conditions where qualities like paranoia, the absence of affective attachment to others, and virtually absolute confidence of ultimate success are invaluable.[1] This kind of personality is also functional in settings marked by hyper-suspiciousness such as in societies beset by human-made or natural disasters, or where patterns of victimization characterize relations between significant numbers of people.[2] These kinds of societies and people are particularly susceptible to a kind of leader appeal that emphasizes a combative orientation in which relations are organized around a "we are right, just and deserving of more but our enemies are evil, exploitive and undeserving of what they already have" conception of social reality. Groups which proceed from this view tend to be highly combative and engender a particular leader-style that Robert Tucker terms the "warfare personality." Robert S. Robins states:

> This "warfare personality" is associated with a leader who is hyper-suspicious, politicises his world image, and has a great capacity for self-deception and self dramatization. Although the warfare personality is very much ego-centered, its holder gives the impression of his being group-centered. The leader with a warfare personality may often be part of an organization that has a bureaucracy, but he is not a bureaucrat. He is preeminently a political activist. Most typically he is a person driven by a desire to acquire power and accomplish some abstract end.[3] Because he was against the dominant powers, he is characteristically a self-starter.

This "warfare personality" exhibits clear family resemblances to Lasswell's "political agitator" variant of "political man." Both of these personality types have their origin in the problematic treatment of ego-threatening experiences which resulted in impaired self and object relations. Narcissism generally employs self-idealization and vilification of the other as ego-defense mechanisms. Destructive narcissism is distinguished by the extent to which specific objects are characterized as wholly bad or evil.[4] This basic dichotomization underlies the operations of the warfare personality. Both Hitler and Stalin fit this pattern of self-aggrandizement, paranoiac suspiciousness, affective alienation from others, and separation of the surrounding political reality into starkly good and bad objects. Their worldview and behaviour reflects the operations of a warfare personality driven by destructive narcissism. This kind of narcissism also facilitates formation of Warlord charisma; by emphasizing the heroic struggle against hated and powerful enemies on behalf of the followers, it induces hero worship and the cult of personality. However, it is not the only type of narcissism capable of generating this kind of devotion.

Vamik also distinguishes a second type of narcissism which he labels "reparative." Though reparative narcissism can become destructive since it too identifies some evil or bad condition, its impact is more positive. Just as destructive narcissism identifies and seeks to destroy the objects of its hatred, reparative narcissism ennobles and strives to uplift the favoured objects with which the reparative narcissist identifies and has internalized into her or his won idealized self-image. This kind of narcissism is in many ways less severe and less "primitive" than the destructive version. Vamik explains how personal qualities and family circumstances, especially his relationship with his devoted but grieving mother, resulted in the formation of a narcissistic personality in Kemal Ataturk.[5] This personality was not dysfunctional, partially because Ataturk's exceptional talents validated substantial aspects of his idealized self-image of supreme self-confidence, self-certainty and conviction, Olympian aloofness, and personal dominance over others. Vamik roots Ataturk's drive to westernize Turkey in his rejection of his mother's image as religiously pious and grieving, venerating instead her image of her as a "merry widow." Ataturk identified Islam and traditionalism with his mother's grief and sought to liberate her from pain by liberating Turkey from Moslem tradition. His behaviour towards "adopted daughters" also suggests a powerful desire to liberate the memory of his mother from Moslem pietism. Ataturk's reforms gave Turkish women a degree of personal and legal freedom unrivalled by any but the most advanced western countries. Ataturk identified Islamic practices and traditions with Turkey's backwardness as well as his mother's grief. His modernization drive sought to transform Turkey into a European country and entailed the rejection of Islamic norms. On a psychodynamic level, it freed his grieving mother to be the merry widow of his idealized memory. The central characteristic of the reparative narcissist is an emphasis upon the restoration of some fallen or threatened ideal. It does not rest upon the denigration of some hated object, though it may come to that if it is seriously frustrated.

The more conventional understanding of narcissism is as chronic self-love manifesting itself as intense egotism, self-centredness, lack of emotional involvement with others, and a general lack of regard for the interests and concerns of others beyond what is instrumentally necessary. This kind of narcissism is the psychodynamic foundation for the related Machiavellian and Conquistador personality types. What is crucial to this constellation of similar types is the absence of any governing purpose other than the desire for nihilistic power. Henry Kissinger's discussion of Otto von Bismarck shows what happens when one such as this finds his "calling."[6] Kissinger recounts a charming story about how Bismarck wins the hand of Joanna von Puttkammer through an adroit combination of shock, relentless pressure, guile and *fait accompli*, despite Joanna's own deeply held Christian pietism and her father's objections. Kissinger goes on to show how the cunning, sense of timing, boldness, and willingness to seize every opportunity to create a *fair accompli* leading to victory in *le guerre d'amour* prefigured his style of operations in political and military campaigns. What transformed Bismarck from being simply a gifted rake into the dominant statesman of his era was the eventual impact of the pietism of Joanna and her friend, Marie von Thadden. He saw himself and God as in an equal partnership in ruling Europe. He adopted statecraft as his calling. What is central in the case of Bismarck is not his thorough-going Machiavellianism - every leader of consequence has employed guile, deception and psychological coercion to overcome opponents - but his adoption of a governing purpose which sublimated his nihilism and focused his endeavors towards long-term accomplishment.

Bismarck's case highlights a central point: even though the Conquistador personality type possesses both the indispensable drive for power and the critically important Machiavellian orientation, it does not possess the self-transcending sense of mission or purpose that Charles de Gaulle stressed as an essential prerequisite for achieving a lasting political greatness.[7] This point is most clearly brought home by the life-history of another national leader whom Kissinger studied, though not academically, with great care: Richard M. Nixon. For all of his considerable gifts and intellect, Nixon's life was governed by a recurring structure of self-induced crises which repeated a more basic pattern originating in the conflictual circumstances of his childhood and adolescence. His central problem went far beyond lacking a governing purpose. He used the pursuit of power as a way of distracting himself from a foreboding sense of looming disaster. The absence of a sense of purpose beyond the pursuit of power prevented him from transcending the cycle through allegiance to a cause or purpose whose nature would have given an alternative to his power-seeking. De Gaulle had stressed the ultimately self-destructive danger posed by selfish power striving.

The discussion so far has focused upon the nature of narcissistic leadership, looking in turn at its destructive, reparative and, for want of a better term, egoistic variants. A number of basic points were made. First, the attraction of narcissistic leaders for many followers derives from their projection of an idealized self-image. Destructive narcissists offer a vision of society to their followers which is paranoiac and combative, emphasizing the existence of some hateful enemy who must be destroyed. Reparative narcissists seek to restore their fallen followers to a higher plane of glory, thus rendering their hero-worship even more glorious. These leaders strive to uplift and restore the confidence of their people and nation as a way of further uplifting themselves. The third kind are egoists possessing remarkable talents who subordinate their power-striving to a cause greater than their own narrow interests which, fortuitously, nonetheless allows for the achievement and protection of egoistic desires. Within the context of the literature, a problem has arisen as a result of the tendency of a number of authors to label seemingly all leaders who show enormous self-confidence and self-certainty as narcissists. This trend is as potentially harmful to the study of leadership as the already current habit of confusing popularity with charisma. Narcissism is not the only basis for the supreme self-confidence, self-certainty and other qualities which seem so essential to charismatic as well as other forms of leadership.

Three distinctly separate but mutually buttressing "mental habits" together can provide the Imperial personality with psychodynamic processes that resemble, sometimes very closely, either reparative or egoistic narcissism in both psychological structure and behavioural outcomes. The first of these is the selection and development of an Ego-Ideal which serves a similar purpose within the healthy mind as self-idealization does in the narcissistic one. The second function, which corresponds to the splitting and projection of unpleasant attributes outward, is the protection of the Ego from stresses through healthy coping mechanisms, the most important of which are rational thought, and adaptation to the environment. The final "mental habit" is commitment to an Ego-transcending ideology or belief system that serves to organize the person's objective and behavior. The behavioural similarities between the Imperial and narcissistic personalities are striking but are rooted in different psychological processes. What fundamentally characterizes the narcissistic personality is the subconscious process of self-idealization through the failure to create properly integrated psychological relationships with eternal objects. Self-confidence, self-certainty and other charismatic qualities can be achieved by other means.

The function of an Ego-Ideal in psychoanalytic theory is to provide an image of the self as it ideally ought to be in the person's own mind. Typically, this image is ill-formed and vague, the product of often contradictory cultural values transmitted to the individual through family, friends and the greater social environment. But sometimes, the individual organizes these conceptions into a coherent and clear ideal self-image. The critical difference between this and narcissistic self-idealization is the consciousness with which the selection is made and the thought that is then invested in clarifying the characteristics of this self-conception. It is far more thoughtful than idle daydreaming, though it is in daydreams that both this and narcissism begin. V. I. Lenin and Charles de Gaulle went through this process during adolescence.[8] Profoundly influencing the future course of Lenin's psychological development was a third-rate romantic novel with the influential title What Is To Be Done?[9] In it, the author, N. G. Chenychevsky provides detailed portraits of a "new type" of person whose extraordinary traits of character mark her or him as being radically different from the norm. These examples were adopted by radicals as the Russian revolutionary left's version of Horatio Alger stories. The adolescent Lenin read and reread this utopian work with its idealized heroic characters. Lenin in maturity went on to describe the work as one of the most significant influences upon his life. He was right. The image of the unflinchingly steadfast and almost superhuman hero was the image he eventually grew into, both in terms of the historical reality as well as in the minds of his followers,

Unfortunately, Lenin did not leave behind any easily accessible studies into his conception of what constitutes excellent political leadership. For this reason, de Gaulle's work is invaluable for the insight it provides into the mind of another great leader who, like Lenin, acquired his sense of the Ego-Ideal from books read in childhood and adolescence.[10] De Gaulle absorbed the image of lonely hero, characterized by enormous self-mastery, preparing for his rendezvous with destiny. In addition, he incorporated a number of strong beliefs regarding self-control and submission to the higher cause of the French nation. Like Churchill,[11] with whom he shares a number of important similarities, de Gaulle conceived of himself as destined to serve as the protector of his nation's essential character, as well as its frontiers. This identification with the mystical aspects of their respective nations enabled both of them, like Ataturk, to appeal effectively to their countryfolk for support in times of national calamity. In this important respect, both Churchill and de Gaulle exhibited the characteristic manifestation of narcissistic idealization in the form of intense nationalism. However, neither exhibited many of the other signs, at least not very strongly. De Gaulle carefully considered and described his conception of personal leadership in Le Fil de l'Eppe which conveyed an almost romantic conception of the heroic leader struggling to tame and master events through the adroit use of force and fraud employed in the service of a higher cause. De Gaulle's image of the leader was as an aloof patrician commanding by force of personality the surrounding circumstances. As Stanley and Inge Hoffman show, de Gaulle consciously organized and set out to actualize an idealized self-image.[12] That both Lenin and de Gaulle succeeded in fashioning themselves to correspond to their Ego-Ideals accounts in no small measure for their ultimate effectiveness as world leaders.

One of the central reasons why many potentially great leaders like Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon and Woodrow Wilson squandered their enormous potential is because of their failure to deal effectively with threats to their egos.[13] Scholars who describe this as evidence of fundamentally low self-esteem miss an important point. High self-esteem is simply a well-entrenched belief in one's capacity to deal effectively with potentially ego-threatening situations. So long as the ego deals effectively with potential threats, it is said to be compensating for the stresses to which it is being subjected. When its thinking or behaviour becomes ineffectual or maladaptive it is said to be decompensating. High self-esteem is rooted in the awareness of a past history of effective coping with threats. Based on their own life experiences, different leaders preferentially emphasize different combinations of coping mechanisms which, in turn, define what Barber had described as leader style. However, a number of coping mechanisms seem to be consistently employed by political leaders.

First, they emphasize problem-solving. This necessarily also entails emphasizing rational thinking, external-environmental rather than internal-emotional variables, a sense of at least partial control over events, and a sense of self as either a sovereign self-interested actor or an autonomous agent for some transcendent cause or interest. The capacity to sustain this externally oriented focus upon the environment and all the variables within it is a function of either a mental rigidity that precludes introspection or a finely developed sense of appropriateness reinforced by considerable self-control over thoughts. Sustaining external focus doubly serves to promote the individual's operational effectiveness within her or his environment while precluding potentially ego-damaging thoughts.

Second, in addition to an externally-oriented problem-solving orientation, all the leaders studied had developed specific mental habits geared to shield their egos from negative effects produced by the self-attribution of fault relating to failures or mistakes. One effective technique, used by narcissists, is to attribute all successes to one's self and failures to others. More conventionally, this is the searching out of scapegoats to whom blame can be attached. A second approach is affective detachment. This is the practiced distancing of negative thoughts and affects using a combination of thought-affect discrimination, intellectual detachment, rationally selective awareness, diversion, and suppression. Although few if any leaders could sustain this separation of thoughts from affects all the time and for every kind of situation, the capacity for self-regulation of emotions, often including the ability to evoke a powerfully expressed sentiment at will, is one of the central recurring traits of historically significant leaders. Perhaps the most important manifestation of this capacity is in the form of self-confidence because it enables a leader not only to project self-assurance but also to feel it, virtually on command.

A third recurring attribute of great leaders is possession of faith in a coherent belief system such as religion or ideology, or the veneration of some cultural ideals such as the nation or ethnic group. Though these are not mutually exclusive commitments, narcissistic leaders tend to emphasize the latter while non-narcissistic ones seem more bound by the former. As discussed earlier, the narcissistic attachment to a venerated ideal-object reflects the ego's efforts to maintain the internal coherence of its own self-idealization through identification with an idealized external image. A rationally defensible and experientially reliable belief system serves a different function for a healthy ego. First, it forms a conceptual framework for organizing and resolving potential conflicts between different desires or aspirations. This serves as an internally consistent hierarchy of goals and values facilitating instrumentally rational behaviour. Second, it provides a predictive explanation for causal relationships within the politically relevant social environment. Third, it gives the ethical reason why certain political projects, as opposed to others, should be pursued. Finally, it can comfort failure by offering satisfactory explanations for their occurrence. These belief systems help sustain emotional self-regulation and an external focus.

The mechanisms an individual selects and develops to deal with threats to the ego constitute the single most important set of personality factors determining overall effectiveness as a leader. The first critical distinction is between those suffering from what Horney described as "basic anxiety" and those who do not. As discussed earlier, the former type are unlikely to become leaders because of unresolved neurotic conflicts. However, some select neurotic fixations which are circumstantially adaptive. These individuals have habits of thought and action which facilitate the acquisition of political power and position under ordinary conditions but which become maladaptive under others. Classic examples include Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon and Woodrow Wilson. These men possessed talents and abilities which could easily have enshrined them as great national leaders instead of what each ultimately proved to be: great national tragedies. All three men suffered from extremely problematic relationships with strong but distant masculine father-figures. Johnson and Nixon both came from similar families characterized by hard-drinking, "roguish" fathers who came from and remained in impoverished conditions, and mothers born and raised into stable and loving upper-middle-class households who were charmed into "marriages beneath their station." The mothers rapidly discovered that their middle class expectations were to be left unfulfilled by their husbands and they projected their frustrated hopes and aspirations onto their sons. The sons had problematic relationships with their fathers as a consequence of the heightened attention paid to them by their mothers. Both Johnson and Nixon exhibited unmasculine mannerisms as children resulting in difficulties with their fathers. Perhaps the single most important decision a boy must make about a problematic father is whether or not to identify with him. This choice is pivotal in terms of how the young adolescent develops because it affects his relationships with the two most significant figures in his life. It is crucial to note however that even when a boy rejects his father, he may nonetheless develop many of his most obvious traits. Each of these three leaders' behaviour was marked by neurotic tendencies deriving from problematic family relations.

In a fashion that was to mark his future political career, Johnson reconciled the conflicting pressures from his parents by selecting goals and behaviour acceptable to both. Thus, he modelled himself after his father in terms of social behaviour while retaining his mother's ambitiousness and success orientation. These combined with Johnson's own desire to be overtly loved and esteemed to produce a political leader of uncanny shrewdness, legendary capacity for work, and a deep desire to win love through gift-giving. Johnson's tragic flaw lay in the insatiability of his desire for love, his humiliating treatment of those whom he had persuaded to support him, and his unbelievable self-inflation. All these traits reflect a narcissistic self-regard, but unlike Ataturk or de Gaulle, who commanded remarkable devotion through their heroic self-presentation and achievements, Johnson set out to win affection through a transactional strategy which consisted of gift-giving by him as a democratic politician in exchange for political support and personal devotion. Johnson's personality meshed perfectly with the practices and mores of the United States Senate during his tenure there. Further, despite the ultimate failures of his presidency, most notably Vietnam, his domestic policies, represented by the Good Society programmes and the Civil Rights Voting Act, constituted some of the greatest achievements of the U. S. government in the post-war era. That Johnson ultimately failed as president was a consequence of his having to deal with problems not susceptible to the infamous "Johnson Treatment" of individuals. His attempts to understand world affairs in terms of personal relations doomed his Vietnam policy to failure. What had served Johnson so well in the Senate and as a domestic politician generally, his facility at interpersonal persuasion, proved insufficient for the challenges posed by war against a shrewd and tenacious enemy. The set of long-standing habits which Johnson had developed in order to sustain his ego and political power proved maladaptive in an arena which emphasized the rational strategic, and effective use of coercion as its principal mode of persuasive communication.

Unlike Johnson, Nixon rejected his father in favour of the values and example set by his maternal grandfather, transmitted to him by his mother. The driving themes of Nixon's life have been achievement and self-control, two qualities notably lacking in his father. From childhood on, Nixon has manifested a self-loathing of remarkable proportions. His "Your dear dog" letter to his mother written at the age of ten exemplified a pattern of low self-regard that continued afterwards. As Barber notes, Nixon seemed to have adopted a habit of grueling and self-punishing labour from childhood on as his principal ego-defense mechanism. This willingness to endure hardship and engage in strenuous effort proved the foundation for his political success. However, the underlying dynamic of self-punishment and insecurity with personal success also laid the ground for his personal disasters, culminating in Watergate. Unlike most leaders, Nixon did not possess either a Conquistador or Imperial personality. Instead, the type he most closely approximates is Rothberg's Entrepreneurial Man, in terms of attitudes and behaviour. Like Entrepreneurial Man, Nixon seems motivated by a self-punishing system of demanding moral values which forces him to work, and suffer, in the face of both low self-esteem and perceived lack of control over his own environment. This "Calvinist" worldview fits tightly with his mother's Quaker values. Nixon's success derived from his adoption of the puritan work-ethic as his pathway into the ranks of the Elected just as his acceptance of self-punishment and suffering assured his placement among the politically Damned.

Few political leaders so clearly manifest the consequences of unresolved neurotic conflicts stemming from problematic childhood relationships with a strong parental figure as Woodrow Wilson. Like Johnson and Nixon, Wilson also had a dominant father-figure with which to contend but unlike theirs, Wilson's father was a paragon of personal achievement and lofty social standing. Wilson's problematic confrontation with his father's image was rooted in the degree to which the young Woodrow had been overshadowed and intimidated by his father. Wilson's response to the ego-threat posed by his father was two-fold. First, like Johnson and others, Wilson assimilated into his own character significant aspects and qualities of his own father, thereby becoming a great deal like him in terms of scholastic achievement and articulation. But second, Wilson responded to challenges from strong men with inexplicable rigidity. Alexander and Juliette George have cogently argued that Wilson's neurotic combattiveness was a consequence of unresolved hostilities towards his father which manifested themselves as attempts to engage and defeat any man whose behaviour posed the threat of insubordination to Wilson.[14] A second significant element in Wilson's character, his moralistic rigidity, also reflects a neurotic attachment to positions whose principal value lay in establishing for the public record Wilson's own goodness. These and other neurotic tendencies were to cost Wilson his dearest achievements and deny him a place among the truly great American presidents.

The role of neuroses in each of the above cases share some similarities but are also different in a number of key ways. First, the ultimate failures of all three are rooted in their personalities' rigidities. Johnson's neurotic fixations precluded the flexibility essential to being able to face the challenges posed by international diplomacy and warfare. Nixon's pietistic quest for self-validation through personal suffering led him through a cycle of success, defeat, resurrection, defeat, further resurrection, defeat, and still another resurrection until at last he fell from the highest of all American political graces. His talent for revival is comparable only to his attendant capacity for self-destruction, which created a tragic tale of self-induced rises and falls of almost biblical proportions: never the hero but always the tragic hero. Wilson's rigidities manifested themselves both in the clearly apparent parallels between himself and his father but also in his incapacity to accept the presence of strong men without seeking their destruction. Wilson was simultaneously driven to be like his father while attempting to destroy any man who threatened to dominate him in a similar fashion. Although Johnson exhibited a number of strong narcissistic traits, the personalities of all three were dominated by adaptive, and in the end, maladaptive neurotic tendencies. Like narcissism, neurotic tendencies can play both positive as well as negative roles in the personality and political career of a leader.

At a superficial level, there appears to be a strong correlation between narcissism and the Imperial personality on one hand, and neurotic tendencies and the Conquistador personality on the other. Both the narcissist and the Imperial personality project images of enormous self-confidence, self-certainty, conviction, and high self-regard. Unlike the narcissist, the healthy Imperial personality uses a repertoire of adaptive coping mechanisms whose primary functions are to screen the ego from potential loss of self-esteem. Neurotic personalities fixated upon power-seeking behaviours strongly resemble Conquistadors and may constitute a significant number of them. At the core of the Conquistador's personality is a basic anxiety deriving from feelings of insecurity. This results in a continuing need to acquire progressively more personal control over the environment and others within it. This is clearly expedited through the possession of wealth, power, and social status. Since the process of acquisition can be pleasurable both for its intrinsic challenge and its associated benefits, it can also be a self-motivating activity. The basic difference between the narcissist and the neurotic is in their ego defence mechanism preferences. What distinguishes the Imperial personality from the Conquistador is the former's possession of a belief system that transcends the latter's egotism. Such a belief system may be rationalistic, messianic-salvationist, or simply implicit. Its primary function is to bond the strong ego of the Imperial personality to a system of values which transcend acquisitive pleasure-seeking. The spectacular consequences resulting from a relative handful of narcissistic world leaders such as Hitler or Stalin, or neurotic ones like Nixon have biased explanations away from accounts of psychologically healthy and highly effective leader motivation. Consequently, there are relatively few psychobiographies of leaders possessing unequivocally healthy egos.

The idea of egoistic utilitarian hedonism as psychologically healthy behaviour runs counter to both conventional morality and the social adjustment approach to clinical psychology. But two important points must be noted. First, conventional morality rarely takes into account the rationality of a particular behaviour from the actor's viewpoint. Thus, what is often deemed exploitive from certain perspectives is simply rational from others. Being self-interested is not psychopathological; it is a necessary attitude for both self-preservation as well as self-actualization. What is central to the egoistic utilitarian hedonist's behaviour is the rational pursuit of maximal pleasure-enhancing means and opportunities. This is not indicative of a weak ego or low self-esteem. Rather, it reflects the manner in which someone possessing a strong ego and high self-esteem has been socialized to actualize her or himself. When combined with a justificatory worldview such as the liberal capitalist ideology or aristocratic *noblesse oblige*, they also become the characteristics of rational Imperial personalities. John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the darlings of the liberal American intelligentsia, possessed very strong egos, exceptionally high self-esteem, and ideologically defensible but principally implicit worldviews that marked them as rational Empire-Builders.[15]

Like his elder and younger brothers Joseph, Jr., Edward and Robert, John F. Kennedy identified and modelled himself after the values and behaviour of their legendary father, Ambassador Joseph Patrick Kennedy, Sr. Joseph, Sr., is the archetypical rational Conquistador who, driven by an intense need to win and acquire, built fortunes in banking, movie-making, the stock market, real estate, and bootlegging. His penchant for promiscuity was as strong as his desire to acquire wealth. He had grown up the idolized son of his mother and beloved brother of his two sisters who treated him like a little prince. His adoration by the women in his life from infancy on established in Joseph, Sr., an enormously strong ego, high self-esteem, and sense of substantial personal worthiness. This was not a man raised to regard self-denial as either natural or moral, despite the Roman Catholicism of his parents. At the same time, Joseph's mother instilled in him a strong devotion to personal achievement and an intense desire to excell. Joseph grew up aware of his Irish heritage in a Boston dominated by Protestant Yankees. Like so many children of immigrants, he was being intensely motivated to succeed by his family while facing overt discrimination from the established members of society. As in so many others, this instilled in Joseph an intense desire to prevail. Within his own family, Joseph was the much absent but deeply venerated role-model for his boys and the person for whose attention all the children competed.

This competition was particularly intense between his eldest and second eldest sons, Joseph, Jr., and John. The first-born served as the crown-prince for his father's *arriviste* ambitions while the latter was frequently sidelined into intellectual pursuits as a consequence of lesser precedence and physical disability. But Jack nonetheless achieved remarkable accomplishments which enabled him to upstage his favoured brother. As a Harvard undergraduate, he wrote his honours thesis on British policy towards Hitler and was awarded a *summa cum laude* for its excellence. It propelled him to public attention when published as the best selling book Why England Slept. Both sons sought military service, but Jack was rejected on physical disability grounds by both the Army and the Navy. Joe, Jr., became a flight instructor and, thanks to Joseph, Sr.'s influence, Jack did become a naval officer. Both sons steered towards extremely high risk branches, Jack as a PT boat officer and Joe, Jr., as a bomber pilot. Joe, Jr., sought to match Jack's heroism after the sinking of his PT boat by volunteering for an extremely dangerous bombing mission. The heir apparent to Joseph, Sr.'s ambitions died when his plane exploded in the skies over the English Channel. Jack was the new crown prince.

The Kennedy family was built on love and pride. Joseph, Sr., instilled a deep love of personal achievement and victory into all his children. They were raised to think of themselves as charmed and special. They all sought to leave their mark in their own particular ways. Jack Kennedy embodied all these special qualities to an even greater extent than his elder brother because of the particular disadvantages he had to overcome in order to compete effectively with his elder brother for his father's attention. The values they all absorbed from their father were those of first-generation aristocrats. Their father's unsentimental ruthlessness had propelled him and his family into the top ranks of the American ruling class and they grew up imbued with his values and attitudes but cushioned from the hardening formative experiences by the wealth and privileges he had already accumulated. Their hands and moral self-regard were "clean" even though they inherited the attitudes which had enabled their father to accomplish the tremendous rise upwards. Both Joseph Sr. and Jack Kennedy possessed the best and most appealing characteristics of the rational Conquistador. They were both unencumbered by conventional moral sentimentalities and they both pursued their goals and objectives, be they money, power or women, because they enjoyed both the pursuit and the prize. Neither was psychopathic but both were extremely egoistic. However, Jack Kennedy went farther than his father in clearly articulating a worldview grounded in liberal capitalism which served to justify his actions and motivate others to adopt him as an example.

Unlike his son, Joseph, Sr., never seemed to grasp the importance of rhetorical stance in legitimating the pursuit of power. His son's talent at rhetoric and image presentation flavoured his presidency, and his drive for power, and overshadowed his actual legislative achievements, such as they were. Both men were liberals, but for the excellent reason that their liberalism protected and justified their personal interests and behaviour. Even Kennedy's civil rights record, which Barber celebrates as a testimonial to his liberal commitment, represented a policy of attempting to broker the tensions within the Democratic party and American society. After all, Eisenhower had also used federal troops to uphold court rulings in Little Rock, Arkansas. Kennedy's use of federal marshalls in Alabama had a precedent established by a conservative Republican president. The greatest post-Civil War legislative civil rights victory was won by a conservative populist, "good ole boy" from Texas. Without Johnson's tactical genius and talent for brokering, the crown jewels of sixties era liberalism would never have been won.[16] That was not Kennedy's achievement. It was L.B.J. who secured the Great Society programmes and trampled the conservative opposition. Kennedy's greatest achievement lay in creating a historic image of idealistic liberal leadership by always sensing the historical moment in every action or initiative. This preoccupation with and understanding of history established in Kennedy a deep concern for the long-term considerations in policy-making and placed historical image on a higher footing relative to immediate power concerns. Kennedy was as successful in securing his historical place as Johnson was in winning immediate victories. The romantic image of Kennedy's pragmatic idealism continues to captivate the American imagination in ways Johnson's actual successes never have nor ever could.

For all the shine on Kennedy's image in the history books, he stands in the shadows of another American president whose real accomplishments gave the liberal cause a cachet and heritage that Democrats have not been able to equal nor Republicans to undo. Franklin Delano Roosevelt is deservedly acknowledged as the greatest American president since Abraham Lincoln and serves as the ideal model for liberal-reformist leadership. Roosevelt's childhood was marked by the absence of troubles, wants, or projected ambitions. Roosevelt was blessed with what in many ways was the perfect childhood. He was deeply loved and played with by his parents. They imparted to him a coherent system of values which they themselves practiced. They gave order and regularity to his childhood without severe restrictions or unnecessary strictness. Roosevelt is the clearest example to be found in the literature on great individuals of someone who was encouraged to grow up into his fullest potential. What seems to lie at the core of Roosevelt's character is his long experience in striving after and achieving good ends. His parents provided him with a clear, intelligible and fair environment. Practically every endeavor upon which he embarked as a child or adolescent was marked with success. His governing disposition seems to have been a consistently sunny cheerfulness and a general capacity to experience joy in virtually every facet of life. These personality traits combined with his parents' ethic of gentlemanly behaviour and conduct to create the patrician character and worldview that New Deal era Americans found so reassuring. His quest for power was both facilitated and tempered by his "to the manor born" experience with and attitude towards life. Roosevelt was an American patrician, a member of its established aristocracy whose family had been so long at the top that they were no longer preoccupied by the same kinds of status and financial concerns as were the other members of the bourgeoisie. The perplexed outrage voiced by so many members of the American business classes was rooted in their incapacity to comprehend the worldview of a man whose family looked *down* upon the Vanderbilts. Roosevelt was the closest thing to a radical Tory the United States had produced until the arrival of the younger Kennedys. They understood implicitly that the basis of elite liberalism's *noblesse oblige* was that by upholding the rights of the down-trodden, one establishes one's superiority over those who seek merely to down-tread.

Both Kennedy and Roosevelt exemplify Maslow's self-actualizing person. Both were deeply loved and actively encouraged as children, though Jack Kennedy faced challenges posed by his own sickliness and his siblings' rivalries which Roosevelt did not. Both had every want and need amply satisfied and largely experienced life as a series of positive challenges, opportunities for success and self-actualization through personal initiative and action. The underlying stability inculcated in both a sense of sureness and security that served to provide the inner resources to deal with serious threats and uncertainties in political life. Neither ever experienced prolonged periods of needs deficiency during their formative periods, although Jack was at a disadvantage in the hurly-burly of the Kennedy household as a result of his relatively poorer health. Their childhood and adolescent experiences stand in stark contrast to Nixon's and Johnson's. Interestingly, Lenin's childhood shares a number of significant parallels with Kennedy's, while Gandhi's experience of an open and energetic childhood resembles Roosevelt's. However, the most important resemblance is that none of these four had faced any significant deprivations during their childhood formative years. The crises of Lenin's and Gandhi's lives came in adolescence. All of them enjoyed stable and loving family lives as children and developed implicit worldviews that stressed at least the possibility of rational and just organization in human life. None of them had to endure the caprices of turmoil until after the critical childhood period was over. Each came to possess and espouse an ideology, implicit or explicit, that stressed the qualities they had known as children in their homes. Kennedy articulated a coherent ideology that stressed and celebrated American ambitiousness and achievement. He was a product of these values and he clearly promoted them. It happens that he was fortunate to be able to propound a worldview that celebrated and justified the personality characteristics and behaviour of himself and his own family. Like Roosevelt, what Kennedy really had was less than an ideology and more like an attitude. Both the coherence of their actions and their ideological flexibility derived from the integrity of their respective worldviews and the absence of any pre-existing commitment to a specific detailed ideology or set of programmmes. Both men were reform liberals emphasizing long-term solutions to specific problems rather than radical changes.

What distinguishes the rational Empire-Builder from the Conquistador is the former's belief in and adherence to the two ideas that life is lived for a purpose that transcends the immediate interests and concerns of the self, and that the world is a rational intelligible place. Both Kennedy and Roosevelt shared these ideas. Though they possessed many of the characteristics typical of Conquistadors, they substituted their respective beliefs in something beyond their own immediate selves for the fundamental nihilism of the pure power-seeker. Nonetheless, they sought power just as avidly and even more effectively than the two archetypical Existential Conquistadors of Kennedy's generation, Richard M. Nixon and Lyndon B. Johnson, or the narcissistic leaders of Roosevelt's, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. Both men were power-seekers with enough comprehension of the long view to have an awareness of limits. These two men represent the best that ordinary politics can generate as leaders. Both won their way to the presidency within the institutional structures and rules of normal politics. Both possessed leadership qualities which proved crucial in dealing effectively with the crises each faced. Both men also succeeded in winning significant numbers of highly motivated supporters, some of whom evidenced very emotional responses to their message and image. The problem-solving ethic that underlies the rational Empire-Builder's orientation towards the environment is ideally suited for effectively dealing with crises in which the normal system of operations has been challenged but neither overthrown nor discredited. The very considerable intelligence and talent such leaders bring to bear can often be decisive in bringing about a successful resolution to problems faced by the regime they control or guide.

This chapter has focused on relating theoretical explanations and typologies to actual leaders and their behaviours. In so doing it has demonstrated both the overall validity of these ideas to understanding the psychological development of different kinds of leader motivation and their corresponding patterns of behaviour. It has concentrated on how narcissism, neuroses, and healthy ego development can result in both Conquistador as well as Imperial personalities. In so doing, it has emphasized the key role of belief structures in distinguishing the two. Although narcissistic leaders appear to have Imperial personalities as a consequence of their identification with an ideal-image, in fact, this ideal-image is actually an image of themselves which they have projected upon some venerated external object such as the nation or ethnic group. Neurotic personalities seek to overcome feelings of inadequacy through the development of defense mechanisms which, when adaptive to their environments, provide significant benefits resulting in the attainment of high political offices. Finally, this chapter examined the nature of rational Imperial personalities in order to show how a non-problematic ego can develop remarkable motivation for power but without any psychopathological traits. This chapter has set the ground for a discussion of the existential Imperial personality. This last type, though not discussed in this chapter, shares qualities and attributes with all the ones discussed. This particular personality type seems to reoccur among the great revolutionary charismatic leaders. This type and their revolutions are the topic of chapter seven.

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CHAPTER FIVE

PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF CHARISMATIC APPEAL

Every leader has followers attracted for different reasons. Some are supporters because of the special advantages or benefits they obtain from association with the leader's group or organization. Their participation is a function of perceived benefits and incentives. The classic example of this is the patron-client relationship typical of ties between notables and their dependents in many developing societies. A second type of relationship is that of the bureaucratic office-holder or functionary. The incentives and benefits are provided by the organization rather than a specific individual. In practice, most organizations are structured by a combination of personalistic and impersonal ties of obligation, favour and loyalty. What they all share in common is self-interested behaviour as the underlying element to the bonds and ties. But in addition to these "rational" factors, many followers are motivated by less materialistic and more psychodynamic considerations. These include individuals whose allegiance is rooted in loyalty to institutional norms and values (i.e., a moral code that legitimates active support for a particular set of social relations, activities and objectives), adherence to a specific ideology or worldview, or to a specific personality. Although these three types of psychodynamic ego-object relations can occur either separately or together, it is analytically simpler to treat them as distinct if similar phenomena. Although all six types of relationships are important to an understanding of organizations and movements, the last is central to understanding charisma and the psychological bonds which create the charismatic leader-follower relationship. This chapter explores the nature of these bonds.

Though charismatic leadership is a perennially favourite topic of scholarly discussion, virtually no work has been done into the causes or bases for the highly personal devotion felt and exhibited by followers in these types of relationships. Part of the reason for this is the difference in relative ease with which leaders as opposed to followers can be studied. Being the primary focus of study, they have overshadowed efforts to explain the psychological motivation of followers. This is not what Max Weber had in mind. He repeatedly stressed that charisma as a quality had to be recognized as present by followers in order for a charismatic relationship to occur.[1] Thus, the focal point of the charismatic relationship lay in the mind of the follower. A second important reason why follower motivations have been given short shrift is because of the absence of a plausible explanatory framework. Traditional Freudian psychoanalysis has been singularly unpersuasive in its psychodynamic accounts.[2] In addition, the few sociological studies have failed to address the central dimension of the puzzle: why the intense psycho-emotive bond?[3] This chapter offers a relatively newer alternative framework deriving from object relations theory. The importance of a psychodynamic explanation for charismatic leadership derives from the manifestly irrational character of follower behaviour. Object relations theory helps explain both this irrationality as well as the emotional intensity of the phenomenon. Charismatic leadership has been an exceptionally significant force in the politics of the twentieth century. This chapter offers an account for the psychodynamic basis of it.

Since Max Weber's death in 1920, his concepts have become central to sociological explanations of the profound changes which have occurred during this century. Among the most important of these are his ideas about charisma and charismatic domination. Related to what will be discussed in the next chapter, this section will concentrate upon Weber's discussion of different kinds of charisma and charismatic leadership. The main task of this section is to identify and clarify useful explanatory concepts without becoming mired in exegetic controversies.

Weber originally drew the idea of charisma from the study of religion where it meant the "gift of grace." According to Weber:

> Charisma is self-determined and sets its own limits. Its bearer seizes the task for which he is destined and demands that others obey and follow him by virtue of his mission. If those to whom he feels sent do not recognize him, his claim collapses; if they recognize it, he is their master as long as he "proves" himself. However, he does not derive his claims from the will of his followers, in the manner of an election; rather, it is their *duty* to recognize his charisma.... As a rule, charisma is a highly individual quality. This implies that the mission and the power of its bearer is qualitatively delimited from within, not by an external order.[4]

Two points are central to the above description. First, charisma is self-created. The charismatic leader lays claim to followership through pronouncement of personal worthiness. Followers either acknowledge or reject the claim on the basis of perceived attributes validating the claim. Upon acceptance they also accept the leader's personal domination as legitimate. The authority of the leader and delegates derives from her or his charisma and not from any traditional, legal-rational, or other basis.

Although Weber has stressed the revolutionary quality of charismatic leadership, he points out that this is not intrinsic. Rather, charisma provides an alternative basis for authority which can be used to displace that of traditional leaders and can expedite revolutionary change by providing a competing elite and leader with legitimacy they otherwise would lack. Weber also points out that charisma arises in times of stress and crisis when followers need and seek alternatives to existing patterns of behaviour. The charismatic leader provides these alternatives while her or his exceptional talents or gifts simultaneously validate her or his charisma and in implementing the new innovations. Over time, the leader's actions are routinized and transformed into a new legitimate order of traditions and traditional authority. Weber argues that charismatics are anti-bureaucratic and oppose participation in the economy. It may be more accurate to say that charismatic leaders oppose the displacement of personal authority into bureaucratic rules and laws, and its constraint by market forces of production and exchange. These claims by Weber seem to describe religious or mystical charisma more than the political or ascetic versions. At the core of Weber's idea of charisma is the conception of a person possessing exceptional talents pursuing a mission or calling who in a time of crisis or great need, demands and receives the active obedience of others based upon their recognition of her or his gifts and purpose. Upon success, the leader's charisma and venerated memory become the basis for a new traditional order via the process of routinization.

Weber's formulation can be and has been criticized on a number of important grounds.[5] First, it does not provide an adequate description of the qualities which distinguish a charismatic from a non-charismatic leader. Partially, this is a consequence of Weber's terminology. It is hard to relate his discussion of Sorcerers, Prophets, and Warlords to modern mass politics in the industrialized countries. But there has also been a general tendency to apply the word charisma as a synonym for popularity. This obscures the almost mystical quality of a charismatic leader's exceptional gifts and results in ordinary political appeal being confused with the often rapturous devotion inspired by many of the historic charismatic leaders. Second, as mentioned earlier, he gives no account for why followers respond favourably to charismatic appeal. More important, he cannot account for why followers differ in degree of support for a charismatic leader. The absence of psychological explanations for what is fundamentally a psychological phenomenon seriously limits the interpretation of the concept. Third, it implies that charisma as a phenomenon usually occurs only in societies engaged in modernization. This view has been developed by a number of scholars. Unfortunately, this has implied that charisma as a phenomenon does not occur in Western, literate, industrialized societies. This implication is clearly refuted by the rise of charismatic leaders during times of crisis in some of these countries. Weber's presentation does not lend itself to clear understanding and use in the context of normal social science. Thus, it has become the starting point for other scholars' work because of its openness to interpretation and its already broad misinterpretation.

The single most thorough sustained effort to systematize Weber's thinking has been by Arthur Schweitzer in The Age of Charisma. In his interpretation of Weber, Schweitzer stresses a number of points.[6] First, he notes that Weber's idea of charisma as based upon a sense of inner calling offers three advantages: it plays down the supernatural as the basis for the leader's appeal, the appearance of inner calling becomes a manifest criterion for the presence of charisma, and the leader's self-confidence serves as the psychological justification for claiming dutiful obedience from followers. Second, he identifies two different kinds of charismatic appeal relevant to politics. Mystic prophets, also called Sorcerers, induce a kind of ecstasy in themselves and followers while propagating a salvationist creed. An example is espoused by Adolf Hitler. Schweitzer distinguished between followers who are emotionally transformed by the experience and adherents who participate in the emotional appeal without being subsumed by it.[7] Ethical prophets avoid creating feelings of ecstasy, relying instead upon their knowledge of a divine mission to generate the exceptional deeds. This divine knowledge can be like Gandhi's Truth, which constituted an ethical and political prescription for a restored India. Third, Schweitzer also stresses the sense of internal compulsion felt by followers to obey the commandments of their prophets.[8] According to him, Weber understood and rejected Freudian interpretations of charisma based upon the idea of repression current in his day.[9] Instead, Weber posited an internal bond within the follower deriving from the ecstatic experience, which induces an active and perhaps intense emotional need to comply with the wishes of the leader. This desire to please becomes the basis of follower obedience. Necessarily, the period of charismatic leadership is limited to the period during which this emotional bond is felt and ends when it dissipates, usually at the conclusion of the crisis which created the original conditions making charismatic appeal possible.[10] Fourth, the psychological bond upon which charisma rests comes into being as a result of the leader releasing her or his followers from a state of painful anxiety by providing them with a new internal orientation.[11] The euphoria results from the release, while follower obedience derives from the internalization of the leader's precepts, worldview or ideology, and identification with her or his person. It is this synergetic effect that produces charisma. Finally, Schweitzer clarifies Weber's discussion of democratic charisma. Weber distinguished between a democracy of delegates and one of leaders corresponding to his division between bureaucratic and charismatic authority.[12] The first consist of elected representatives who are either politically or economically dependent upon their parties and the special interest groups which support them. Alternative leaders elected at large to executive posts and wielding considerable power and influence are, he felt, free to make ideological and personalist appeals which mobilize mass support behind their policies and thereby transcend the limitations or opposition of bureaucratically organized electoral parties in legislatures. This view has considerable utility in explaining the dynamics of American national politics under Franklin Roosevelt and others.

In the end, Weber's three basic kinds of charismatic leaders describe more mythical or ideal types than actual existing ones. The Warlord is clearly the crisis leader. Lenin during the Bolshevik Revolution, Roosevelt during the Great Depression and Winston Churchill during the Second World War mobilized their respective nations to make extraordinary efforts which may not have been possible without inspired leadership capable of great persuasive force. Similarly, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were Sorcerers capable of inducing an almost orgiastic release among their followers. Gandhi was an (Ethical) Prophet who propounded a new conception of social reality and mobilized supporters to achieve the new order. A number of points should be immediately obvious. Although neither Lenin nor Gandhi were noted as great speakers, they both possessed the stature to command the almost rapturous attention of their audiences, and they were also superb political strategists and tacticians. Both Hitler and Mussolini offered worldviews which, though they were nowhere as sophisticated as those advanced as Lenin or Gandhi still represented coherent ideological positions of often considerable complexity. Similarly, Roosevelt and Churchill were more than simply clever "Mr. Fixits." They too were spellbinding orators with strongly conceived implicit views of how the world ought to be ordered. Weber's typology of Warlord, Sorcerer, and Prophet clearly captures and distinguishes between the important but different leadership functions of instrumental direction, expressive arousal, and intellectual guidance of followers. Despite the difficulties Weber's work has posed for conventional social science, it has brilliantly captured the essential features of the phenomenon called charismatic leadership, even if it failed to provide complete explanations for all aspects of it.

Perhaps the most problematic feature of the charismatic relationship lies in understanding why followers form such intense feelings of personal devotion towards their leaders. As Weber sought to convey by using the word charisma, the very nature of the relationship is extraordinary. The abuse of the word by journalists and social scientists has stripped it of its almost divine connotations.[13] Consequently, charisma is now taken to mean likability, popularity, or high levels of esteem. This is not what Weber meant. Weber's notion stressed the superhuman, almost god-like, qualities which followers impute to the charismatic leader. Although a sense of calling and exceptional abilities assist an individual in being perceived as charismatic, the quality or charisma itself exists within the mind of the follower, and not in the body of the leader.

Schweitzer wrongly claims that psychoanalytical theories offer no coherent explanation for the charismatic leader-follower relationship.[14] This objection may be validly applied against orthodox psychoanalytical accounts asserting mass regression to an infantile condition characterized by longing for the primal father-figure, but not to the more sophisticated accounts deriving from object relations theory. Ralph P. Hummel shows the strong similarity between Weber's account of charisma and Freud's discussion of totemism and the primal horde:

> Weber's "moments of distress" Freud treats as "object-loss." Weber's "complete personal devotion" Freud explains as the projection of love onto an outside object or person. The experience of the leader's "quality" as more or less supernatural, Freud explains in terms of the fact that the love projection is undertaken by the follower's unconscious and cannot be explicated by the conscious because it is unaware of the process. Weber's revolutionary "alteration of the central attitudes ad directions of action" Freud explains in terms of the cutting off of the emotions of love and hate from previous objects and their occupation (cathexis) of new objects, especially the leader...[15]

Both Weber and Freud had captured essentially the same kind of psychological event, though Weber's "myth" is both more intelligible and descriptively accurate.

Object relations theory provides a coherent account of the psychodynamic relationships which underlie this phenomenon. Specifically, the archetypical charismatic leader-follower relationship is a psychological mutual dependency between a narcissist projecting an idealized self-image and "ideal-hungry" followers. As will be discussed in the next section, this relationship occurs even when the leader is not narcissistic but is nonetheless capable of fulfilling the role of an ego-ideal for her or his followers.[16] Under the right conditions, this kind of relationship can allow followers to recuperate psychologically through re-orientation while providing the leader with the political resources necessary to institute major reforms or even revolution. Although this is not the only kind of relationship supporters can have with their leaders, it is the type that underlies the phenomenon of charisma.

Central to the charismatic relationship is the follower. Although the leader must exist in order to be the recipient of the follower's devotion, it is the latter whose psyche must be in a condition to be either susceptible to a charismatic appeal or that spontaneously projects onto a leader intense object-love. Jerrold M. Post describes this as a relationship between a "mirror-hungry" charismatic leader and "ideal-hungry" followers. Both formations are a result of "injured selves."[17] The first, the mirror-hungry leader, possesses a narcissistic personality which requires adulation in order to sustain the self-idealization that results in a grandiose self-image and presentation. This ego nourishment is provided by the second type of personality. Ideal-hungry followers are individuals who suffer from a permanent or temporary impairment of ego strength, producing a felt need for guidance by an ideal or ideal-type and resulting in the veneration of a suitable leader-image. As Post notes, along with this idealization comes the possibility of disillusionment, which can be warded off only through the demonstration of exceptional abilities and the capacity to bestow miraculous gifts. If the leader proves capable of providing a continued basis for followers' idealization, then the foundation for the charismatic relationship has been set.

Individuals with borderline personality disorders stemming from the failure to form clear and definite boundaries for the self during childhood suffer from permanent ego impairment. At least two members of the Nazis leadership clearly exhibited ego impairment rendering them susceptible to Hitler's persuasive appeal. Joseph Goebbels is a classic example of the "ideal-hungry" follower. As Downton recounts, Goebbels suffered from severe ego deficiencies deriving from his clubfoot and frequent rejections as a playwright and author.[18] Despite his doctorate, he had also faced considerable difficulty in supporting himself. Hitler recognized Goebbels' inner craving for reassurance and confirmation of a grandiose self-image. Hitler captured his support through constant ego-inflation and pleas stressing Goebbels enormous importance to him and the Nazis' cause. Downton paints a portrait of a man exhibiting classic symptoms of a borderline personality attempting to sustain a narcissistically idealized self-image but with only partial success:

> The goals incorporated into Goebbels' ego-ideal seemed quite divorced from the reality of his physical and personal limitations. The behavior model that he hoped

> to reach included heroic, intellectual, and romantic components. He dreamed of making his mark on history in the tradition of Carlyle's "hero" or Nietzche's "superman." ...Three excesses that became the chief marks of his character developed in Goebbels' ego. He grew to interaction, and was driven by a strong need to be loved as well as recognized as a genius. In order to compensate for his feelings of rejection, he developed an exterior that exuded confidence, arrogance, and pride. In private, however, his feelings of inadequacy produced deep depressions and thoughts of suicide...[15]

Hitler exploited Goebbels' fundamental self-doubt to create bonds of intense psychological dependency of him upon himself. Like all narcissists and borderline personality cases, "'the secret of Goebbels is always that he only loved those who openly and emphatically loved him. Hitler was astute enough to discover and exploit this weakness...'" Goebbels lacked Hitler's capacity for effectively screening out ego-threatening considerations. But he retained the need for such defenses, which Hitler provided through his flattery and explanations. Nonetheless, Goebbels remained one of the most realistic of Hitler's close aides precisely because he was less adept, and perhaps willing, to practice the kind of self-deception that marked others, and especially Hitler, right up to the end.

Like Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler also fell under Hitler's spell because of a weak and poorly developed ego. Himmler possessed a classic example of a schizoid personality marked by obsessive-compulsive character traits. Peter Loewenberg explores Himmler's adolescent diaries, showing that from an early age he displayed intense rigidification through the use of compulsive habits such as preoccupations with schedules and the trivial details of meals and toiletry.[20] Loewenberg describes the schizoid personality, stating:

> He is emotionally inaccessible, apathetic, cut off. The schizoid does not experience suffering, excitement or enthusiasm, anger or affection. He builds up a repressed, robot-like, mechanized personality. he does the "correct and necessary thing" without any feeling entering into the action. As Guntrip puts it, "Duty rather than affection becomes the key word." He goes on to cite as indications of the schizoid's repression of feeling and retreat from emotional relationships such obsessional symptomology as list-making, the routinizing of a whole life, "doing things in order," hard work, and efficient organization.[21]

The schizoid uses this obsessive-compulsive symptomology to repress consciousness of her or his own sense of isolation. This depersonalization is buttressed by a belief in the low worth of other people, whom the schizoid treats as dispensable.

Himmler was preoccupied with being strong. He sought to enforce rigid self-control upon all aspects of his behavior, particularly those inspired by sexual feelings. His severe self-repression postponed the normal adolescent crisis of personal identity, but at the cost of seriously accentuating it. During this period Himmler displayed remarkable incomprehension of his socio-political environment. Seeking to become a farmer, he learned Russian in order to purchase land and take up this livelihood in the newly revolutionized Soviet Union. The central psychological problem faced by the schizoid personality is diffusion and loss of identity. Preoccupation with self-control also results in the displacement of repressed affects for which a target object must be found. Both the sense of identity as well as displacement must be "rationalized." Himmler's pre-existing concern for defending "Aryan Womanhood" provided fertile psychological ground for Hitler's ideology of simultaneously venerating the Germanic nation while condemning Jews and other "subhumans." The Hitlerian worldview provided Himmler with a comprehensive system of rationalizations for his repressed affects and obsessive-compulsive behaviors. It also served as the core for his new-found sense of identity. Ideology in this case doubly served to provide a psychologically satisfactory system of rationalizations and personal *raison d'etre*. Hitler's hold upon Himmler was immeasurable strengthened by Himmler's dependence upon him as the articulator of the Nazi ideology. In effect, Hitler provided Himmler with his sense of personal identity. Just as Hitler's ideal-image served as the linchpin to Goebbels' identification and dependency, so too his sense of social reality proved central to Himmler's sense of self.

The ideal-hungry follower is a person seeking rescue from anxieties. These anxieties may be rooted in childhood traumas or may have been induced by crises resulting from personal accidents or broader environmental forces. How individuals cope with these anxieties is critically influenced by past experience, ego resilience, strength of social support networks, personal belief systems, and how they interpret the stress-inducing events. Apparently, even minor variations in any of these factors can result in appreciable individual differences in reaction. In addition to these individual variables, the cultural and sub-cultural milieu also has a profound impact upon individual reactions. For these reasons, it is not possible to demonstrate (yet) linear causal relationships between different stress-inducing events and specific psychological phenomenon. But despite this limitation, clear patterns recur which suggest the probable form of such relationships.

Economic distress, social turmoil, and ethnic hostilities, and national defeat all have profound effects and can induce severe anxieties because of their impact upon the integrity of people's egos. Quite aside from the very real fears and pressures imposed by a sudden sharp decline in income, the loss of a job can seriously undermine self-esteem and self-efficacy, particularly in cultures where self-worth is measured in terms of one's usefulness and industry. Employment in particular crafts and professions often constitutes a vitally important component in many people's self-image and the sharp loss of status resulting from unemployment can be seriously damaging to self-esteem. Such conditions over a prolonged period of time can result in learned helplessness on a mass scale. The basis of charismatic appeal to such people lies in the fact that this form of helplessness can be "unlearned" through the reinterpretaion of experiences. As Seligman and others have shown, simple knowledge of why events occur can have a significant settling effect on anxiety-inducing events, even when they cannot be controlled.[22] Belief in one's ability to influence or control events has a strong positive impact upon self-efficacy, even when the perception is inaccurate. Ego resilience benefits tremendously from a certain degree of self-deception and wishful thinking. Since high self-esteem derives from a personal interpretation of the self, these factors can have a very positive effect upon a person's capacity to feel effective and enjoy the living of life.

The ego stroking characteristic of many charismatic leaders, most notably Hitler, provides the basis for re-inflating the egos of followers. As was true in the cases of Goebbels and Himmler, ego reintegration can be achieved through adoption of the leader's ideal-image, worldview or both. All that is necessary for these psychical events to occur is for the follower to be aware of the ideal-image and the worldview. Both radio and television are particularly effective mass media for disseminating contact with the leader's voice and image. Print communications do not provide the same possibilities for emotive engagement even though they can still have a significant impact. Perhaps the classic venues for charismatic appeal are the personal encounter and the staged event. In common with a number of clearly charismatic leaders, Hitler possessed the capacity to induce an almost electric effect on individuals coming into his immediate presence. There exists no satisfactory explanation for this phenomenon. But it does occur. In The Spellbinders, Willner reports that Sukarno possessed the same capacity.[23] What seems central to this kind of charismatic magnetism is the successful presentation of an ideal-image emphasizing capacity for egoistic domination. Both Hitler and Sukarno projected qualities strongly associated within their respective cultures with masculine virility and heroism. In Hitler's case, this is a profound example of the triumph of self-presentation over reality. Hitler was a short, ugly, physically unfit male whose two most prominent features were his protruding nose and his startling eyes. Nonetheless, Hitler presented himself as a Wagnerian hero and that is how people responded to him. Hitler always managed his settings so as to facilitate identification of him with the heroic motifs he projected. He combined a genius for self-presentation with a deep insight into the psychodynamics of his audiences. The first talent enabled him to project his idealized self-image convincingly to susceptible potential followers. His second allowed him to tailor the projection for maximum emotional response.

By contrast, neither Lenin nor Gandhi projected the same kind of immediately hypnotic appeal. Lenin's charisma was rooted in his tremendous self-certainty, intellectual capacity, self-discipline, and powers of persuasion. Although singularly unimpressive at first glance, Lenin's capacity to dominate others was rooted in the awesome strength of his will and intellectual prowess. Unlike Hitler, Lenin never commanded (or demanded) the fawning behaviour characteristic of narcissistic personalities. He did establish a continuously expanding sense of respect for himself in the minds of all his associates and followers which ultimately expanded without his approval into a cult of personality, especially after his death.

Gandhi had no such equivalent appeal, at least not at the start.[24] Gandhi's great interpersonal skill lay in his ability to make almost everyone feel comfortable and relaxed in his presence. His charming combination of mild kidding, ironic humour, gentleness, sense of inviolable personal dignity, attentiveness, and social gracefulness greatly enhanced his capacity to persuade those who came into personal contact with him. He was in no sense a commanding or compelling public speaker and lacked any clear stage presence. Gandhi's charisma lay in the powerful symbolic import of his image and actions. Gandhi had adopted the appearance, demeanor and ostensible ethic of a traditional Hindu Guru or holy man. Such figures are sufficiently common to be familiar to virtually all East Indians who have lived on the sub-continent. In common with Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist, and Oriental cultures, Hinduism venerates knowledge as a manifestation of divine grace. When combined with ascetic conduct, these two attributes mark the holy man as being in contact with the divine. As well, in Hindu culture learning and self-discipline are regarded as qualities which transcend in value all others, including power and wealth. Gandhi's "truth" or *satyagraha* was perceived as divine knowledge while his personal self-discipline was both renowned and periodically demonstrated through his fasts. Gandhi's charisma rested upon his personal charm and his capacity to fit the form of the most powerful cultural symbol in Hindu India.

Although Hitler, Lenin, and Gandhi mobilized fundamentally different kinds of affect, the political support they were able to generate as Sorcerer, Warlord, and Prophet was still enormous. In each case, the leaders were offering to their followers a clear ideal-image and worldview to serve as focal points around which weak or damaged egos could be re-integrated. The basic strength of Weber's conception of charisma is that it seems to capture the basic relationships as they actually occur. Nonetheless, it is unsatisfactory without object relations theory to provide an explanation for the psychodynamic bonding between the leader and followers. This has been the missing link in establishing a plausible account for an otherwise inexplicable psychological as well as political phenomenon.

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4. Weber, p. 112-3.

5. Downton, p. 272-86.

6. Schweitzer, p. 33.

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8. Ibid., p. 34.

9. Ibid., p. 37.

10. Ibid., p. 38.

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CHAPTER SIX

LEADERSHIP AND CRISIS:

THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND THEIR ACCOUNT OF LEADERSHIP

As noted in the Introduction, leadership as a social phenomenon only makes sense when viewed from the personal-situational perspective. So far, this thesis has emphasized the psychological dimensions of leadership with particular focus on leaders themselves. But, as was argued in the Introduction, all leaders operate within situational frameworks which ultimately define their range of opportunities and constraints. These effectively limit the kinds of behaviors leaders may employ to deal effectively with their specific dilemmas. However talented or exceptional, all leaders must begin with the circumstances as they find them, and the extent to which they can alter these conditions is itself a function of the overall state of things. The leaders are themselves integral elements embedded within their context. The degree and type of influence a particular group may successfully exert in a given context is itself a function of the overall situation of which the leader and group are themselves a part. The role and influence of particular individuals and groups within specific historical settings are empirical questions which cannot be resolved through *a priori* reasoning or theoretical gymnastics. Knowledge of the situation must include and "explain" the leader in question as a possibly significant and autonomous factor operating within the greater matrix of social forces. For these reasons, leadership can only be properly understood within the particular socio-historical context within which it occurs This means that in order for leadership to be understood, one must also possess a basic understanding of the different kinds of circumstances within which it occurs. This chapter examines the contexts of normal and crisis leadership.

One of the most basic disputes in sociology revolves around how social change and stability should be conceptualized. As Harry Eckstein points out, at the heart of this dispute is a perceptual disagreement over whether humans are primarily oriented towards seeking peace or power. If humans are primarily geared toward seeking the former, then social theory is directed towards a search for the contingent causes resulting in the breakdown of peaceful homeostatic order. This view also implies that humans as individuals and as social collectivities "naturally" tend towards seemingly self-regulating and correcting societies which only exhibit conflict only as a consequence of factors or events external to social order. Eckstein labels this the "contingency" perspective. He labels as the "inherency" perspective viewpoints which see conflict within human societies as either the result of some intrinsic or socialized psychological predisposition such as a need for power, or arising necessarily out of the processes of social differentiation and the division of labour.[1] The works of Durkheim and Parsons are often associated (rightly or wrongly) with the former while Hobbes, Marx, Pareto, and Weber are typically perceived as having formulated conflict-oriented theories.

This controversy over whether conflict is inherent within human societies or merely contingent upon external circumstances has been a significant dispute for some time. It can also be viewed as a chimera. What is fundamentally important is not the ontology of social conflict, but rather its genealogy. It does not matter whether conflict is or is not, in some theoretical sense, inherent in human society, because of either psychological or sociological reasons, or whether it originates in the external conditions within which all human societies exist. What is important is that most known societies exist within environments which seem to induce strains capable of generating significant social stresses. At the same time, all known societies also have histories of continuing conflicts arising from internal contradictions and clashes of interest. Even the most primitive societies experience what often begin as individual disputes but which then expand into inter-family, village, or clan conflicts. The ubiquity of social conflict deriving, typically, from the synergetic combination of both internal divisions and external forces is, as an accepted reality of human life, more important to understanding stability and change than an argument over whether the conflictual glass is half empty or half full.

Broadly speaking, one can identify about five different major theories of social change and stability deriving from the works of four principal theorists. Emile Durkheim is represented twice: both relative deprivation and systems theories originate in his works. Although both of these theories allow for conflict, their presentation of it is typically as a social pathology resulting from the breakdown or perversion of "normal" social operations. These would be labelled by Eckstein as contingency theories of political violence. Among those perceiving conflict as inherent, perhaps the most famous and influential is Marx's theory of dialectical class struggle. Related to the class conflict thesis is collective action theory. This seeks to explain the behavior of social formations as historical actors. Also related to class conflict is what may be called the state or institutional conflict thesis. This resembles collective action theory in its emphasis upon the behavior of critical social formations but locates the venue of struggle directly within the venue of state power and its possession.

Unlike the above theories, a number of other major perspectives have been left underdeveloped by current scholarship. Perhaps the most obvious is the absence of Vilfredo Pareto's work on the circulation of elites and the cyclical alternation of emphasis between liberal and conservative tendencies within society. The general use of his work to describe elites has been at the expense of utilizing it as a dynamic explanation for social change driven by elite conflict. Also absent are serious efforts incorporating the impact of charismatic leadership upon the transformation of societies generally, and not simply those undergoing modernization. The Weberian model is often treated as if it is not applicable to advanced, industrial democratic societies. As already discussed, Weber never provides a satisfactory explanation for why leadership should be able to play such a significant if episodic role in the transformation of human societies. Nonetheless, his theoretical insights have not been properly pursued, paradoxically because an excessive focus upon the exceptional features of charismatic leaders has served to obscure their contextual role and significance. Unfortunately, this very emphasis upon leaders has served to mystify leadership as a contextuated social activity. This chapter proposes what Weber had not: a contextuated understanding of the social function played by leadership under conditions of crises. But before this discussion can be provided its foundation has to be laid by giving an account of social stability, change, and crisis that accords leadership at least a potentially consequential place.

In Suicide, Emile Durkheim showed how the apparently private act of suicide is itself partially the result of greater social forces impinging upon the individual.[2] Thus, he also demonstrated the connection between psychologically felt states and the greater social environment. Following in Durkheim's intellectual footsteps, Ted Robert Gurr examines the relationship between what he terms value expectations and value capabilities, feelings of relative deprivation, and propensity for various forms of political violence. Gurr's basic hypothesis is that:

> The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity. *Relative deprivation* (RD) is defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and the value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping.[3]

Further, the more important the values are, the greater the degree of intensity with which the sense of relative deprivation is felt. The fewer the counter-prevailing sources of satisfaction and the longer the sense of discontent is denied avenues of expression, the greater its eventual intensity. The likelihood that this will result in violence is a function of the coercive balance between the incumbent regime and rebels, socialization, ideology, and a host of other factors. Although Gurr's work has been criticized for its manner of operationalization and inconclusive findings, his model does find broad statistical confirmation.[4] Regardless of its specific inadequacies and weaknesses, it has sufficient confirmation to warrant acceptance of its main thesis. This is significant because relative deprivation theory provides an important set of linkages connecting the impact of social changes to the rise of personal grievances and psychological changes. When politicized, these serve as a dynamic force for social change. Conceptually, they also serve as an important bridge connecting sociological to psychological theories.

Systems theory also derives from Durkheim through the synthesizing agency of Talcott Parsons and David Easton. This approach posits societies as essentially organismic. Various structures have evolved into being and persist in order to fulfill specific kinds of functions. These structures exist as social institutions which by definition are systems of stable patterns of role interactions. Although both Durkheim and Parsons address the problems of social change, their main concerns are with explaining the apparent persistence of social order in the face of change. An exemplary work within the Durkheimian-Parsonian framework that does explicitly address the causes and structural nature of social change is Chalmers Johnson's Revolutionary Change.[5] This work will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, so these comments will be brief. One of the great attractions of the systems approach is its highly axiomatic, logical and categorical style that lends itself to elegant theory construction and rational analysis.

Unlike Durkheim, whose intellectual project focused upon explaining the persistence of solidarity in the face of social change, Marx sought to give an account of social conflict as both a consequence and further cause of change. To give a very basic rendition, Marx saw social conflict arising out of struggle between classes whose nature and interests are established by their respective relations to the dominant and changing mode of production. Marx perceived the mode of production as dynamic both in terms of its own capacity to evolve through technology as well as the pressure it put upon class relations and what he termed the social superstructure. The latter was comprised of the laws, mores, and institutional structure of state and legal relations. The locus of change for Marx was changes in the mode of production. These cause social conflict due to the alterations they force upon the relations of production, class relations, and the superstructure. Conflict rooted within the very structure of social reproduction can only be resolved through the elimination of the very class relations that structure and organize practically all known societies. Thus, the millenarian aspect of Marx has the withering away of the state and the recombination of human beings with their alienated labour occurring only after a very long period of socialist domination under the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the interim, only class struggle can produce transformative change.

The theory of collective action as presented by Charles Tilly in From Mobilization to Revolution reflects considerable Marxist influence, particularly in its careful use of social history to draw out evidence of social conflict typically ignored in more conventional political histories.[6] Tilly's object of study is the organized groups acting on behalf of particular class or social formations in conflict with the dominant forces within their societies, usually represented by coercive instruments of the state.

He lays out a model of political mobilization consisting of seven interacting factors.[7] The first four are properties of the contending group while the latter three reflect key chararistics of the particular historical circumstance. Interests are the shared benefits or costs accruing to the group's population from its dealings with others. Organization reflects the degree to which the group shares a common identity and unifying structures. Mobilization denotes increases in either the extent of or the degree of group control over politically useful resources. Collective action simply refers to the group's purposive and unified behavior directed towards the winning of political ends. As stated, opportunity consists of three elements. Power is the extent to which interactions with other groups favour the reference group's own interests. Repression is the cost imposed upon the group for engaging in collective action, whereas facilitation entails their reduction or amelioration. Finally, opportunity/threat refers to the degree to which additional claims against others either benefit or harm the reference group's efforts to achieve its basic goals. Tilly argues that the likelihood of collective action is a function of the degree to which interests are shared in common by group members, the degree of shared identity among group members, the presence of integrating structures facilitating group organization, and the group's level of mobilization. The opportunity variables of power, repression, and opportunity/threat delimit the group's strategies and tactics.

Although Eckstein notes that much data runs counter to the collective action model, his criticisms do not undercut the value of the work as a pioneering effort to establish a contextuated model of group behavior in response to broad socio-political forces. Though he is generally critical of Tilly's work, Eckstein does acknowledge that it finds statistical confirmation for its basic predictions.[8] The significance of Tilly's work lies in what it says happens to Gurr's discontented individuals after they have been subject to relative deprivation. Tilly's groups constitute the ideal vehicle through which politicizing ideologies can be propagated, transforming individual feelings of relative deprivation into political discontent. Both Tilly and Gurr are commenting upon essentially the same socio-political phenomenon. The only significant difference is that the former is explaining it in terms of group behavior whereas the latter is approaching it in terms of the psycho-social mobilization of group members.

Although Tilly provides an extremely simplistic model of how groups contend with each other and the state, he does so primarily to contextuate his much more developed discussion of mobilization. On the other hand, it is precisely to this consideration that Theda Skocpol devotes her work States and Social Revolutions. She makes two important theoretical arguments, one explanatory and the other methodological, in her work.[9] Her substantive contention is that the state and its institutions possess considerable autonomy from the greater socioeconomic processes occurring around it. By extension, in order for a revolution to succeed, it must occur in the context of a political crisis in which the state simultaneously finds its coercive capabilities severely constrained as the consequence of significant military defeats, while at the same time fiscal pressure, caused by international competition with other states, forces it to increase its demands upon society. She argues that the state's primary concerns are to ensure that it is effective in inter-state competition and remains able to maintain internal order. The easiest way to accomplish the latter is by preserving the existing system of economic and class relations. But despite this interest shared by both the state and ruling classes in keeping the subordinate classes in their place, they are competitors for the extracted surplus value. Thus, the tasks imposed upon the state by its international environment may force it into conflict with dominant class interests. Skocpol examines cases such as Japan and Prussia where the state apparatus was triumphant in its confrontation with the traditionally dominant groups in society and compares them to her main examples of France, Russia, and China where the state proved unable to introduce substantive reform and grew sufficiently weakened by the excessive demands imposed by external opponents to eventually collapse in the face of internal revolutionary forces which then proceeded to reform the state's capacity to contend effectively with its international adversaries. Skocpol pointedly notes that each of the successful revolutions produced state regimes of enormous military and political might. She also stresses the central importance of coercive power as the fundamental basis of a state's ability to hold on to effective control over its society. Skocpol's analysis uses concrete historical cases to outline the necessary preconditions for successful revolution. She recognizes the role of groups in struggle but rightly points out that their eventual success is a result of greater environmental factors impinging upon the state.

Skocpol also makes a strong argument against a voluntaristic conception of revolutionary change. She criticizes perspectives which claim revolutions are made by individuals, groups or broader social agents such as classes on the grounds that they ignore the overriding capacity of states to effectively control their own populations until such time as they become incapable of maintaining order and ineffective against external foes. She situates the critical sources of destabilization of state power outside of society and in the international conflictual environment. From this analysis, she endorses the claim that "revolutions come, they are not made." What Skocpol ignores is that the internal agents are just as necessary for revolutionary change as are the opportunities created by external events. Tilly notes the work of French historians who demonstrated the existence of substantial community organizations which acted as mobilizing agents to bring about the decisive events of 1789.[18] As virtually every student of the Bolshevik coup has noted, the critical events which led to the stunning seizure of power had been organized by a small group with the insight and courage to grasp the historic opportunity created for them by the cumulative errors of their adversaries.. That coup was the pivotal event which initiated the November Revolution. The error Skocpol makes is in confusing necessary with sufficient conditions: that a certain chain of preconditions must be met in order for a revolution to occur is not the same thing as saying that they are all the necessary events or that they in themselves are sufficient to bring about revolution. Skocpol has listed some but not all the necessary conditions. They also cannot predetermine the kind of revolution that may ensue. In order for her model to explain particular revolutions properly, it must incorporate the kind of explanations Tilly develops in collective action theory. Although Skocpol provides a persuasive account for the originative causes of revolution, Tilly's work helps explain the actual dynamics of conflict between the state and contending groups. Tilly's collective action theory serves as the critical linkage between empirical theories such as Gurr's investigation of relative deprivation and societal level studies in comparative historical sociology such as Skocpol's relative autonomy of the state thesis. Nonetheless, there still remains a need for an integrating theoretical paradigm to help organize these various approaches into some semblance of a coherent whole. Chalmers Johnson provides such an integration.

In Revolutionary Change, Chalmers Johnson provides an excellent framework for understanding how changes in the division of labour affect political behavior through stresses imposed upon individuals by the desynchronization of the value system and experienced social interaction. This section explores some of the relationships Johnson discusses as a means of explicating the types and functions of charismatic leadership. As well, this section highlights the preconditions of successful charismatic leader appeal.

Johnson begins with an extension of Weber's idea of social orientation, noting that it occurs when:

> ...the acting individual possesses stable expectations of the behavior and responses of others in a full range of social situations...The very concept of the division of labor depends on such mutual expectations, and man's ability to orient his behavior to that of others is a prerequisite for the complex human interaction that characterizes even the most rudimentary society.[11]

The division of labour gives rise to unequal and stratified social structures containing coercion as an essential component.[12] He notes four key functions that values fulfill in the context of the division of labour. First, they provide definitions of situations and standards of behavior which are indep[illegible]ent of private motives. Second, they provide abstract explanations and, consequently, constitute psychological expectations of the human condition.[13] Johnson states "Values thus provide meanings for social actions: they make sense of reality."[14] Third, values legitimate the division of labour, thereby minimizing the need for coercion. Finally, values authorize and legitimate the use of force to preserve certain aspects of the social order. But he also appreciates the limitations of value theory.

According to Johnson, value theorists only recognize three sources of deviant behavior: (1) imperfect socialization, (2) the "role strain" resulting from the imperfect integration of the person into the social setting, and (3) "normative discord" arising from conflicts or ambiguities within the value system itself.[15] He argues "The greatest weakness of value theory...is its inability to conceive of any form of antisocial behavior other than deviancy."[16] Since the Freudian psychoanalytic approach typically seeks to explain unusual human behavior in terms of psychopathologies, the combination of it and value theory provides the foundation for claiming that any opposition to an established order derives from mental instability or bad parenting. Johnson points out the obvious: any value-coordinated social system exists within the context of a greater human and physical environment. Strangely, Johnson seems also to regard endogenous social, economic and political factors as part of the environment external to the value system. The process by which conflict within the value system is endogenously generated is partially but inadequately addressed. He states that the interaction of the value system and the constraints imposed by the environment simultaneously determine the social structure and establish the bases of conflict. The three forms of competition he identifies are for scarce goods, political power, and what he refers to as "interstratum conflicts of interest." It is apparent from the text that the last phrase is a clumsy euphemism for class conflict.

Johnson's central achievement is his integration of psychological phenomena happening at the level of the individual with his macroscopic model of societal change. Johnson relies upon Anthony Wallace's discussion of the relationship between culture and personality to show the linkage. Wallace lays out five stages of personality reorganization in the face of externally imposed stress.[17] First, steady state involves tolerable levels of stress resulting in evolutionary change where the personality successfully adapts to continuing environmental change. During the second state, increasing numbers of individuals find themselves under excessive stress because either they or the social system are no longer able to ensure needs satisfaction. It is at this stage that psycho-social processes such as relative deprivation sentiments occur. This provides the psychological motivation individuals need to support the kind of collective social action. At the third stage, individuals without social support from family, friends and social organization begin to exhibit the psychologically damaging affects of high levels of sustained stress in the form of alchoholism, anxious depression, withdrawal, loss of self-esteem, and hysteria. The effect of anxiety under those conditions is to induce the initially gradual but cumulative and accelerating rate of personality fragmentation. The fourth stage, which Johnson refers to as the period of revolution, consists of personality reintegration through the adoption of a new and more coherent symbolic universe. This stage has six phases:

> First is the "formulation of a code," or what we have called the creation of a revolutionary ideology. The code is a prescription for disoriented people, telling them two things about the culturally distorted system: what to do to change it, and what to replace it with. These two functions are performed respectively, by what Wallace calls (as we have noted) the "transfer culture" and the "goal culture". Whether or not the goal culture can ever be achieved, its psychological importance is immense, for it opens up the possibility of liberation from the disturbing reality within which people have been trying to orient themselves. The second requirement of a revitalization movement is communication, or the preaching of the code by its formulators with the aim of making converts.... Wallace's third and fourth requirements, organization and adaptation, refer to needs generated by small-group dynamics.... This means simply that the people united by an ideology go on to organize themselves as a hierarchically structured revolutionary association, regardless of the ultimate values to which they subscribe. "Adaptation" occurs as the transfer culture is hardened into a program of action.... These four requirements culminate in "cultural transformation" --in the overt attempt to implement the transfer culture ... the final task of a revitalization movement becomes

> "routinization." The focus of the movement shifts from innovation to maintenance."[15]

Wallace's fifth stage, which follows routinization, is the new steady state, or in Johnson's terms, the re-equilibrated society. Wallace's discussion about revitalization as well as Johnson's ideas about disequilibrium - re-equilibrium can also be applied to relatively autonomous population groups or cultural milieus within a highly differentiated society characterized by relatively low levels of integration between the various social groupings. In these kinds of societies, the Johnson and Wallace models fit societal sub-systems each with their own autonomous cultural milieus. This is significant because if a revolutionary credo triumphs with one significant grouping while the conservative political order retains the support of another, the ideological basis for revolutionary mobilization and civil war has been laid. Such a conflict would entail much more than what either Wallace or Johnson have discussed. Here again, Tilly's and Skocpol's discussions of conflict between opposing social formations is relevant because it shows how and under what conditions ideologically motivated and organized collectives contend against each other employing both lawful and illegal methods.

Wallace's highly abstract model, linking heightened susceptibility to new ideas and hysterical conversion as maladaptive responses to personality fragmentation brought about by excessive stress caused by social instability, is immediately plausible. It also highlights the importance of intellectual and expressive leaders whom Wallace refers to as "formulators." It seems obvious that "formulator" is simply another term for charismatic leader. The Wallace and Johnson models can be strengthened by a number of observations. The relationship between social stress and psychological response is a function of the individual's capacity to cope and social support. It will vary substantially from one person to the next. There is no inherent requirement linking any given level of change to numbers of personality break-downs beyond the tendency for these numbers to increase with rising levels of felt anxiety. Individuals and population groups may vary significantly in their resilience to stress as a consequence of past personal experiences and resources. Wallace takes the presence and impact of "formulators" for granted. He assumes formulators will arise naturally and successfully bring about a revitalization. He presumes that successful formulators are themselves a necessary consequence of cultural distortion. He is probably right in assuming that at least one or more of them will arise and they will have a larger audience as a consequence of a major social crisis. But this does not guarantee they will be able to fulfill all the conditions, including revolution, necessary to bring about revitalization. Like Wallace, Johnson acknowledges the importance of leadership behavior, without actually discussing their leaders' functions in any but the broadest systemic terms. Wallace and Johnson simply assume the natural appearance of "formulators" during times of crisis, presuming an excessively mechanistic relationship between crisis and leadership. This creates the impression that societies automatically re-equilibriate themselves. Neither mentions cases of societies which literally dissolve or cease to exist as a consequence of prolonged disequilibrium. This is completely false. By taking charismatic leadership for granted, they fail to provide a clear place within their own, otherwise quite illuminating theoretical frameworks, for a very significant component.

Unlike the other major founders of sociology, Weber incorporated a discussion of leaders into his general worldview. Weber identified three ideal types of legitimate domination, traditional, bureaucratic, and charismatic. Weber states:

> Bureaucracy and patriarchalism are antagonistic in many respects, but they *share continuity* as one of their most important characteristics. In this sense both are structures of everyday life. Patriarchalism, in particular is rooted in the need to meet ongoing, routine demands, and hence has its first locus in the *economy*, to be precise, in those of its branches which are concerned with normal want satisfaction. The patriarch is the natural leader in matters of everyday life. In this respect, bureaucracy is merely the rational counterpart of patriarchalism. Bureaucracy, too, is a permanent structure and, witn its system of rational rules, oriented toward the satisfaction of calculable needs with ordinary, everyday means.
>
> All *extra*ordinary needs, ie., those which *transcend* the sphere of everyday economic routines, have always been satisfied in an entirely heterogeneous manner: on a *charismatic* basis.[19]

Weber's central distinction between bases of legitimate domination is in terms of whether the needs being fulfilled are ordinary or extraordinary. The Weberian corpus, unlike most journalistic and many academic accounts, applies the word "charismatic" only to individuals of such exceptional qualities that they truly do seem blessed with the "gift of grace."

At the heart of Weber's sociology is his conception of the progressive rationalization of all social relations, particularly those involving the economy. This process changes the material and social conditions within which people exist through technical alterations to the means of production and organization of work, what Durkheim referred to as the division of labour and Marx as the mode and relations of production. This process revolutionizes people from without. In contrast, charisma revolutionizes people from within by altering their convictions regarding religious, ethical, political or economic ideas. The resultant revolution, generated and mobilized by charismatic belief, then reshapes material and social conditions. Weber stresses that charisma manifests its revolutionary power from a central change, *metanoia*, in the followers' attitudes.[20] The charismatic leader derives her or his authority from perceptions of followers that he or she embodies a mission whose importance and value commands their devotion to her or him. Weber notes that this mission need not be revolutionary but stresses that it generally does entail significantly altering important features of the pre-existent regime.[21] Weber never satisfactorily reconciles the occurrence of charisma with the general tendency of societies towards progressively greater degrees of rationalization. He notes that charisma is more frequently to occur within societies characterized by traditional authority because of their greater susceptibility to magical thinking. Still, he argues that charisma can also arise within much more rationalized societies. Weber's work is a useful basis for examining the relationship between leadership and social change.

On the whole, the accounts of social change offered by Johnson, Skocpol and Tilly are compatible because they address different types and levels of political action. What Johnson, Skocpol, Tilly and Wallace fail to discuss clearly are the central functions of leadership in each of their discussions of social change. They focus almost exclusively upon how change occurs without explicitly commenting upon one essential factor that is not in itself a predictable manifestation of systemic forces. Tilly, whose excellent theoretical work is the most tightly connected with historical events of the three, devotes only three brief paragraphs to the kind of leadership process Wallace centered on. Instead, Tilly focuses upon the consequences of leadership manifested through the kinds of social actions undertaken by groups and institutions under their control. By concentrating on the level of analysis where the groups and institutions are reified as the significant actors without making reference to their internal processes, Tilly neatly side steps the need to examine the nature and consequences of different types of functional leadership and leader behavior. To each, leadership is a "black box" whose inner working is essential to the phenomena being explained but is itself not subjected to direct examination. Worst of all, Skocpol restricts her discussion of leaders, groups and ideology to post-revolution state-building activities. She says virtually nothing about their systemic/historic roles in bringing about the revolution themselves. Though her work speaks volumes about revolutions, it says nothing at all about revolutionary leaders or organizations.

Despite their substantive disagreements, Skocpol notes that all the major approaches share in common three central points:

> First, changes in social systems or societies give rise to grievances, social disorientation, or new class or group interests and potentials for collective mobilization. Then there develops a purposive, mass-based movement--coalescing with the aid of ideology and organization--that consciously undertakes to overthrow the existing government and perhaps the entire social order. Finally, the revolutionary movement fights it out with the authorities or dominant class and, if it wins, undertakes to establish its own authority and program.... None of these perspectives ever questions the premise that, for the occurrence of a revolution, a necessary causal condition is the emergence of a deliberate effort--an effort tying together leaders and followers that is aimed at overthrowing the existing political or social order.[22]

Though Skocpol herself does question this premise, she does not disprove its validity. Her summary, however, is correct. Every major theoretical approach stresses the importance of social organizations and movements as the critical factor that transforms latent revolutionary situations into actual ones. Further, every period of reform has also been marked by the rise of social movements and political organizations either pressing or resisting change. In many instances, though the key groups existed before and continued on after the period of crisis or reform, they nonetheless played a distinctive role during the time of change. Though Skocpol resolutely ignores the importance of movements and their leaders in her theoretical overview chapter, she clearly recognizes their critical role in bringing about change in her case studies. She notes the importance of crucial organizational and administrative innovations within the Chinese Communist Party to its long-term capacity to overcome otherwise severe resource constraints.[23] These internally developed organizational capabilities provided the Communists with resources necessary to first hold off the Japanese and then defeat the Kuomintang. All the theories discussed by Skocpol indicate the catalytic functions of political parties and politicized social movements in transforming potentially revolutionary conditions into significant reforms or actual revolutions.

Social organizations generally are also important to the study of leadership. A major reason why theorists other than Weber have ignored leadership within the context of social change is because its effects have been typically subsumed under the general operations and activities of institutions and social movements. Thus, a discussion of these social formations, such as Tilly's, is implicitly also a discussion of decisions made or influenced by specific leaders and leadership elites. In this sense, organizations constitute media through which leader and elite influence is transmitted. A second reason why politicized social movements specifically are important to the study of leadership and social crisis is because it is at their level that one sees the confluence of social psychological and socio-political effects. Social movements and organized political groups arising out of them are manifestations of proximate interpersonal relationships occurring in the context of established social networks of individuals and small groups. The inner dynamics of all social organizations are a function of social psychological factors, especially leader-follower relations. At the same time, these groups exist within the greater social environment. They function as the combative entities whose behavior and political impact Tilly describes in his theory of collective action. Institutions also reflect leader-follower interactions, though here they occur within the constraints of legal-bureaucratic rules and customs. Although the legitimate authority of institutions substitutes for the personal authority of a social movement leader, both types of organizations remain hierarchies of leader-follower relationships of varying degrees of proximity. This is why the seeming truism, that leadership is always situated within some form of social organization, is important. The type of organization an eventual leader joins or founds imposes significant constraints upon the subsequent range of practicable actions.

Even though neither Tilly nor Skocpol address the questions of group organization and leadership, both theories rest heavily upon, first, the actual existence of such groups, and second, presence of at least minimally competent organizational leaders. In particular, Skocpol never deals with the fact that two world historical figures, V. I. Lenin and Mao Zedong, were instrumental in bringing about her two latter revolutions and her first produced the man Hegel referred to after the battle of Jena as "the World-Soul on horseback," Napoleon Bonaparte. Though Gurr recognizes the importance of ideology in mobilizing those feeling relative deprivation, he does not address the manner in which these ideologies are originated and propagated. The Wallace and Johnson models are both superior to this account. However, both falsely imply that by some inexplicable process, in every situation where "formulators" are needed they will somehow appear and successfully re-equilibriate the social system. Their accounts are grossly misleading in their emphasis upon the apparent ease with which societal homeostasis can be achieved. Both minimize the importance of leaders and their organizations by assuming that they will simply appear, do their job, and then disappear into the history books. In addition, their shared assumption of homeostasis as the "normal" social condition is problematic and unnecessary. Paradoxically, both accounts would be more plausible if they had argued that the causes of potential social conflict, such as class conflict, are inherent within the structure of society. But taken together, all these theories interlock on their substantive explanatory points, providing the broad framework for a synthetic comprehensive theory of social change and the systemic role and functions of leaders and leadership.

Each of the theories discussed so far pertains to a particular aspect of the relationship between leadership and crisis. First, the Marxist approach offers insight into how social change can arise out of conflicts rooted in the conditions of domination and economic exploitation inherent in all differentiated societies. Second, Gurr's theory of relative deprivation points to the psychological impact crisis conditions have on individuals similarly affected and socially placed, and how these effects may themselves act as the motivational basis for mass political behavior. Gurr's theory ties directly into the third, Tilly's theory of collective action. Tilly's framework helps explain the organization of turmoil and potentially revolutionary challenges to the hegemonic control of the dominant classes and the state. Fourth, Weber's theory of charismatic leadership explains how such a challenge may arise and work out. Finally, Skocpol's discussion of social revolution identifies the two key preconditions to revolutionary success, coercive incapacity and a political confrontation between the dominant classes and the state over increased extractive demands by the latter to meet threats in the international arena. These five theories provide an interlocking account of how large-scale social forces can lay the basis for revolutionary change in societies.

Much of the literature on social change seems animated by a bias against taking seriously the possibility that variations in outcomes are the consequence of differences in the quality and effectiveness of leadership. In part, this is a justifiable reaction against the "Great Person" thesis. But in most cases, leaders are simply ignored or their presence is taken for granted. The general impression created by these tendencies is to view the outcomes of social change as determined by the conditions which originally produced the initial state of crisis. But as Sidney Hook ably argued, nothing requires the presumption of predetermined outcome in order to accept the possibility that significant change is likely. Perhaps the real source of so much resistance to the idea that leaders may make a significant difference is the implication this carries for theories of social change. If leaders are either irrelevant or interchangeable, then only the broad dynamics of situations need be known and explained. Conversely, if leaders do make a difference, then this introduces an unaccountable degree of indeterminacy into theoretical formulations. It also adds to the complexity of distinguishing between different kinds of leaders on the basis of their effectiveness and appropriateness for different kinds of situations. The consequence of this bias is to skew discussions so as to deny the possibility that leaders can make a significant difference in crises.

This chapter has sought to make the simple point that any complete account of social change must not only seek to explain the impact of macro-societal forces but also how the actions of people, both as individuals and as collectivities, shape their own future. Leaders are typically either taken for granted within these theories or are simply ignored. Neither does justice to the significant historical role of significant individuals. This chapter has also stressed the central role of leaders in the context of social movements and political parties which organize and mobilize people and resources seeking change. Social change comes about as a consequence of popular response to societal stresses. Parties and movements organize these popular responses under the direction of organizational leaders. Some of these leaders possess personal qualities which make them pivotal in influencing the outcomes to crises. The next chapter is about two of them.

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1. Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Violence," in *Handbook of Political Conflict* ed. Ted Robert Gurr (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. 138-40.

2. Charles Tilly, from *Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 16-24.

3. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 24.

4. Eckstein, p. 149-50.

5. Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, sec. ed. (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1982.

6. Tilly, p. 48.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 52-9.

8. Eckstein, p. 147-50.

9. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 14-33.

10. Tilly, p. 231-8.

11. Johnson, p. 8.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 8-9.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 25-33.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 34-39.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

17. Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Culture and Personality* (New York: Random House, 1961.)

18. Johnson, p. 110-3.

19. Weber, p. 1111.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 1116-7.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 1117.

22. Skocpol, p. 14-5.

23. Skocpol, p. 236-62.

CHAPTER SEVEN

LEADERSHIP AND CRISIS: THE CASES OF LENIN AND HITLER

The explanatory purpose of most theories of social change and crisis is to account for political events such as major reforms and revolutions in terms macro-societal forces or conditions. But, as pointed out in the analysis of Skocpol's theory in the last chapter, such circumstances seem more to allow rather than require such results. This point is critical to understanding the implicit difference between the voluntaristic and deterministic viewpoints. Most of the theories discussed in the last chapter can be interpreted in either way. The latter concentrates on showing how conditions preclude certain options while creating opportunities favourable for the realization of others. By demonstrating how behavior is simultaneously constrained and guided by circumstantial factors, this approach "gives the reason why" actors behave the way they do.[1] In turn, these assessments form the evidentiary basis for essentially sociological explanations for why certain outcomes are "necessary." As a tried-and-true form of rhetorical argument, this technique is perfectly acceptable. But it does not constitute a logical or "scientific" proof of necessary connection. Rather it identifies and establishes the necessary but not sufficient conditions for the occurrence of a historically significant episode. This distinction is important because while such explanations are essential to understanding why events transpire, they cannot ever demonstrate causal necessity.[2] In grasping why history has taken specific turns and not others, it is crucial to identify the self-conscious intentions of the critical actors in the situation. It is how they respond to the choices created and precluded by the matrix of circumstance that establishes what actually happens. Sometimes the range of options is great and the consequences fundamentally different depending upon which is selected. The actors making these "choices" can be social formations such as classes or ethnic groups, organized bodies like institutions or social movements, and individuals, acting as either principal leaders or as the members of decision-making elites. The chapter brought together different but complementary approaches to articulate an integrated theory relating leadership, social movements, macro-societal conditions, follower social psychology, and politico-institutional change to each other.

Perhaps the best way to explain this framework is as a series of stages. In the first stage an internal or external change induces strain within the socioeconomic system. At this stage the system can either effectively adapt to the strains, thereby neutralizing their potentially harmful impact, or conversely, the social groups and political institutions affected may fail to respond well enough to prevent widespread experiences of felt injustices and psychological stress. Individuals subjected to hardships may be mobilized by social groups whose existence either preceded the period of stress or came about as a consequence. At this point, the ideology and generally accepted worldview of those affected becomes crucial to governing their interpretation of events and subsequent strategy. The various leadership elites of both these groups and of the political system as a whole play a decisive role at this stage in determining the future course of events. If the society's history, its institutions, and the situation as a whole are conducive to political change, then the ruling elites and structures may still be reformed without requiring a wholly new order.

The second stage occurs if the sources of stress have not dissipated and reforms are not possible because of structural or elite inflexibility. The social system will have achieved the first significant precondition for revolutionary change: a continuing state of unresolved crisis. But no condition of crisis can last forever. So long as the state elites and their allies possess either a monopoly or preponderant control over coercive force, they can retain effective political power indefinitely. Skocpol points rightly to the significance of a crisis of state power as the catalyzing circumstance that transforms latent social crisis conditions into actual ones. The most common form for such crises is as a combination of fiscal and military crises induced by heightened competition from other nations. How such crises are resolved is a function of the behavior of social and organizational elites who are again presented with the opportunity, though with diminished room for maneuver, for significant reform. If reform efforts are not made or fail, the chances for revolutionary change escalate. If the military crisis had resulted in the incapacitation of the state's coercive resources or their transformation into elements supportive of radical change, then the likelihood of a successful revolution will have also increased dramatically.

The importance of leadership derives from its role in determining, first, the likelihood that reforms will be pursued successfully, and second, the likelihood and successfulness of revolutionary insurrections. A key point must be noted: revolutionary change as a genuine possibility is predicated upon the prior and substantive failure of ruling elites and leaders to achieve reforms sufficient to restabilize the social system in the event of a major crisis. Revolutions occur because ruling elites fail to realize that what suffices to keep order in normal times may prove insufficient under crisis conditions. It is this difference between normal and crisis demands that results in a social system being imbalanced. This inadequacy of normal measures results in revolution becoming a serious possibility. Revolutionary periods constitute the third stage.

The success or failure of revolutions often rests upon the quality of leadership afforded to the insurgent forces. Even though not all revolutions have been instigated by consciously planned conspiracies, their course has always been decisively influenced by the various groups and leaders who participate in them, and the quality of leadership can be crucial in determining which group eventually succeeds. It is impossible to identify a single revolution in which a singular individual or elite group did not come to occupy a controlling position. Regardless of whether this simply reflects the "iron law of oligarchy," their actions and decisions often have had decisive influence over the course of the revolution's changes.

The final stage is one of stabilization. In this, the new ruling elite establishes its own institutional order, seeks to enhance its popular support and perceived legitimacy, and rebuilds state power. This is typically the stage of routinization and the growth of bureaucratic institutions and a critical change occurs in the kind of personnel who come to occupy leadership positions. Unlike the old revolutionary elite who rose to power as a consequence of the upheaval, the new ones have attained their ranks through institutionalized pathways of bureaucratic or conventional promotion. Even in competitive political systems, there exist conventional or typical lines of advancement. In this sense, the new rulers resemble the pre-revolutionary elites even though the institutions through which they have arisen may be radically different. At the same time, some of the most important institutions of both the new and old regimes may have remained substantially the same in both internal structures and personnel despite the revolution. The revolutionary armies of Republican France and Bolshevik Russia clearly derived from their royalist or imperial predecessors. Over time, this pattern of promotion will result in a ruling elite psychologically predisposed towards fulfilling the conventional or bureaucratic dictates of a new institutional order. Ironically, this may markedly distinguish them from the leaders who first successfully led the revolution that produced this new order. Even more ironic, the original leaders may be as ill-disposed towards the eventually confirmed new order as they were towards the one they had originally supplanted. This fourth stage highlights the differences between the kinds of elites who successfully carry out revolutions and those who govern well established and stable regimes.

Like the theories discussed in the last chapter, the preceding overview describes social change as a procession of stages. But as argued in the last chapter, the critical variable that effectively determines progression from one stage to another is leadership. This leadership can be provided by organizational elites or dominated by charismatic leaders. This chapter examines two case-studies which highlight the central importance of two revolutionary elites controlled by a pair of exceptional leaders: V. I. Lenin and Adolf Hitler. Both of these men created the organizations and organizational elites which carried them to power. The participation of each demonstrably altered the outcome of the national crises they exploited and facilitated. Without either, the history of the twentieth century would have been a considerably less bloody and brutal one. Both men are among the titans of this century and have played pivotal roles in creating the modern world.

Both the Russian Revolution and the rise of the Nazis were the consequence of social forces unleashed by the French Revolution and the growth of industrialization throughout Europe. Though the autocrats successfully suppressed both the liberal and nationalist upheavals of the mid-century, their actions served only to ensure that the next out-break would be even more violent and broader in scope. The roots of the cataclysmic changes of 1917-23 were firmly embedded in the reactionary victories in 1848. The ruling elites of Prussia, Russia and Austro-Hungary were not completely unaware of the need for reform. Otto von Bismarck succeeded in enervating the German liberals, suppressing his growing working class opposition with repressive measures and mollifying their supporters with the most progressive social welfare policies to be found anywhere. The Russian liberals also enjoyed their own season of triumph culminated by the emancipation of the serfs through a decree issued by Tzar Alexander II. These internal transformations were occurring in the broader context of great power rivalry and conflict. Beneath the facades of imperial power and glory, the tensions and forces which had been suppressed in 1848 continued to build, awaiting a release from their strait-jackets of police repression and bourgeois sensibility. The First World War turned these restraints into tatters.

All the European belligerents suffered internal turmoil and, in many cases, open class war. Even Britain and France, ostensibly the most victorious of all the combatants, experienced tremendous social unrest. But theirs was mild compared to what others endured. The Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved into a quilt of successor states. The liberal nationalist government of Count Karolyi gave way to Bela Kun's Hungarian Soviet Republic, itself rapidly crushed by Czechoslovakian, Croatian, Rumanian, and Hungarian rightist forces. Austria witnessed the outbreak of prolonged class warfare with the rightists eventually gaining ascendance. Massive class conflict broke out in post-war Italy, ending only with the rise of Mussolini's fascism. Given the general upheaval caused throughout Europe by the war, it would have been virtually miraculous if revolutionary conflict had not broken out in either Germany or Russia. The real miracle was that in Russia, the revolution prevailed. Two points ought to be noted at this stage. First, virtually all the liberal or socialist risings ended with ultra-rightist governments in power except in Germany and Russia. Of the newly created countries, only Czechoslovakia produced a substantially democratic government. Though Germany did eventually fall to Hitler, the collapse of the Weimar Republic was in no sense fore-ordained. The rise of Lenin and the Bolsheviks was not even conceived.

The importance of both revolutions to this thesis derives from the central role that was played by their principal leaders, Lenin and Hitler. The times in which they rose to power were turbulent and witnessed the rise of many dictators, most notably Benito Mussolini. But there are fundamental differences between the roles played by the other dictators, including Mussolini, and Lenin and Hitler. In the case of Lenin, no Bolshevik Revolution could have occurred without him. Without Hitler, a rightist government may well have come to power in Germany but it would not have been recognizable as of the same type of regime as what the Nazis eventually installed. The rightist successor regime to Weimar might well have been brutal and repressive but without Hitler it almost certainly would not have been maniacally genocidal nor, possibly, as willing to wage another world war. Hitler gave the Nazis a specific character that would almost certainly not have occurred independently in another rightist dictatorship. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to establishing these claims concerning the specific importance of Lenin and Hitler within the contexts of their times.

Two of the most influential leaders of the twentieth century were probably Kaisar Wilhelm II and Tsar Nicholas II. Their importance is a tribute to the impact of mediocrity in high places. Though their decisions accidentally set in motion the First World War and the Russian Revolution, it was Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's genius that enabled the transformation of both events into the Bolshevik *coup d'etat* and eventual victory in the subsequent civil war. Without Lenin, the modern history of both Russia and the world would have been radically different. More than any other leader of the twentieth century, Lenin altered the historical flow of events the most sharply from their probable course. Lenin's success was rooted in certain important aspects of his personality which facilitated the seizure and consolidation of power by the Bolsheviks under his direction. But Lenin's genius would never have been manifest if Tsarist Russia had not provided the revolutionary opportunity.

The defeat of Russian armies by the much smaller but better equipped Franco-British forces during the Crimean War provided the impetus for the Age of Reform under Tsar Alexander

II. The single most significant change promulgated during this period was the Emancipation Act of 19 February 1861, a compromise between the demands for freedom and land of the peasants, and the economic interests of the land owning nobility.[3] The manner of implementation dissatisfied both sides. The land allocation to the peasants was paltry and subject to manipulation by the landowners. Further, emancipation came at a monetary price. The peasant owed debts to the landowner in compensation for the land received. In fact, the Emancipation Act constituted a means through which the landed nobility could gain at least temporary relief from their widespread fiscal crisis induced by the increasing commercialization of Russian life concurrent with increased competition from new grain-producing regions in North America. The Emancipation Act did not resolve the conflicts between an impoverished peasantry and a financially pressured nobility. It did serve to whet the former's appetite for more change while strengthening the latter's resolve to prevent them.

The Age of Reform was also the age of terror. Nihilism and anarchist philosophy found fertile soil in the minds of the Russian intelligentsia. The conditions of autocracy in Russia precluded the kind of political activism that marked the same period in Great Britain. Instead, educated Russian youths were inspired to "go to the people" in movements which sought to educate and propagandize the peasantry. More moderate liberals such as the fathers of both Alexander Kerensky and Lenin himself sought reform and change in the employ of the imperial bureaucracy and of local governmental institutions (*zemstva*). Eventually, the terrorists succeeded in forcing a reaction that throttled chances for further reforms, following their assassination of Tsar Alexander II. His successors, Alexander III and Nicholas II continued policies of unimaginative reaction until the latter was finally overthrown by the February Revolution. The central weakness of reformist efforts rested on the fact that they could only be pursued at the discretion of the Tsar. This historic Russian pattern was to leave liberal hopes at the mercy of both Court politics and the conspiracies of romantic youths enamoured by the latest ideological fashions.

Nonetheless, the eventual failure of reformist efforts during the nineteenth century was never a foregone conclusion. The central necessity for successful long-term reform was the strengthening of Russian political institutions. A number of Alexander II's leading advisors had suggested expansion of consultative roles for the *zemstva* as a means of broadening liberal support and opportunities to participate in the Tsarist government. Alexander III's advisors rightly saw this as a move in the direction of constitutional monarchy and successfully blocked it.[4] Nevertheless, the *zemstva* continued to grow in both size and importance as they took on responsibility for public health, primary education, relief and a host of other ostensibly local concerns. By the turn of the century, the *zemstva* had become the natural institutional home of reformist liberals and the potential basis for genuinely representative government. The *zemstva* were governed by assemblies of elected nobles and peasants. They proved capable of effectively working together for the management of local and regional matters. They also possessed broad support from the peasant communes and the landed gentry. In 1904, prince P. D. Sviatopolk-Mirsky, Nicholas II's newly appointed interior minister, proposed that the *zemstva* be allowed to elect representatives to participate in legislative discussions in the State Council.[5] Despite massive support from the majority of his advisors, Nicholas II was swayed against the plan by the opposition of his finance minister, S. Y. Witte. Ironically, Witte was to propose even further reaching reforms in the wake of the 1905 Revolution.[6]

The victories won by the Japanese Imperial forces during the Russo-Japanese War shattered the coercive strength of the Russian Autocracy and revolutionary discontent swept through European Russian. The chance for revolution had come. The Tsarist regime faced the consequences of national humiliation and its own repressive history. On the 9th of January, 1905 Father Gapon marched on the Winter Palace at the head of a demonstration of St. Petersburg workers demanding livable working conditions and human rights.[7] When soldiers opened fire, ninety-six marchers died and over three hundred were wounded. Russia was outraged. Forced by the disturbances and demands for justice following the slaughter, the Tsar issued an *uskase*, or decree, on 18

February calling an elected assembly, or *Duma*, with consultative powers to offer proposals for general reforms. It was insufficient to stop the escalating waves of strikes and demonstrations. By October, a general strike paralyzed St. Petersburg and an armed insurrection broke out in Moscow the next month. By April 1906, the Tsar had been forced to proclaim new concessions in the Fundamental State Laws which offered veto powers over legislation to the *Duma* and guarantees for civil liberties. The most popular party at the time, the Constitutional Democrats, or "Kadets," rejected these offers, realizing that the Tsar could withdraw them as soon as order was restored. They were right. By 1907, the bulk of the constitutional reforms introduced by the 1905 Revolution had been dismantled and the Autocracy was again firmly in control. The army had fully recovered from its defeat in Asia and the Conservative Union of October 17, or Octobrists, had gained control of the Duma through electoral fraud and manipulation.[8] The most obvious and immediately important reason for the failure of reform was the Tsar's hostility towards them. With the active support of reactionary elements, Nicholas II's appointed ministers set about to dismantle the framework of concessions as quickly as circumstances allowed. The 1905 Revolution was significant for what it failed to accomplish. It was the last clear opportunity for liberal reform. Had Witte's reforms been allowed to stand and be expanded upon, then the liberal institutions which Lenin eventually sought to destroy in November, 1917 would have had eleven years rather than eight months in which to take root and evolve. Nicholas II was the most valuable of all Lenin's adversaries.[9] But in the end, it was not Nicholas II but Alexander Kerensky whom Lenin was to overthrow.

By January of 1917, three years of severe battlefield losses to the Germans, worsening economic conditions, and through-going incompetence at virtually all levels left the Tsar's regime in a state of extreme political vulnerability. From then until 27 February, the situation for the Tsar continued to worsen as an escalating cycle of strikes and repressive violence finally climaxed with the revolt of the Petrograd garrison. By 1 March, over 170,000 troops of the garrison had gone over to the revolt. In addition, three other crucial events had occurred on the 27th of February.[10]

First, the Tsarist cabinet resigned in the face of imminent violence. Second, the Tsar had ordered the proroguing of the *Duma*, leaving Russia without a generally recognized legitimate assembly. But before the *Duma* ceased being, the progressive parties led by the Kadets managed to organize an informal committee that rapidly evolved into the provisional government. The final significant act was the formation of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet by Menshevik and Bolshevik leaders of the strike movement newly freed from prison. Within the space of a single day the Capitol's garrison had revolted, the Tsar's government resigned, the only alternative source of legitimate legal authority, the *Duma*, ceased to exist and two rival centres of power, the provisional government and the Petrograd Soviet, had come into being.

The most significant of all these events was probably the elimination of the *Duma* as a source of legitimate authority. As initial events were to demonstrate, the Petrograd Soviet was not hostile to the provisional government but the latter was effectively paralyzed by a preoccupation with its own illegitimacy and consequent necessity for a Constituent Assembly. Preoccupation with this goal incapacitated the liberals, Social Revolutionaries, and Mensheviks participating in the provisional government. Had the *Duma* remained assembled, this constitutional nicety may have been successfully deferred until a more propitious time. But even without the *Duma*, the provisional government could still have successfully expedited its own and others' preoccupation with legalist legitimacy through the speedy election of such an assembly. Instead, they fatally postponed it. The reformists consistently failed to grasp the moment on that critical issue and a host of others. Lenin did not make the same mistakes.

The provisional government first under Prince L'vov and later Kerensky faced five basic problems. First, it had to obtain legitimacy in order to establish a stable regime. Second, it had to obtain and maintain the support of a disciplined army. Third, it had to establish popular support for itself among the Russian population, most notably the peasantry. Fourth, it had to win the active cooperation of the urban proletariat and its organized formations, specifically the Petrograd Soviet. These were severe but not unsolvable problems. Their resolution lay in how the final problem, the war, was handled. What eventually hanged Kerensky and the provisional government was their decision to continue prosecuting the war despite the enormous strains imposed upon Russian society and the new-born liberal democratic regime.[11]

Given the scope of the difficulties which faced him it seems only natural to feel forgiving towards Kerensky for having failed to resolve them successfully. Unquestionably, the man was overwhelmed by the pressures he faced, but his actions did not represent the best that could have been done under the circumstances. In every significant crisis, Kerensky augmented their scope by committing often grave tactical errors and fatal misjudgments.[12] These mistakes added to the already severe problems faced by the provisional government. In addition, after Lenin's arrival, the Bolsheviks methodically set out to create disturbances and worsen the overall situation facing the regime. As a consequence of his own mistakes and failures to resolve admittedly taxing problems, Kerensky created additional opportunities which Lenin exploited to decisive advantage in subverting and overthrowing the provisional regime. In the end, the inability of the liberal and socialist parties to recognize and respond to the urgent need for peace and massive social reform undermined the liberal-democratic revolution and Kerensky's democratic socialist government. They failed to appreciate the urgent need for radical social change geared towards winning immediate mass support and fundamental reorganization of state institutions. These failures stripped the provisional government's ministers, liberal and socialist, of the most potent basis for mobilizing popular support: effective handling of immediate problems.

Despite his failings, Kerensky had a number of important leadership qualities, including inspired oratorical talent and a remarkable ability to charm people into agreement. He possessed the necessary skills to be a charismatic leader and succeeded in generating enormous enthusiasm for his positions when he spoke publicly. But his ability to perceive the most tactically expeditious way for achieving a particular end in the face of determined opposition was weak and, more importantly, he completely lacked the requisite strategic insight necessary to grasp what ought to be his specific goal in the various situations and crises he faced. Kerensky's legal career and overall political experience had emphasized the importance of public speaking and interpersonal relations. For the first time, he was faced with a situation that required a firm grasp of context and the capacity to plan out thoroughly a strategy geared towards the conquest of power rather than the evocative communication of a particular position. By contrast, Lenin has spent his entire adult life mastering the art of intrigue. Also, unlike Kerensky, Lenin possessed a masterfully developed theory of social conflict resonant with strategic implications. Most important, Lenin had invented a system of tactics and organization framed around the problem of organized class struggle. Lenin literally wrote the textbook on how to conquer state power.

Without all the conditions enumerated so far, Lenin could not have successfully pulled off the Bolshevik Revolution. But the question this raises is whether it would have occurred in any case without him, or was he the irreplaceable catalyst necessary for the event to have taken place? Although the Bolsheviks might eventually have sought to overthrow the provisional government, the November Revolution occurred because of Lenin, and it would not have happened had he died, for whatever reason, before March 1917. His presence in Russia from April of that year on was the single most important factor to result in the foundation of the Bolshevik state. No Bolshevik leader other than Lenin (1) contemplated the immediate overthrow of the provisional government, (2) possessed the required sense of tactics and timing, and (3) commanded the necessary degree of authority and stature. Lenin was one of the very few leaders in history whose presence was strictly necessary for an epochal event to occur.

No other Bolshevik leader sought to overthrow the provisional government because everyone but Lenin adhered to the two-stage theory of revolution.[13] Lenin had also supported this view until the revolutionary situation presented itself. Unlike all his other colleagues, Lenin had the insight to grasp the opportunities created by actual events which had not been comprehended previously in exhaustively debated theoretical formulations. Singularly, Lenin abandoned such formulations virtually overnight in favour of a radically new strategy that recognized the potentialities of the new situation. This amazing display of cognitive flexibility underlay Lenin's most important

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contribution to the Bolshevik Revolution: the belief in its very possibility. A number of factors facilitated this insight. First and most important was his tactical orientation. He understood how an apparently weaker group, through superior organization and an excellent grasp of tactics and timing, could defeat a seemingly stronger adversary. He also understood the critical value of propaganda and agitation as tools which can divide, confuse, and polarize large elements within the opposing camp. Above all, he appreciated how the determined exploitation of all advantages without concern for secondary considerations could yield power.

Perhaps the best example of this aptitude, and one that was in many important ways the precursor to his subversion tactics of 1917, was his successful capture of a significant portion of the Russian Social Democracy movement, culminating in the formation of the Bolshevik wing at the 1903 All Russian Social Democracy Congress.[14] Throughout his political life, Lenin had emphasized the importance of political organization. Returning from his Siberian exile, he implemented a novel plan for a new party journal, *Iskra*, which served as a platform for battling the "economism" of reformist-oriented positions gaining currency under the influence of Eduard Bernstein.[15] He used the journal as a means to win the support of senior party leaders, build a covert organization, and recruit revolutionary supporters to his perspective. It was the prototype for the kind of organization Lenin elaborated upon in his seminal work What Is To Be Done?

Lenin's approach to revolutionary politics was the mirror-reflection of brokering. Whereas brokerage politicians seek to find points of contact and agreement between different groups and factions, Lenin sought out and exposed the areas of division and conflict. Whereas a broker would attempt to win by assembling a majority coalition in the face of competing attempts by others, Lenin sought to win by eliminating bases of support for opposing perspectives until his remained the only organized one capable of providing guidance and leadership to otherwise totally disorganized and disoriented potential followers. What remained his most consistent tactic for victory was the creation of an organizational monopoly. He targetted for destruction all groups capable of acting as an alternative focal point. Only after disrupting his adversaries, be they moderate social democrats or the existing state institutions, did he orchestrate a positive bid for control over the organizational "commanding heights." He always sought to use the strongly held beliefs or desires of others as the basis for splits between themselves and either their supporters or leaders. He was a master at the art of alienating one group from another. By seizing control of such organizational resources and symbols as remained after a split, Lenin was always able to establish his group as the focal point for ready identification, continued organization and further political growth. He would then solidify support by polarizing his new supporters against an external enemy whom he would polemicize as an immediate threat to their now shared values and beliefs. Lenin always ensured that his long-standing close supporters and fellow party members held tight control over the newly created or strengthened organizations so that they would come to be accepted by group members as the normal figures of authority. By using this strategy, Lenin was consistently able to destroy far stronger opponents while enhancing the strength of his own faction or party. He possessed an almost sublime insight into the dynamics of organizational formation, growth and destruction. This was the basis for his eventual success as a revolutionary.

Both Kerensky and Lenin were men of remarkable talents and abilities. Against Kerensky's enormous personal charm and speaking ability, Lenin had a capacity for intellectual argumentation and organizational acumen. But what governed the application of their respective talents was their differing leadership styles and worldviews. Kerensky's style emphasized immediate oratorical and interpersonal persuasiveness and appeal, often at the expense of long-term interests.[16] These he often undercut by making promises or commitments which subsequently had to be retracted with a concomitant loss of credibility. Kerensky's rhetorical style was a potent means for mobilizing support but one that eventually became blunted as a consequence of his inability to provide tangible benefits validating his initial promise.[17] Lenin's leadership derived from his capacity to overwhelm fellow revolutionaries intellectually. His support was based upon the power of his ideas and the force of will with which he presented them. He also repeatedly displayed a capacity to understand events and foretell opportunities. In the end, history judged Lenin's abilities to be of greater importance than those of Kerensky. Had Kerensky been leading the Bolsheviks, he probably would not have perceived the possibilities Lenin foresaw, whereas Lenin, even without Kerensky's oratorical gifts, probably would have more successfully addressed and resolved the material bases of the crisis that the provisional government was experiencing.

Given Lenin's superiority to Kerensky as a leader, it still remains to be shown that Lenin was the only Bolshevik capable of instigating and successfully leading the November Revolution. It is a central fact of history that of all the senior Bolshevik leaders, only Lenin supported the overthrow of the provisional government from the outset and only he initially sought October as the ideal month. Lenin had to overcome considerable opposition from his colleagues in order to get the Bolsheviks to attempt the revolution that bears their name. What is most striking about both debates was the necessity of his physical presence at the meetings of the Central Committee.[18] Before Lenin's arrival at the Finland Station in Petrograd, he had sent "letters from afar" detailing his position on opposing the provisional government. Leo Karmenev and Joseph Stalin censored them before their publication in *Pravda*. Upon his arrival, Lenin proclaimed his "April Theses," which reiterated his call for the overthrow of the provisional government. By doing this he broke with the "two-stage theory of revolution" that held that a bourgeois revolution and government must precede a socialist one. The Bolsheviks' initial response was one of the extreme hostility. Every major leader, from Karmenev to Trotsky, opposed Lenin. Gradually, Lenin persuaded or cajoled them into accepting his viewpoint. By mid-May the Bolsheviks had accepted, in principle, the idea of revolution against the same provisional government with which virtually all of them had intended to cooperate only a month before. The sole basis for this transformation was Lenin's presence.

Still, this did not translate into support for a specific plan of insurrection. One of Lenin's great problems during the months between May and August was controlling the behavior of his own supporters. He was attempting to subvert the army while building support for the Bolsheviks. His difficulty lay in ensuring that his own members did not instigate a premature enterprise that would disrupt his plans. This is precisely what happened during what is now called the "July days." Perhaps the worst crisis Lenin faced in the time between his arrival and the insurrection itself in the first week of November was when units about to be ordered to the front spontaneously sought to resist the order through demonstrations which rapidly escalated in scope and violence. Several hundred lost their lives in street fighting before order was restored. The event was a disaster for the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik military organization was broken, the Red Guards were disarmed, Lenin and others were forced underground by police arrest warrants, and the party as a whole was largely broken in Petrograd. What reclaimed the party from defeat was General Kornilov's attempted coup in August. The Petrograd Soviet sought the support of the Bolsheviks who were allowed to reactivate and rearm their Red Guard under the control of the Petrograd soviet's military revolutionary centre. This was controlled completely by Bolsheviks appointed by Trotsky, who had already been elected president of the Soviet. This group was to be Trotsky's instrument for planning and carrying out Lenin's coup. But having been driven underground and out of Petrograd, Lenin lost the capacity to influence the Central Committee in person.

Lenin sought the fulfillment of three conditions in order to realize the coup: first, disorganization of the army; second, widespread support or at least the supportive neutrality of the peasants he hoped to win with promises of land; and last, Bolshevik control over the proletarian workers' organizations in both Petrograd and Moscow. At the same time he was anxious about Kerensky's efforts to organize support for the provisional government through a Constituent Assembly, and the possibility of peace before he could organize the coup. These considerations dominated his sense of timing. The other members of the Central Committee did not grasp the tight constraints these factors imposed upon the planning and execution of the insurrection. Again, Lenin had to return to Petrograd to confront his colleagues. In the face of strong initial opposition, Lenin persuaded them to organize an insurrection before the Congress of Soviets scheduled for 7 November, 1917. Trotsky was charged with the actual responsibility for carrying it out. Despite Lenin's enormous importance to the revolution in the years that followed, particularly in his decision to force acceptance of the unfavourable peace terms offered by the Germans, his unique role was fulfilled with the decision of the Central Committee to execute the coup under Trotsky's operational leadership. With the possible exception of the peace terms, Lenin ceased to be irreplaceable in the context of how history was to unfold. But what he had accomplished between April and October of 1917 transformed the history of the world.

Clearly, Lenin saw the revolutionary opportunity and possessed the ability to exploit it. But this does not explain his motivation or extreme sense of self-certainty. These qualities mobilized Lenin's genius in the cause of revolution. Practically all major biographies rightly point to the central importance of his mid-adolescent crisis triggered by the death of his father and the execution of his brother for attempting to assassinate Tsar Alexander III. But almost none pay sufficient attention to the important character traits Lenin had already developed before these events had occurred. This is central: the crises did not "create" the revolutionary personality as much as give a revolutionary mission to a developing personality of already enormous potential.

From late childhood on, Lenin displayed many of the personality traits which were to characterize him as an adult. Unlike his brother Alexander who displayed a highly unemotional and dispassionate orientation towards the world, Lenin was boisterous, aggressive, extremely self-confident, aloof and often highly domineering. He also possessed enormous self-discipline, powers of concentration and the intense driving passion for work that marked his entire family. Following his brother's execution, Lenin acquired Alexander's taciturn, unemotional and very private self-regard.[19] Both Lenin and his older brother Alexander were characterized by a strongly developed and defended sense of privacy to which Lenin's habits of self-reliance and self-sufficiency can be traced. The founder of the Bolshevik regime was a man who from boyhood on had a deeply developed sense of self and of individuality. These traits are significant because they highlight the origins of the particular set of stress coping mechanisms which underlay his leadership style and motivation: emotional isolation, intellectualization, rationalization, denial, projection, displacement, and repression. Lenin's formidable strengths of character, such as his capacity for sophisticated intellectual thought, psychological detachment, single-mindedness, enormous self-discipline, and sheer toughness, were manifestations of these mechanisms.

All these characteristics come together into a pattern Bruce Mazlish called the "revolutionary ascetic."[20] Mazlish's formulation is important because it explains the relationship between Lenin's character traits, key developmental events, their impact upon his personality's psychodynamic structure, his resulting leader style, and character type. Mazlish points to a constellation of personality traits shared to varying degrees by a number of historically significant revolutionaries including Lenin.[21] Mazlish stresses two aspects of asceticism relevant to understanding these kinds of leaders. First, they exhibit enormous self-discipline and self-denial in the cause of some transcendental goal or purpose. Second, they have "few libidinal ties" with other individuals as a result of affective displacement of such ties onto abstractions like the nation, some ideal state or future goal. Normal feelings of love and attachment to individuals are transferred onto collective entities. Mazlish points out the similarity between this displacement and narcissism noting that what seems to have been displaced is a virtually narcissistic intensity of self-love onto an ideal object with which the person then completely identifies. In a crucial sense, the person is completely free of self-concern or self-interest. The person has completely subordinated her or his personality and personal needs to the achievement of whatever end he or she has come to identify with. This "transference" can be the result of abnormal personality formation, such as in the case of Hitler, or a consequence of intense feelings generated by some unresolved trauma being displaced onto an abstract ideal object. The latter occurred to Lenin, as a result of the deaths of his father and brother.

From early boyhood, Lenin displayed an exceptionally strong personality, though of the sort similar to those of his father and elder brother. Lenin was the product of an exceptional family. Although he was aloof, nothing about him suggested anything more than an intense desire to preserve his personal autonomy. If Lenin had suffered no traumas or difficulties, he would still have become a truly exceptional man in any field of endeavor. Unfortunately for both him and the

Tsarist regime, Lenin's father and brother died in quick succession. Though he died of natural causes, Llya Nikolayevich Ulyanov also died disappointed. Immediately following the assassination of Alexander II, the new regime introduced policies of widespread repression and began reversing the progressive measures of the dead Tsar. One of the victims of this reaction was Lenin's father. Though liberal, he was a patriotic Russian and reacted with outrage and horror at the regicide. But despite his loyalty, he was told that he would be forcibly retired from his life-long career as an educator. Within months, in January 1886, and at the relatively young age of fifty-five, he died of a brain hemorrhage. He died as reactionary forces systematically began to undo a lifetime of devoted service to the Tsarist regime. With Alexander at university, Lenin was the eldest son left at home.

The second and more significant tragedy occurred the following year. Lenin's elder brother and the person he identified with most closely was arrested on 1 March 1887 and executed on 8 May 1887, for plotting to assassinate the Tsar. Winston Churchill noted the impact:

> His mind was a remarkable instrument. When its light shone it revealed the whole world, its history, its sorrows, its stupidities, its shams, and above all its wrongs. It revealed all facts in its focus---the most unwelcome, the most inspiring---with an equal ray. The intellect was capacious and in some phases superb. It was capable of universal comprehension in a degree rarely reached among men. the execution of the elder brother deflected broad white light through a prism: and the prism was red.[22]

A second and even more important impact was the consequence on Lenin's character. Lenin transformed the feelings of intense grief and separation in two important ways. First, the rupture of primary libidinal ties traumatized Lenin in a significant way even though it's impact was not readily observable. The deaths of his father and brother in quick succession massively reinforced his already present tendency not to form strong affective bonds with others. But what might have otherwise have been a habit of aloofness and formality became an intense denial of human attachment. Describing a crucial encounter with Georgi Plekanov, the great Marxist leader of Russian Social Democracy and the man who was a father-figure to him, Lenin wrote "...An enamored youth receives from the object of his love a bitter lesson: to regard all persons 'without sentiment'; to keep a stone in one's sling..."[23] Though Lenin turned his formidable self-discipline and capacity for self-denial to the task, he did not entirely succeed. Though thoroughly repressed, Lenin's behavior was governed by conscious will and not fundamentally neurotic impulses. As a consequence, he exhibited moments of sentimental "weakness" which would not have occurred with a completely narcissistic personality. Nonetheless, Lenin was a man lacking almost any of the normal feelings of attachment.

These qualities made Lenin an adequate candidate for charismatic attachment, after the fact. He never commanded the kind of fawning devotion that marked Hitler's entourage. Instead, what Lenin demanded was unswerving loyalty which, as Stalin repeatedly pointed out later, Lenin rarely received from his colleagues. In fact, even Stalin opposed Lenin on a number of important occasions. Lenin was responsible for a considerable amount of the absence of sentimental attachment in that he repeatedly drilled into them his dictum to "keep a stone in one's sling." But Lenin was respected. His power to compel followers to obey was largely a function of the supreme self-certainty which he communicated and the remarkable acuity of his insights. Together, these two qualities generated a compulsive, almost hypnotic, effect upon his colleagues. His effect on crowds also derived from the same combination. The root of Lenin's appeal lay in his ability to provide both the appearance and substance of sure guidance to professional revolutionaries. In this sense, Lenin was a "Warlord" because his extraordinary prowess, operational as well as intellectual, served as the basis for his leadership appeal.

Ironically, Lenin did not become a "true" charismatic leader until after he died and the revolution deified him as its prophet and saint.[24] This was the work of his colleagues, especially Stalin. The Lenin cult had its foundation in the Bolshevik propaganda of the revolutionary period immediately following the assassination attempt on him of 30 August, 1918. During the first months of the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin was barely perceptible as the public leader. Within days of the shooting, the other leaders of the revolution had begun to transform Lenin's public persona from one being virtually nonexistent to that of a transcendental hero and potential martyr.[25] While this served the Bolshevik cause beautifully, the praise seems also to have been quite sincere.

The hagiography continued to increase after his recovery even though there is no evidence that he sought it. Lenin's death was a watershed for the new Soviet regime. The massive emotional outbursts throughout the new country and in the newly renamed Communist Party were both sincere and intense. Lenin had become a prophet of the new order as well as the founder of a new regime. His virtual deification served to legitimate the new regime and its rulers. His name and genuinely stupendous accomplishments continue to serve as a touchstone for the new Marxist-Leninist faith, as well as a mask behind which to hide and forgive its crimes.

History does not often seem like a Greek tragedy but it does in the case of the fall of the Tsarist regime. Tsarism created Lenin. It produced his father only to destroy his ambitions. It created the romantic movements for revolution which so influenced and killed Alexander. It willfully smashed the opportunities for reform generated by the 1905 Revolution. It was instrumental in causing the mechanized slaughter known as the First World War. It allowed itself to be governed by fools and incompetents. But when it did fall, it was not to Lenin and the Bolsheviks but to Prince L'vov, the Kadets, Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and above all, Kerensky. Had Lenin so chosen, Kerensky and the new regime almost certainly would have survived. If he had joined the provisional government, Lenin very probably would eventually have become a senior minister, if not the prime minister, of a liberal-democratic Russian state. He chose not to. Instead, the Soviets are only now, under Michail Gorbachev, beginning the process of democratization that Lenin abrogated in 1917. In order to understand the modern world one must appreciate the consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution. But in order to grasp its causes one must also be able to account for Lenin and his motivations. Lenin's importance to history results from the unique role he played as the catalyst for the Bolshevik Revolution. Nothing in the history of Russia preordained the rise of the Bolsheviks to power. Lenin was instrumental to its occurrence.

Adolf Hitler's role in the rise of German right-wing authoritarianism in the form of the Nazis was somewhat different. Although the rise of the Nazis party was largely the result of his leadership, Weimar Germany was already heading in the direction of a right-wing dictatorship. Unlike Lenin's role in the rise of the Bolsheviks to power, Hitler was not strictly necessary for Germany to produce an authoritarian regime. What makes Hitler significant is that he is almost the archetypical case-study of charismatic leader appeal. His influence and rise to power derived from his seemingly magical capacity to evoke intense emotional loyalties and political devotion. This "magical" ability was the consequence of the kind of narcissistic leader and ideal-image hungry follower relationship discussed in Chapter Five. Hitler possessed the kind of leader personality best suited to projecting an ideal image.

But this by itself would have been insufficient had other conditions not existed. the critical factor that led to the rise of Hitler and the Nazis was the presence of a vast pool of potential followers rendered psychologically susceptible to charismatic appeal by the severe social dislocations brought about by the First World War and its aftermath. This susceptibility was heightened by certain child-rearing and socialization practices particularly prevalent in Germany. The existence of this pool provided a priceless political resource to Hitler. In order to understand Hitler's rise to power it is necessary to understand how this pool came into being as a consequence of specific socioeconomic and political events, and traditional patterns of socialization.

Henry V. Dicks points out the importance of traditional German cultural values and patterns of socialization in creating a heightened susceptibility to authoritarian ideological appeal. He notes three assumptions underlying posited relationships between ideology and personality structure: 1) the greater the relationship between the ideology and unfulfilled unconscious needs, the greater the cathartic effect conversion and attendant sense of relief; 2) childhood experiences have a decisive formative impact upon the personality of the adult; and 3) national culture creates recurrent personality types and similar patterns of psychological development through uniformities in socialization and education.[26] His study of 138 German prisoners of war found that "the German prisoners who held Nazi or near Nazi beliefs and ideology with conviction and fanaticism, had a personality structure which differed from the norm of German national character in the sense that they embodied this structure in more exaggerated or concentrated form."[27] Nazism both appealed to and derived from certain critical features of German culture.

Traditional patterns of socialization stress the inculcation of authoritarian values in family settings consisting of remote and often brutal father-figures, and submissive and fearful mothers.[28] The child grows up in a family climate of enormous insecurity and doubts of self-worth. At the same time German youths are socialized to admire harshness and submit only to clearly manifested strength while holding anything implying softness or femininity in contempt. Two points have to be recognized. First, the German family inclulcates what Horney referred to as basic anxiety through the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding expressions of love. The dourness and austerity of German emotional life results in a psychologically crippling and emptiness within. Second, given the general climate of harshness, criticality, and self-punishing attitudes running through the German national character, it is also very difficult for someone socialized within that culture to develop what Maslow referred to as growth motivation. Their milieu is poisonous towards a self-actualizing sense of motivation. Rather, they are imbued with a compulsive yet fundamentally insecure and frenetic attitude towards work. They have been socialized to be submissive yet to also regard submissiveness as "womanly." The German national character has its roots in the inculcation of deep-seated insecurities resulting in basic anxiety and deficiency motivation. These insecurities also make them extremely vulnerable to varying degrees of personality fragmentation and maladaption in the face of environmentally induced stress.

The socio-political forces that ultimately facilitated Hitler's's rise to power had their origins in the unresolved conflicts of Bismarck's Germany. Though the Iron Chancellor had succeeded in uniting the Germans under one regime, he did not create social unity. James M. Diehl describes this period and its consequences:

> A less teleological, and probably more accurate description of late Wilhelmine Germany is of an impacted society, composed of militant, mutually hostile, and rigidly encapsulated social and political blocs, capable of thwarting the ambitions of their opponents, but equally incapable of realizing their own. World War I and Germany's ultimate defeat upset the precarious equipoise.

Bismarck's response to the economic dislocations of the 1870s and their political ramifications was to seek the "second founding" of the Reich based upon state-supported nationalism, the identification of internal enemies targetted for suppression, and the introduction of economic policies geared towards shoring up the position of groups either belonging to or supportive of the Bismarckian regime.[30]

The Catholics originally targetted for the *Kulturkampf* were replaced in 1878 by Social Democrats with the passage of the antisocialist laws. The marginal position of the *Junker* class was protected with a high grain tariff passed in 1879. During the same period, Bismarck's regime began introducing some of the world's most progressive social welfare legislation in order to bleed off working class support for the Social Democrats. But despite these efforts, the Social Democrats continued to gain popular support at an exponential rate while the *Junkers* and bourgeoisie feuded over relative preferences in economic policies. The growth of social democratic mass support induced considerable anxiety among entrenched elite interests who attempted to counter the appeal of socialist ideas with an increasingly militaristic nationalism. They also sought to build mass-based organizations, drawing membership from the middle and lower-middle classes, the *Mittelstand*, as a counterweight to the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the unions, and working class organizations. Starting with the Farmer's League in 1893, this *Mittelstandpolitik* became the mainstay for generating popular support for state and dominant class interests. The German government sought to resolve its problems of conflicting economic and social interests through policies centred around imperialistic overseas colonial expansion (*Weltpolitik*). At the core of this programme was a massive naval expansion intended to make Germany a major sea power while winning the enthusiastic support of German commercial industrial interests. This naval build-up also led to a major arms race with Britain, while German colonial intentions added considerable additional friction with France. This policy moved the two Atlantic countries militarily closer to each other. These two sets of policies, *Weltpolitik* and *Mittelstandpolitik*, combined to form *Sammlungspolitik*, or policy of concentration.

But these efforts did not prevent the Social Democrats from again increasing their strength in the 1903 elections for the Reichstag. The right-wing panic set off a fresh round of efforts to find conservative counterweight organizations. This led to the formation of employer-controlled unions, rightist youth organizations which provided paramilitary training, grass-roots electoral organizations for right-wing parties, and conservative agricultural associations. But again, in 1912, the Social Democrats significantly increased their support. Though the right had constructed a formidable array of anti-socialist organizations, they had failed to halt the continued growth of socialist popular support or organizational strength. Instead, they had succeeded in building up a political culture centred on the ideological hostility of class-based mass organizations. In addition to its history of a class hostility, Wilhelmine Germany bequeathed to the Weimar Republic a tradition of intensive organizing around ideological and class positions. Further, the prewar militarization of German society introduced into its politics the habit of thinking in conflictual terms. This permeated all aspects of German society including the left with its highly disciplined mass organizations. The immediacy of militaristic thinking, even on the left, enhanced the degree of socio-political polarization. This too was part of the Wilhelmine legacy to its successor.

Despite these grave disadvantages, the Weimar Republic was not born doomed to failure. The 1918 Revolution offered the left the opportunity to secure a strong foundation for the new republic. Instead, the leadership of the Social Democrats destroyed the revolutionary support for both their own party and the new regime. The party leadership was transfixed by a dread of revolution at least as great as that felt by the privileged classes. Thus, when the revolution did come in November, 1918 the socialist leadership set about co-opting the newly formed workers' and soldiers' soviets while negotiating with the army high command for troops to suppress them.[34]

Like the provisional government in Russia, the socialist provisional government in Germany was completely unwilling to undertake any significant measures during the critical revolutionary period, partially because they were preoccupied by a legalistic need for a constituent assembly and lacked the political imagination and will necessary to deal effectively with crises beyond the scope of embryonic parliamentary democracies. Like their Menshevik and Social Revolutionary counterparts in Russia, the German Social Democrats frittered away the opportunities created by the revolutionary risings throughout the country to introduce a political order reinforced by the strong popular support of a significant portion of the population. Instead, they aborted their chance to endow the new republic with a passionate mass following. The Social Democratic government allowed and actively assisted the right-wing and reactionary elements to organize the Freikorps, Civil Guards and a host of other rightist paramilitary groups which put down the workers' political organizations by violent means.[12] Further, their unwillingness to pursue at least some necessary radical measures alienated the Independent Social Democrats (USPD), who had split off from the main party during the war over the issue of war credits, as well as significant portions of the main party's own rank and file. Large numbers from both these groups gradually shifted left-ward until they merged with the newly formed German Communist Party (KPD). Like the Russian Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, the German Social Democrats had become so fixated upon the routines and forms of parliamentary government, and the process of legitimation through a constituent assembly that they forgot the political necessities of their own as well as previous revolutionary periods. Both the Mensheviks in Russia and the Social Democrats in Germany failed to deal with the enemies of the new democratic governments. Both democratic regimes were overthrown and replaced by totalitarian ones, albeit from opposite extremes.

The Weimar Republic was a period of intense social conflict bordering on civil war. The failure of the Social Democrats to seek a conclusive victory over the class enemies of mass democracy left the latter's capacity to organize and mobilize anti-democratic elements intact. At the same time, the disunity of the left combined with the marked unwillingness of the Social Democrats to move beyond parliamentarism when circumstances demanded it resulted in progressive social forces often being victimized by rightist paramilitary groups. The intense hostility felt by the SPD and the KPD for each other undermined any possibility for sustained cooperation. Poisoned relations between the two major leftist parties continued right up to the Nazis takeover.

The failure of the SPD leadership to appreciate and seize the historic opportunity granted to them by the risings of November laid the foundations for Hitler's eventual victory. Had they at least tried to radically reorganize key elements of German society, specifically the armed forces and the principal economic trusts, then they would have given the new republic a fighting chance of survival against the reactionary forces, all of which had been left intact at the foundation of the Weimar Republic. The major questions unanswered so far concern the character of the forces which would either have displaced or taken over the Weimar Republic, and the kind of regime that would have replaced it. Even though, as time passed, it seemed increasingly probable that the republic would be followed by some sort of rightist authoritarian regime, nothing could have predicted what actually came.

Hitler and the Nazis were by no means unique in the immediate post-war era. Bavaria in particular was fertile ground for right-wing polemicists and groups, especially after the collapse of Kurt Eisner's Bavarian Soviet Republic. Even the ideology that Hitler propounded was in no way unique to them; these ideas had their roots in the pre-war nationalist movements. Nonetheless, the war had made a number of changes to German society, especially in Bavaria, that facilitated the rapid growth of groups espousing more militant versions of the pre-war rightist ideologies. Figuring prominently in this pre-war nationalist ideology had figured prominently "...a virulent anti-semitism, a blood-and-soil ideology, the notion of a master race, the idea of territorial, acquisition and settlement in the East. These ideas were embedded in a popular nationalism which was vigorously anti-modernist, anti-humanist and pseudo-religous."[33] Hitler did not invent the Nazis' ideology. He inherited it from the nationalistic conservative movements created by the reactionary elements in pre-war Wilhelmine Germany. What the war did do was to politicise significant portions of the German population that had been largely neglected by the previous era of political conflict.[34] The war had torn large numbers of young men out of traditional rural as well as urban communities and militarized their conception of themselves and life in general to such a point that they were unwilling or unable to "demobilize" psychologically at the end of the war. Instead, they joined paramilitary formations and sustained the appearance and style of a highly militarized way of life. These young and middle-aged men formed the membership of the various private, partisan militias that played such a significant role in the escalation of political violence during life of the Weimar Republic and helped propel Hitler to power.

Despite these favourable conditions, Hitler and the fortunes of the entire right were heavily dependent upon the general social and economic climate. There is a tremendous difference between a strong mass movement and a successful political party. The Nazis were successful in attracting significant numbers of followers because of their psychological appeal and organizational acumen. This did not necessarily translate into electoral support. This can be seen in the vote tallies recorded for the May and December elections in 1924.[illegible] In the period between the two elections, the currency had been stabilized and inflation brought under control, the Dawes Plan eased reparation burdens, American investment flowed in, the French withdrew from the Rhine and Germany joined the League of Nations under the terms of the Locarno settlement. Both the extreme left and right had exhausted their attempts to overthrow the Weimar Republic and political violence had began to abate. The aura of crisis was dissipating and a sense of normalcy was returning to ordinary life. The Social Democrats increased their vote from the May to December elections by thirty percent to nearly eight million. The Nazis and their rightist allies dropped to under a million from almost two million just seven months before.

Over the course of the next four years, the right continued to lose support.[illegible] By the 20 May, 1928 election, the Nazis were polling only 810 thousand votes out of thirty-one million cast and the rightist Nationalists had dropped to four from six million in the elections between 1924 and 1928. Conversely, the Social Democrats had improved by one and a quarter million to over nine million voters. But during the interim period, Hitler had built up the Nazi movement from 27,000 at the end of 1925 to 108,000 in 1928 and 178,000 in 1929. The decisive change in the Nazi movements' fortunes as an electoral party occurred with the Great Depression. As world trade sagged, German industrial production in 1932 had fallen to half its 1928 level. In a breath-taking leap, the

Nazi vote tally rocketed to 6,409,000 by the evening of the 14 September, 1930 election. At the other end, KPD support rose from 3,265,000 to 4,592,000 while the SPD and centrist parties lost a million voters apiece and the Nationalists fell by two million. The growth in votes occurred along with that of the organization; by the end of 1930 over a hundred thousand men were enrolled in the SA and SS alone. Nonetheless, it is vitally important to recognize that the strength of the Nazis as a movement both preceded and was in many ways necessary for its eventual strength as an electoral political party.

Weber's distinction between followers and adherents must be recalled.[37] The Nazis as a political party attracted the adherence of a wide range of Germans who were not emotionally involved in the movement. They supported the Nazis for a wide array of reasons, not the least of which was the appearance the Nazis projected of being able to suppress the Communists and Social Democrats. This electoral support was won by the Nazis from liberal and agrarian *mittelstand* parties whose decline mirrored the Nazis' rise. But this support was not the core phenomenon. What was the central feature of Nazism was its charismatic character. As was argued in Chapter Five, Hitler possessed a destructive narcissistic personality and projected an ideal image absorbed by ideal hungry followers. What was important was not that the phenomenon occurred but its scale. In addition to the widespread state of social crisis and class hostility, along with a well established tradition of rightist social movements, the war had created two generational cohorts predisposed towards extremist and authoritarian politics: the generation of military-aged men who had fought in the war, and the younger group who grew up during the war and its immediate aftermath. Peter H. Merkl states:

> According to the official party statistics, exactly one-third of the Nazis who had joined by January 1933 were actually veterans. Of the two-thirds who were not, the vast majority--almost exactly one-half of the total membership--had been too young to serve in the war. The rest were either too old or had managed to avoid the draft for other reasons.

These two cohorts provided the substance to the Nazis movement long before it began its rapid growth in electoral popularity. The eventual success of the Nazis at the polls derived from their already established success as a mass movement.

The critical experiences for the wartime generation obviously included the war. But in addition, they also endured the social traumas brought about by the fighting with the left in the immediate post-war era, the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, and the heightened polarization of German society under the Weimar Republic. As Merkl put it, "World War One threw a long shadow over the first five years of the republic, a field-gray shadow of uniforms and warlike behavior in domestic politics which nearly overthrew the Weimar Republic in 1920 and again in 1923."[39] In his analysis of the Theodore Abel collection of autobiographical essays by Nazis party members, Merkl finds that the above events were the most significant episodes in the lives of those old enough to experience them.[40] The war had created a sense of community and brotherhood among the soldiers which transcended anything they had experienced before. Thus, when what passed for peace finally came, many of the veterans were unwilling to surrender the intensely powerful bonds and instead transferred them to the Freikorps, veterans groups, and eventually to the various armed militias such as the Nazis' SA. This cohort showed the greatest degree of allegiance towards the rightist ideologies of pre-war Germany and were early supporters of groups like the Nazis espousing more militant versions in the post-war era.

As important as the wartime generation was to the early growth and success of the Nazis in Bavaria and Western Germany, it was the Nazi appeal as a movement to youth that propelled them into power. The critical importance of youth support to the rise of the Nazis between 1928 and 1933 has already been noted by a number of authors. Peter Loewenberg notes:

> The comparative age structure of the Nazi movement also tells a story of youthful preponderance on the extreme right. According to the Reich's census of 1933, those 18 to 30 constituted 31.1 percent of the German population. The proportion of National Socialist party members of this age group rose from 37.6 percent in 1931 to 42.42 percent a year later, on the eve of power. "The National Socialist party,"[41] says sociologist Hans Gerth, "could truthfully boast of being a 'young party.'"

The key to understanding the rise of rightist movements generally and Hitler's eventual domination of them through the Nazis lies in perceiving what attracted so many German youths to groups with such ideologies. These causes were themselves the psychological consequences of wartime and postwar traumatic experiences. Perhaps the single most important disruption caused by the war was the withdrawal of fathers from the lives of their young sons.[42] This had a number of psychological consequences. First, these children grew up with an often idealized and romantic view of what their fathers, uncles, and elder brothers were doing and experiencing at the front. While it is natural that small boys should play "soldier" (at least in that era), this was also the only way they could gain a sense of identification. Thus, young boys displaced their feelings of love and need onto a highly militarized conception of their fathers. The absence of fathers and adult men generally precluded the formation of wholesome adolescent masculine identities through direct observation and role-modelling. So, instead of such identities being formed through familial relationships with mature men, they came into being through the play-acting of young adolescents trying to create a sense of what their adult relations are like. Given the tendency of virtually all patriarchal cultures to romanticize hyper-masculinity, especially during wartime, German children and youths were being exposed to a fundamentally false but seductive image of what men are and ought to be like. Having absorbed these misleading images, as adult men to play out their own conduct in accord with the models they had learned as adolescents.

In addition to the absence of fathers, many children were also deprived of maternal care and supervision by the necessities of wartime labour shortages.[43] While this seems less significant in scope compared to the absence of fathers, it may have had a major impact in terms of creating long-standing separation anxieties among the affected boys and adolescents. These, in turn, translate into a general preoccupation with the need for stability and order. Separation anxiety induces a neediness for secure ties and bonds. This reinforces the importance of peer-group ties.

A final major consequence of the war was the widespread experience of hunger among the German population as a whole and of children in particular.[44] As Maslow and others have pointed out, severe deprivation at a formative stage can have lasting psychological implications. From the winter of 1917 through to the final lifting of the wartime blockade on 12 July 1919, famine and malnutrition were constant concerns for the German population. Given the importance of group ties to feelings of security, it would be only natural for German youth culture of the post-war era to be characterized by high degrees of group affiliations and bonds. This is precisely what one finds. To an almost unbelievable extent, German youth were organized into mass youth organizations characterized by high degrees of mysticism, belief in leaders, and feelings of group allegiance.[45] In many ways the role of the adult father had been displaced onto the group and the group leader. Thus, for the post-war generation, their whole psychological experience geared them towards ready acceptance of an individual capable of presenting a hyper-masculine and patriarchal persona as their group leader. This was precisely what Hitler did.

But beyond his persona, Hitler also possessed certain extraordinary talents which considerably facilitated his ability to induce the formation of charismatic attachments by potential followers. Even without Hitler, German youth and men were formed into militarized mass political movements of both the left and the right. What Hitler provided was the advantage to one particular rightist group: the Nazis. Hitler had his start in politics as an operative for the Political Department of the *Reichswehr* in Bavaria.[46] One of the tiny groups he was sent to spy on was the German Workers' Party organized by Anton Drexler and Karl Harrer. After considerable pondering, Hitler joined. Already members were Ernst Roehm, future leader of the SA. and Dietrich Eckart, Hitler's mentor and benefactor. Although Harrer was to claim that Hitler was a poor public speaker,[47] other accounts describe his first attempts as masterful and irresistible.[48] He seemed to possess an intuitive sensitivity to the emotional temperament and reactions of his audience to things he said and gestures he made. Hitler's speaking style lacked literary grace or substantive content. Nonetheless, he was capable of building up waves of emotional responses from the crowds to which he spoke.[49] Hitler's technique rested upon a combination of flattery, hatemongering, self-adulation, and proclamation of a supreme shared task.[50] Hitler would relax and win over his audiences by praising some special quality they shared in common. This also served to establish or strengthen their sense of group identity. He would recognize their often abased condition as being the result of devious conspiracies undertaken by powerful evil groups, such as Jews and Bolsheviks. Hitler would then engage in progressively more histrionic self-adulation. He would note his own hardships in order to create a sense of common bonding with the badly off in the audience and to stress how far he personally had come. He would cast a heroic image of himself they could identify with and turn to for guidance, comfort and leadership. He would then proclaim the sacred destiny of Germany under his leadership and demand his listeners' support and allegiance. Hitler possessed a genuine artistic genius when it came to manipulating crowds with words and staging. He used his capacity to sense audience reaction and staging. He used his capacity to sense audience reaction to guide and lead him through his speeches, thereby enabling him to create and direct the ecstatic crowd responses so typical of Nazi rallies and meetings.[51]

This capacity to read and manipulate emotions was also in evidence in his dealings with individuals.[52] He was also capable of remarkable displays of acting ability. Ronald E. Riggio describes a set of traits including expressivity, sensitivity, and self-control which Hitler had developed to exceptional degrees.[53] In addition, he was also a "high self-monitorer: which means that he maintained a continuous awareness of himself in his situational context and a sense of what was appropriate behavior under the circumstances, given his intentions.[54] Hitler also resorted to constant use of flattery and his own version of the "Johnson Treatment" of which his own behavior was a more extreme, and effective, variation. Hitler possessed and constantly used his insight into the vanities and psychological inadequacies of others as the basis for manipulating them into agreement, cooperation and subordinate positions. This talent enabled him to obtain the sycophantic loyalty of his immediate entourage. It also allowed him to manipulate Daladier, Chamberlain and possibly Stalin into profoundly disadvantageous diplomatic agreements, as the world was later to discover.

The history of the Weimar Republic strongly suggests that some form of rightist authoritarian group would have come to power eventually. Though this is obviously not a certain claim, politicians like Franz von Papen and others were clearly seeking a new political order considerably further to the right of the Weimar Republic. But given this, there is a significant difference between a rightist authoritarian government and the Nazis. Despite the massive repression that characterized both Franco's Spain and Mussolini's Italy, neither introduced the kind of genocidal practices that marked the Nazis, nor did any of the rightist governments in Europe at that time exhibit the same kind of territorial aggressiveness that Germany displayed. While it seems highly probable that the Germans would have sought revisions to the Versailles Treaty, the assumption that they would have pursued a policy of global war is untenable. Even though some measure of repression would almost certainly have followed a clear rightist victory, there is no reason for believing that it would have had the gas chambers and concentration camps of the Nazis. In the absence of Hitler, the rightist forces would have lacked a central focus and a powerful communicator their ideology. It would almost certainly not have reflected the almost demonic qualities which Hitler imparted first to the right and then to all of Germany once it came under his leadership.

Most historians stress the impact of Hitler's charisma upon Germany after he came to power. But it was his charisma that first enabled him to rise out of the fervid political mass of post-war Munich in the first place. Whereas Lenin had used opportunities to create an event that without him would never have happened, Hitler used his opportunities to take advantage of general currents heading in the direction he wished to go. Though Hitler undertook a considerable array of actions which further undermined the Weimar Republic, for the most part he was exploiting strong tendencies which already existed. The final crises of the Weimar Republic, including the clashed between rightist paramilitary groups and their adversaries, could well have occurred under a different group of rightist politicians. But Hitler was instrumentally necessary for the rise of the Nazis and their particularly virulent form of mystical nationalism. Hitler created the Nazis movement and was responsible for its growth and popularity. He led it to prominence even though other rightist organizations like the *Stahlhelm* were already popular and in place at the outset. Hitler's genius for propaganda, organization, and fund-raising gave the Nazi movement the crucial advantages to rise above its other rightist rivals. Unlike Lenin, Hitler was not pivotal in securing victory for his ideological bloc. But like Lenin, he was responsible for ensuring that his particular organization prevailed over all the others.

The full implications of Hitler's personal victory were not felt until after the passage of the Enabling Act on 23 March 1933.[55] Thereafter, Hitler was absolute dictator and quickly set about using his powers to eliminate the existing social institutions which might have impeded or opposed his rule. State governments were replaced with Reich governors, the leftist parties were suppressed while the rightist ones dissolved themselves. The mighty German labour unions were given a tremendous May Day celebration by the new state and then hammered out of existence the very next day with arrests, occupations and confiscations of union assets. The anti-semitic terror had been unleashed the previous month on April Fool's Day with a national boycott of Jewish establishments, mass beatings and intimidation. Though the Hitlerian regime was firmly in place, one bit of internal party business still had to be tidied up: The SA. and the left Nazis had to be destroyed. Once this had been accomplished on "the Night of the Long Knives," Hitler was left absolute dictator and the process of nazification of German society began in earnest.

This too had profound psychological consequences. The restabilization of German society was achieved concomitant with the systematic victimization of significant out-groups, most notably Jews and socialists. G. W. Allport, J. S. Bruner and E. M. Jandorf discuss the psychological impact of Hitler's rise to power.[56] The authors examined the retrospective biographies of ninety subjects discussing changes induced by the Nazi Revolution. This group was 67.7% Jewish, and 72% belonged to either the upper middle class, middle class or intelligentsia. As may be expected, their view of the Nazi Revolution stands in sharp contrast to Merkl's Nazi party members. Nonetheless, their experiences highlight a number of critical points. First, even though the authors found remarkable stability over time in basic character traits, they noted that the subjects underwent sharp changes in attitudes and behavior. These attitudes both reflected and intensified the polarization of political sentiment either for or against the Nazis. Second, they failed in their attempt to fit their data to the aggression-frustration model even when heavily modifies. Strikingly, their findings of passive resignation and withdrawal are precisely those predicted by Seligman's theory.[57] Finally, the data reflects the often forlorn attempts of subjects to adjust to the new circumstances in some fashion that sustained the illusions of normalcy. But, unlike the potential Nazis, these individuals had neither leader nor movement - only death or flight.

The Nazis are virtually the archetype of a charismatic movement just as Hitler is that of a charismatic leader. His written or spoken word was taken as possessing the force of law with the power to immediately cancel out any statutes or court decisions.[58] His psychological hold upon his immediate circle of followers was mesmeric. Even though factionalism was endemic within the Nazi movement, no faction or other leader successfully resisted Hitler nor even sought to when he turned against them.[59] The key to Hitler's strategy of winning power was his use of his charismatic abilities to disseminate a personalistic organization-building ideology with himself as the group leader.[60] From the outset, he secured complete control for himself over all decision-making and executive functions so that he became a combination of absolute dictator and high priest.[61] The entire Nazi organizational system was based upon a linear hierarchy of absolute personal allegiance and dependence of subordinates upon superiors. He made masterful use of rituals and symbols to create a sense of internal shared identity and, like Lenin, reinforced this by polarizing feelings against some designated out-group. Continuous activity within the movement and conflict with others outside reinforced these comradely bonds. He manipulated wealthy individuals and the rich as a class in order to get resources for the movement. This combination of devoted following, thorough organization and resources provided Hitler with the springboard from which to leap into positions of state power.

Hitler's greatest asset in his dealings with rightist allies was their desire to believe that what he said to them was somehow more truthful than what he said to his own supporters; that though he lied, he would not lie to them. The resilient belief among rightists within and outside Germany that an accommodation could be reached with Hitler rested upon viewing him as bellicose but essentially a bluff-maker. They had confused Hitler with Bismarck. Hitler used his uncanny ability to facilitate false impressions to pacify his opponents until he was ready to strike. He was a master of manipulating others' wishful thinking. What made him dangerous was not simply his ability to lie well but his even more important talent for encouraging others to believe their own self-deceptions. Hitler combined his genius for psychological insight and manipulation with his talent for organization building to move him step by methodical step out of basement meeting rooms suitable for a tiny party to the assembly halls of a mass movement and eventually into the cabinet rooms of a major world power.

Both Lenin and Hitler were master practitioners of a new form of political warfare: organizational conquest. Lenin pioneered the techniques of party-bureaucratic organization in the context of a revolutionary movement. He created for Marxism a sharp sword by forging his organization along bureaucratic principles. His genius lay in the adroit use he put this weapon to in 1917. Hitler pioneered the fusion of mystical evangelism and a medieval conception of fealty and allegiance with paramilitary organization under the absolute authority of the Leader, or *Fuhrerprinzip*.[42] Through their respective innovations, both created radically different kinds of organizations based upon virtually opposite principles which nonetheless succeeded in reshaping their countries and the world in ways that would have been impossible had they, the Bolshevik and Nazi parties, not existed. Neither leader nor group created the essential conditions within which they worked but both transformed them into opportunities through which they were able to win power and substantially achieve their grand designs.

The histories of the Bolshevik revolution and the rise of the Nazis to power dramatize the interdependent relationship between the exceptional leaders of well organized movements and the times of crisis during which they manifest their talents. Neither Lenin nor Hitler could have achieved his historical project had broader social forces not created the conditions necessary for his success. It was the absence of adequate or effective reformist leadership during stable times that allowed conditions to arise under the pressures of crisis that allowed them to seize power. Neither overthrew an established regime. Necessary preconditions the for successful overthrow of liberal-democratic regimes by extremist seizures of power are the absence of strong institutions, well established elites favourably disposed towards the order, supportive mass organizations, loyal military and police forces, and a unified leadership willing to undertake decisive measures in defense of the regime. Both struck at newly founded and still tentative liberal-democratic regimes arising in societies lacking suitable political traditions. The two slaughtered the political equivalent of unguarded infants. Given these, the histories of the two periods stresses the crucial role of leaders.

Neither the Bolsheviks nor the Nazis would have existed as significant parties without Lenin and Hitler, respectively.. Both understood the crucial role and use of ideology and propaganda as means of attracting popular support to their own movements while undermining their opponents. Each possessed exceptional skills essential to the ultimate success of both groups. Both had the will and personality necessary for establishing and exerting psychological control over others. Each played a crucial and indispensable role in the winning of power for himself and his movement. Had either not been present at his respective juncture in history, or had behaved differently, then the modern world would be dramatically different. It is this that established the importance of the leader's personality as a crucial variable in the outcome of transformative social crises. This is the reason why the study of leadership and the psychological foundations of leader-follower relationships is so essential to understanding the processes of social change and politics generally.

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CONCLUSION

Despite the self-evident benefits of specialization and a narrow research focus, there are significant attendant draw-backs. One of these is an inability to easily perceive the explanatory linkages between different areas of study and a single but highly complex phenomenon. The case of charisma exemplifies this point. Any adequate account of it must bring together theories and findings crossing over a wide range of specialized fields. This thesis had attempted to do so. It began in Chapter One began with a review of general theories of leadership followed in Chapter Two with an examination of the major psychological explanations for human motivation. Chapter Three examined leader motivation and its roots in greater detail while Chapter Four looked at the various leader personality types said to characterize leaders and resulting from the different motivational patterns. Chapter Five focussed on explaining charismatic attachment as a psychological phenomenon occurring primarily in the minds of followers but often facilitated by particular kinds of leaders. Chapter Six reviewed the dominant theories of social change emphasizing their interrelationships and the importance to them of leadership as a social phenomenon. The last chapter provided case-studies on two particular but very different kinds of charismatic leaders. This thesis presents an account of charisma in which it tries to integrate different psychological and sociological theories in order to create an integrated understanding of the phenomenon.

Perhaps the most important contribution this work makes to the field is that it has shown the explanatory value of integrating different approaches to the study of leadership. The current absence of a guiding paradigm is the single greatest obstacle facing any student of leadership. As pointed out in the introduction, leadership can be understood as a kind of interpersonal relationship and as a set of functions operating within the context of organized groups. The first addresses what leadership is while the second seeks to explain why it occurs. In the former case, leadership is understood as a psychological relationship between two or more individuals forming a group where one exerts a disproportionate amount of influence over the actions and thinking of the others. The latter focusses upon the roles, functions and characteristics of effective group or organizational leadership. These kinds of studies dominate the field of leadership. In a very important sense, the study of political leadership is simply organizational leadership within a specific institutional context. In the Western polyarchies, it is one of electoral parties and legislative assemblies. In the Soviet Union and other communist countries, it is that of the one-party state. Developing societies have their own varied structures. Organizational Norms and mores mediate leader-follower relationships occurring within institutional contexts. This perspective readily explains the behavior of most politicians operating within stable institutional frameworks. Even societies marked by relatively high levels of political instability may still be governed by stable expectations of behavior if the recurrent crises follow a consistent pattern. The difficulty with this view is that it fails to explain how leadership operates when the institutional framework itself has fallen apart. This is why an account of charisma is essential to any comprehensive explanation of leadership.

The domination of modern political science by macro-societal explanations has led to a systematic under-valuation of the role of individuals in generating political outcomes. This reductionist strategy is largely justified by the rule-bound and customary behavior of most political actors as a result of institutional selection and socialization. The progressive rationalization and formalization of political life through legislation, the growth of institutionalized relationships between groups and bureaucracies, and the use of social scientific marketing technologies all serve to diminish the importance of personality in all but the most senior institutional office-holders. It is possible for a highly organized institutional order to compensate for weak or inadequate leadership at the very top. Most bourgeois polyarchies and communist oligarchies possess this capacity, as attested to by the tenures of Richard Nixon during the Watergate crisis, Ronald Reagan throughout most of his presidency, the latter years of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and his successor Konstantin Chernenko. Though both these kinds of regimes certainly benefit from popular and competent leaders, they are less dependent upon the individual abilities of their regimes' rulers than more personalistic orders such as the old autocratic monarchies. This capacity to limit the adverse consequences of inadequate or poor leadership is one of the major advantages possessed by institutional regimes competing against personalistic ones.

So long as the structures of a regime are able to adapt effectively to their environment, leaders will remain subject to and constrained by institutional roles and expectations. It is the degree of environmental volatility that determines the extent of an institution's dependency upon the personal qualities of its elite members. When the environment has become so volatile that the institutional order can no longer adapt or has collapsed, the personal qualities of leaders become paramount in determining how the remaining or newly created social groups respond to the state of crisis. Leaders who may have been excellent under normal circumstances, like Kerensky, are often shoved aside by ones who could not have prevailed against strong institutional regimes but can succeed in winning power in the midst of a crisis. Some of these, like Lenin, also succeed in consolidating power and founding new institutional orders. The qualities possessed by these kinds of leaders fit those specified by Weber as falling under the rubric "charisma."

Two important points must be remembered. First, there is no guarantee that a person with such capacities will arise *and* prove successful in dealing with the substantive causes of the crisis. The ability to appeal crowds or large masses for support does not imply an ability to solve substantive problems. Crises do *not* always generate leaders able to resolve them effectively. Second, the very psychological qualities that make a person a potentially charismatic leader under crisis conditions may act to handicap or preclude her or him from achieving positions of authority and power under normal circumstances. Clearly, this limitation does not apply to individuals like Roosevelt but it does point to the difficulties likely to be experienced by a Hitler were he to attempt to win supporters in a generally well contented society. The occurrence of a crisis in no way ensures the presence of an exceptional leader. Similarly, possession of remarkable talents and motivation also does not guarantee elevation to power positions if conditions are unfavourable.

Stable social organization provides two important qualities which make them invaluable to human beings. First, they convey a set of shared expectations which serve to facilitate and coordinate cooperative behavior. Second, they provide a material context within which these behaviors can occur. When societies begin to break down, even the simplest and most basic of needs become extremely difficult to meet. These conditions give rise to feelings of intense anxiety and disorientation. People suffering from these feelings are inordinately susceptible to domination or influence by others who offer clear directions and a coherent worldview. But the capacity to convey such directions and views is itself rooted in certain psychological predispositions which may precede or occur as a consequence of the state of crisis.

Unlike organizational leadership, revolutionary charismatic leadership provides both a new value system as well as a new organizational context through which to coordinate social cooperation. The charismatic leader differs from the organizational one in that he or she possesses a value system and "right to obedience" independent of the existing or prior authority structure. It was to this autonomous sense of authority that Weber alluded in his reference to the leader's self-perceived calling. The charismatic leader appeals directly to the same foundational beliefs that undergird the organizational structure. This capacity to evoke a society's primary values underlies the charismatic leader's capacity to repair a damaged authority structure or facilitate the introduction of a new one. Successful charismatic leadership provides the foundational beliefs and organizational structure around which a new institutional order can grow. Ideology, charismatic legitimacy and bureaucratic routinization transform revolutionary charismatic regimes into institutionalized dominant power structures. Revolutionary charismatic domination is the embryo out of which both the traditional and legal-rational varieties of authority emerge.

This work also implies answers to questions which have not been formally asked. For example, an obvious extension of the concluding chapter would be to reformist charismatic leaders such as Gandhi and Roosevelt. From there it would be only natural to examine the bases for popularity of politicians operating under normal circumstances and compare how these differ from those of charismatic leaders operating under crisis conditions. The chapters on leader motivation can serve usefully as the tasks for understanding the behavior of politicians rising up the institutional hierarchies of different societies. This kind of analysis would point to similarities and differences in leader selection based upon the degree of congruence of personality-types, institutionalized roles and the political system.

This thesis also emphasized the importance of studying follower motivations as a critical factor in explaining the rise and degree of success of different leaders and groups. Although political and organizational activists have been a major focus of research, there is virtually no work geared towards explaining why some individuals develop intense emotional attachments to particular causes, organizations, ideologies or personalities. But such people invariably constitute the "hard-core" of virtually all movements and parties regardless of whether or not they achieve political significance. The fact that these kinds of individuals often seem to gain attention as a result of some type of aberrant religious behavior disguised their presence in and importance to all sorts of social organizations. Intense commitment to a cause, organization, ideology or another person is not necessarily indicative of psychopathology. But it is also different from the behavior implied by assumptions of rational self-interest. Much of political science simply presumes that political activists act out of some form of "need gratification" without actually exploring what these needs are, how they maybe gratified and what consequences will be experienced by the political system as a result of such behavior. Insufficient attention has been paid to the different bases for political activism and the kinds of behavior they promote.

A point hinted at in the thesis but not pursued relates to how motivations affect the individual's predisposition to develop particular politically relevant skills which then become critical to defining her or his leader style. The question of skill as a result of personality development and motivation has been insufficiently explored in the literature. As for studying actual leaders facing historically significant problems, this thesis has pointed to the importance of personality as a critical factor governing their abilities and inabilities. Unfortunately, the psychobiographical literature shows a marked predisposition for concentrating upon those leaders who display aberrant or psychopathological behavior. It is just as important to know how someone as psychologically healthy as Roosevelt could achieve great accomplishments as it is to understand the mind of Hitler. One of the strengths of this thesis is that it has gone beyond the traditional Freudian explanations to look at the more modern and sophisticated accounts deriving from a broad spectrum of approaches. The failure to apply the new and sophisticated psychological theories to the study of political leadership is perhaps the greatest failing of political psychology. So much of the work in this field seems mired in controversies or questions settled or superseded decades earlier in the main discipline of psychology. This is the principal reason for the its often appalling lack of conceptual sophistication. These all represent areas of necessary further work highlighted by this thesis.

In addressing its core questions, this thesis has sought to go beyond the narrow boundaries of specific sub-disciplines and approach the topic with a comprehensive perspective because of the disjointed nature of research in the various fields involved in the study of leadership and related phenomena. It has sought to explain charismatic leadership by integrating work done in diverse areas. This was necessary because the partial or limited focus approaches which dominate the field do not explain more than the simplest components of leadership as a psycho-social phenomenon. If this work has shown the value of integrating theories and research findings from a wide range of disciplines, then it has at least partially fulfilled its *raison d'etre*.

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